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*B 1^ T37 



ALBERT E. HOGAN, LL.D., B.A. (Lond.) 














Whilb much has been written and said of late years, 
and rightly so, with regard to arbitration as a means of 
settling international disputes, little notice has been taken 
of the subject of pacific blockade. And yet during the 
last eighty years, pacific blockades have been the means of 
bringing a nxmiber of such disputes to a peaceful conclusion. 

It is strange that although Great Britain has been, 
perhaps more than any other nation, responsible for the 
development of the practice, there is no work in the English 
language dealing with it at any length. It was with a view 
to remedying this omission that this work was undertaken. 
The materials for it had to be collected in the odd times 
that a somewhat scant amoimt of leisure afforded during 
the last three years. If, therefore, the following pitges 
show any lack of proportion or arrangement the author 
trusts the long period over which their compilation has 
necessarily extended wiU be accepted as an excuse. 

That more and more use will be made of pacific blockade 
in the future can scarcely be doubted, but the rules for its 
proper conduct must be determined and generally accepted 
before it can attain its maximum of utility. The author 
therefore ventures to hope that the detailed examination 
of the method in which it has been conducted in the past 
which he has endeavoured to make in this work will not 
be without some value in determining its position in the 
sphere of International Law. Particular attention may, 
perhaps, be called to the accounts of the blockades of 
Nicaragua in 1842 and 1844, and of Greece in 1860. The 
first two contain a considerable amount of matter hitherto 
unpublished, while in the last the author has endeavoured 
to controvert the current and erroneous accounts of the 

A 2 




*of)6r4ti6li/ Th'e author has found considerable difficulty 
in the choice of a word to express the position of states 
which were neither blockading nor blockaded. The frequent 
necessity for the mention of such states made the use of 
a long phrase undesirable, while the term ' neutral ', with its 
connotation of the existence of war, was obviously un- 
suitable. In the circumstances he has fallen back on the 
use of the somewhat barbarous expression ' third states '. 

He hopes that the classified bibliography, which has 
been made as exhaustive as possible, will prove of use 
to any future students of the subject. 

His thanks are due to Mr. Maurice Gwyer, of All Souls 
College and of the Inner Temple, for his assistance in 
revising the work for the press. 






I. The Nature of Pacifio Blockade and its Atten- 
dant Problems 11 

II. The Classification of Pacific Blockades . .17 

in. The Legality of the Practice .... 21 

IV. Notice 32 

V. Treatment of the Ships of the Blockaded 

State 40 
VI. Treatment of the Ships of States unconnected 

with the Blockade 51 

Vn. Conclusions 70 



Greece, 1827 73 

Portugal, 1831 77 

The Netherlands, 1832-3 80 

Carthagbna, 1834 82 

New Granada, 1837 83 

Mexico, 1838 85 

The Argentine Confederation, 1838-40 .... 88 

San Salvador, 1842 . . 91 

Nicaragua, 1842 92 

Nicaragua, 1844 . . . 95 

The Argentine Confederation, 1845-60 .... 98 

Greece, 1850 106 



Gabta and Messina, 1860-1 114 

Brazil, 1862-3 117 

Bolivia, 1879 120 

Formosa, 1884-6 122 

Gbbeoe, 1886 ; 126 

Zanzibar, 1888-9 130 

SiAM, 1893 137 

Crete, 1897 142 

Venezuela, 1902-3 149 


Notices relatinq 

Netherlands, 1832-3 168 

\ New Granada, 1837 168 

^- Mexico, 1838 163 

The Argentine Confederation, 1838-40 . • .161 

Nicaragua, 1842 161 

Nicaragua, 1844 162 

The Argentine Confederation, 1846-60 . ' • . 166 

Greece, 1860 167 

Gaeta and Messina, 1860-1 170 

Formosa, 1884-6 171 

Greece, 1886 173 

Zanzibar, 1888-9 174 

SiAM, 1893 180 

Crete, 1897 182 

Venezuela, 1902-3 .183 


Thebb are only three works which deal with the subject of 
pacific blockade at any length, viz. : — 
Babjss : Le Blocus Pacifique (Toulouse, 1898). 
DuGBOCQ : Bepr^sailles en temps de paiz ; Blocus Pacifique 

(Paris, 1901). 
Falckb : Die Hauptperiode der sogenannten Friedensblokaden 
(Leipzig, 1891),! 

Of these Falcke goes into the greatest detail, but only treats 
of the pacific blockades up to the year 1850. He also fails to 
make any general statements as to the theoretical side of the 
subject, although discussing each blockade separately. 

Bards and Ducrocq go into detail far less than Falcke. The 
former is in places inaccurate and inclined to be biased by a 
certain amount of animus against Great Britain, but each contains 
a consideration of the various theoretical views on the subject. 

A number of other authors have dealt with the subject, but 
none of them go into any great detail. The most important 
are : — 

L'Annuairb db L'Institxjt db Dboit Intbbnational for 1887. 
BuLMEBiNCQ : ' Le blocus pacifique et ses eSets sur la propri6t^ 
priv6e,' article in Le Journal du Droit inUrruitional privi 
for 1884, pp. 669-83. 
Calvo : Le droit international (Paris, 1896), §§ 1814-59. 
Fauchillb : Du blocus maritime (Paris, 1882), pp. 38-67. 
Holland : Studies in International Law, pp. 130-50. 
Oppbnhbim : International Law (London, 1906), vol. ii, §§ 26-49.^ 

Other works dealing with the subject of pacific blockade 
generally are : — 
AssENSio : Les questions du droit maritime au congr^s de 

Naples, p. 43. 
Bluntschli : Das modeme Volkerrecht der civilisierten Staaten 
(1872), §§506-7. 

^ These three works are cited as Bar^, Ducrocq and Falcke respec- 

* These six works are cited as Annuaire, Bulmerincq, Calvo, Fauchille, 
Holland and Oppenheim respectively. 


BoKFiLS : Manuel de droit international public (4tli edition 

by Fauchille, 1906), §§ 986-94. 
BuLBCBBiNCQ : in Holtzendorff : Handbuch des Volkerrechts 

(1885-9), vol. iv, pp. 116 et seq. 
De Bubgh : The Elements of Maritime International Law 

(1868), pp. 120-1. 
Calvo : Dictionnaire de droit international (1885), t. i, 

p. 102. 
Cabnazza-Aman : Trait6 de droit international public, t. ii, 

p. 622. 
Cauchy : Le droit maritime international (1862), t. ii, pp. 

Deake : The Law of Blockade (1870), pp. 46-8. 
Desfagnet : Cours de droit international public (1894), pp. 

617 et seq. 
Febqusok : Manual of International Law, vol. ii, pp. 240-1. 
FiOBE : Trattato di diritto intemazionale pubblico, 2nd edition, 

t. ii, pp. 498-9. 
FiOBE : Nouveau droit international public (2nd edition, by 

Antoine, 1886), t. ii. No. 1231. 
FuI^ck-Bbentano bt Sobbi* : Prdcis du droit des gens (1887), 

book iii, p. 408. 
Geffckbn : 7th German and 4th French edition of Hefifter. 
Gessneb : Le droit des neutres sur mer, 1st edition, pp. 

Glass : Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, 

vol. xi, p. 458. 
Hall : International Law, 4th edition, § 121 ; 6th edition, pp. 

Hautefetjille : Des droits et des devoirs des nations neutres 

en temps de guerre, t. ii, pp. 269-74 et seq. 
Heefteb : Das europaische Volkerrecht der Gegenwart (7th 

edition, by Geffcken), 1882, pp. 237-8. 
Heffteb : Le droit international de I'Europe (3rd French 

edition, by Bergson, 1873), pp. 215-6. 
Lawbence : The Principles of International Law (1900), § 159, 

pp. 670-1. 
LiBBBECHT : La guerre maritime, pp. 114 et seq. 
F. DE Mabtens : Volkerrecht (1883), t. ii, p. 106. 
F. DE Mabtens : Trait6 de droit international (French edition 

by Leo, 1887), t. iii, pp. 165-76. 


De Nbgbin : Tratado elemental de derecho international marf- 

timo, p. 262. 
Von Neumann : Grundriss des heutigen europaischen Volker- 

rechts, p. 26, 
VoN Neumann : £l6ments du droit des gens modeme, 3rd 

edition, p. 142. 
Nys : La guerre maritime (1881), p. 69. 
Opfenheim : System des Volkerrechts, p. 265. 
Pbbbi^ : Das intemationale off entliche Seerecht der Gegenwart 

(1882), pp. 167-9. 
Billet : Les lois actuelles de la guerre, p. 143. 
PiSTOYB BT DuvBBDY : Trait6 des prises maritimes (1865), 

t. i, pp. 376 et seq. 
PBADiBB-FoDfiBfi : Traits de droit international public, 7 vols. 

(1885-97), t. V, No. 2483-9 ; t. vi, No. 2648. 
RiSLBY : Law of War (1897), pp. 62-4. 
EiviBB : Principes du droit des gens (1896), t. ii, pp. 198-9. 
RiviBB : Lehrbuch des Volkerrechts (1889), pp. 368 et seq. 
RouN : La Revue de Droit International et de Legislation 

compar6e for 1875, pp. 611-2. 
Smith, F. E. : International Law (1900), pp. 91-2. 
Snow : Ceases and Opinions of International Law (1893), p. 248. 
Taylob : A Treatise of International Public Law (1901), § 444. 
Testa : Le droit public international maritime, p. 229. 
Ullmann : Volkerreoht (1898), § 138. 
Wbstlakb: International Law, Part II, *War' (1907), pp. 

Whabton : A Digest of the International Law of the United 

States, vol. iii, § 364. 
Whbaton : Elements of International Law, 8th (Dana's) edition, 

1866, pp. 687-8. 
Whbaton : International Law (4th edition, by J. B. Attlay, 

1904), §§ 293 et seq. 
WooLSEY : Introduction to Study of International Law, 4th 

edition, pp. 442-4. 
WuBM : Staatslexicon, t. xii, p. 132. 

A brief bibliography of the various books and documents dealing 
with the blockades separately is given as a footnote to the title 
of each blockade in Part II. The works are divided into three 
classes : (a) the most important documents dealing directly 
with the blockade, such as the State Papers ; (&) the less 


important works dealing directly with the blockade ; (c) works 
dealing incidentally with the blockade. 

The following abbreviations are used in citing the following 
classes of documents : — ^B. S. P. : British State Papers ; P. R. O. 

No. — : Bundle of unpublished documents in the Public 

Record Office, London ; L. O. : London OazeUe. 

In the Appendix will be found the text of the notices which 
have been given of the various blockades. Every endeavour 
has been made to make this collection as complete as possible, 
but some gaps are unavoidable. 




The nature of an ordinary blockade in time of war is 
well known. Ships of war of one of the belligerents take up 
positions in which they can prevent all traffic by sea to and 
from certain of the ports or coasts of the other belligerent. 
The blockading force must be sufficiently powerful to 
effect its object, and notice must be given to those whose 
interests are affected, although there are differences of 
opinion as to the method in which such notice should 
be given. The object of such a blockade is to cut off 
a state from its supplies and paralyse its trade and indus- 
tries, and thus bring to bear a method of coercion which 
is felt by the great majority of its inhabitants. If vessels 
endeavour to enter or issue from the blockaded port they 
may be captured, taken before a prize court, and with their 
cargo condemned. 

But while these rights are allowed to a belligerent he is 
subjected also to certain disabilitieB. Thus, he may not 
make use of the ports and harbours of a neutral state as 
bases for his fleets : indeed, under the neutrality regula- 
tions of some states his vessels may not in general stop 
more than twenty-four hours in a neutral port, and may 
only take on board sufficient coal and provisions to enable 
them to reach the nearest port. These restrictions on the 
rights of a belligerent and the corresponding duties which 
they impose on neutrals are a comparatively modem addition 
to the law of nations. They may be said to have had their 
origin at the end of the eighteenth century in the declarations 
of the First Armed Neutrality and the first neutrality law 
of the United States, while the era of the great Napoleonic 
wars fostered their rapid growth. 

Previously the idea of neutrality was almost non-existent. 


Machiavelli, in The Prince, had laid down that it was the 
duty of a sovereign to side with one belligerent or the other 
when two nations were at war, and that little was to be 
gained from remaining neutral. 

As a matter of fact, belligerents took very little pains to 
respect any rights that neutrals might have until they were 
forced to do so by the growth of a new conception of neu- 
trality, and by the fact that the neutral states were becom- 
ing strong enough to see that their rights were respected. 
The gigantic burdens which modem warfare imposes upon 
a belligerent state have caused it to become a far more 
important question to consider whether the advantages to 
be derived from a war will counterbalance the disabilities 
which it necessarily entails. Especially is this the case 
when there is a great disparity in strength between the 
states that are parties to a dispute and the controversy is 
over some matter of Uttle moment. Some of the smaller 
states in the administration of their affairs do not always 
conform to the ordinary usages of International Law, and 
when called upon to make redress, defiantly refuse to do so, 
reljdng on their very weakness to protect them from any 
serious harm. In circumstances such as these it is often 
hardly worth while for a powerful state to go to war, and 
yet some means should exist of bringing the small state 
to reason and compelling it to act in accordance with inter- 
national ideas of righteous dealing. In ordinary municipal 
matters, if one citizen is injured by another he can obtain 
redress in the courts of his country, but in disputes between 
nations there is no superior power to which appeal can be 
made. All nations are in theory supposed to be on an 
equality, and if any dispute arises they have to settle it 
between themselves, either by diplomatic means or by 
arbitration, or by some method of compulsion. If it is 
not desired to go to war, some other method of compulsion ^ 

^ Cf. Oppenheim, ii, § 26 : * OompuLsive means of settlement of diffi- 
culties are measures containing a certain amount of compulsion taken 
by a state for the purpose of making another state consent to such settle- 
ment of a difficulty as is required by the former.' Also Hall, International 
Law, 4th ed., p. 302: ' The existence of a right to oppose acts contrary to 


must be used, and it is here that the practice of pacific 
blockade has proved so useful. Pacific blockade has been 
so called because of the similarity which it presents in certain 
features to an ordinary warlike blockade. There are, as 
the contrast in the epithets indicates, considerable differ- 
ences between the two, but the main idea, the coercion 
of a state by interference with its conmierce and supplies, 
is the same. Pacific blockade has been defined in the 
following terms : ' Le blocus pacifique n'est autre chose 
que la fermeture des ports ou de districts particuliers de la 
cote d'un pays, en dehors du cas de guerre d6clar6e et dans 
le but d'empecher les relations conmierciales maritimes.'^ 
To take an example : In June 1861 a British vessel was 
wrecked on the coast of Brazil ; the British consul, hearing 
of it some time afterwards, found on inquiry that much of 
the cargo that had come ashore had been broken into and 
stolen, and that there was a strong probability that the crew 
had been murdered. Repeated applications for investiga- 
tion and a payment by way of compensation were made- 
to the Brazilian (Jovemment, but peremptorily refused. It 
would have been strange if Great Britain had been compelled 
to go to war with Brazil to obtain the necessary compensa- 
tion, and her squadrons all over the world to be treated as 
belligerent by all other states although taking no active 
part whatever in the operations. It would also have been 
strange if Great Britain had been compelled to forgo her 
just claim for compensation because she was unwilling 
for so trifling a matter to inflict upon her commerce the 
great inconvenience which a state of war would have 
involved. But a way out of the difficulty was found. 
The British squadron in Brazilian waters blockaded Rio 
for a period of seven days, at the end of which time the 
Brazilian Government gave in.^ 

law, and to use force for the purpose when infractionfl are sufficiently 
serious, is a necessary condition of an efficient International Law.* 

* Annuaire, p. 277. Cf. Ducrocq, p. 59 : * Le blocus pacifique . . . 
consiste h, emp^her, au moyen de la force arm6e, toute communication 
avec les cotes et les ports d'un pays auquel on n'a pas d^lar6 la guerre.' 

• ' Correspondence respecting the plunder of the wreck of the British 


The same method of compulsion has also been used by 
the states composing the Concert of Europe to give effect 
to their policy in the Near East. Thus in 1886 the powers 
of Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Italy and 
Grermany blockaded the coasts of Greece to prevent that 
country going to war with Turkey.^ 

In neither of the above instances was it considered that 
a state of war existed between the respective states. Hence 
operations such as were then conducted have come to be 
known by the term ' pacific ' blockade, to distinguish them 
from the ordinary operation of war, which bears the name 
of blockade simply. 

The first use of this new weapon in the international 
armoury occurred in 1827, when Great Britain, France and 
Russia combined to blockade the coasts of what is now 
the kingdom of Greece, to put an end to the savage war of 
desolation and extermination which was then being waged 
by the Turks. But although since that time it has been 
employed by various powers in about a score of cases, the 
exact position which it occupies in International Law and 
the conditions under which it may be exercised have not 
yet been definitely and universally determined. The 
circumstances in which it has been employed have been 
so varied that there has been little uniformity of practice, 
and hence there is considerable difficulty in defining with 
any accuracy the rules by which its exercise ought to be 
governed. It is true that in 1887 the Institute of Inter- 
national Law, after a discussion of this subject, laid down 
certain propositions with regard to it ; ^ but although 
the views of such an eminent body of international jurists 
must always carry great weight, yet, on this occasion, 
they hardly seem to have paid sufficient attention to the 
practical difficulties of the subject, and, as a result, their 
declaration, while on the face of it appearing to be a deduc- 

barque Prince of Wales on the coast of BrazU in June 1861 ; and respecting 
the ill-treatment of three officers of H.M.S. Forte by the Brazilian police 
in June 1862.' B. S. P. 1863. 

* B. S. P. Greece, No. 4 (1886). 

• Annuaire, pp. 300-1. 


tion from the acknowledged rules of International Law, is 
not in accordance with tiie practice which, in the majority 
of cases, has attended pacific blockades in the past. As 
a matter of fact the roles on the subject are in the course 
of formation, and it is impossible to say decisively that 
this or that is right or wrong. Their final shape wOl un- 
doubtedly be determined by a compromise of the conflicting 
interests concerned, just as the various rules relating to war 
and neutraUty have been determined in the past. Meanwhile, 
it is the province of the jurist who wishes to advance the 
solution of what is to-day undoubtedly one of the most 
open questions of International Law to investigate the 
methods which have been used in the past, and ascertain 
with accuracy the facts upon which a^y of his conclusions 
must be based, and, when this is done, to define the prob- 
lems which await solution and endeavour as far as possible 
to state clearly the arguments on each side. 

The question of pacific blockade involves many problems 
which are stiU unanswered. It has first to be determined 
whether there can be such an operation as a pacific blockade 
at aU, or whether the term is but a misnomer and a cloak 
for an illegal form of coercion. Next, supposing it to be 
decided that a pacific blockade is legally possible, the 
method of conducting it must be considered ; whether 
notice is necessary or not, and, if so, to whom ; whether 
the blockading force need be ' effective ', and whether a 
blockade must extend to all kinds of merchandise or may 
be confined to particular varieties. Further, there is the 
extremely important question whether the blockade may 
or may not extend to the ships of third powers, and, if so, 
under what conditions : and connected with this is the 
further question as to what may be done with the vessels 
seized. May they be confiscated or merely detained, and, 
if the latter, is the captor responsible for any damage caused 
by the detention ? 

In the following chapters an endeavour will be made 
to investigate the problems indicated above, and to arrive, 
so far as is possible in a subject stiU perhaps in the transi- 
tional stage, at some definite conclusions with regard to 


them. In Part II an account will be given of the circum- 
stances which have preceded the various pacific blockades 
in the past and the manner in which they were actually 
carried out. Although this part of the work may seem 
to be beyond the province of the jurist and to usurp the 
functions of the historian, yet it is difficult and almost 
impossible without an impartial review of all essential 
fa^ts to ascertain the general principles which govern, or 
ought, it is submitted, to govern, the practice and conduct 
of a pacific blockade. 



.Although only about) twenty instances of pacific blockade 
have as yet occurred, the circumstances attending them 
show a considerable variety, and accordingly any attempt 
at classification is beset with difficulty. Many of the block- 
a4es have had little more in common than the fa^t that 
they were instituted at a time when the peaceful relations 
of the states concerned had not been broken oflE. It i^ 
difficult, for example, to find many points of similarity 
between the blockade of Gaeta and Messina in 1860-1 
by the ships of Piedmont-Sardinia, and that of Brazil 
by Great Britain a couple of years later, or between the 
blockade of Zanzibar by Great Britain, Germany and Italy 
in 1888-9 and that of Siam by France in 1893. 

Still one attempt at classification has been made> Pro- 
fessor Holland divides pacific blockades into three classes, 
according to the object with which they are entered into, 
and distinguishes them ' as aiming respectively at Reprisal, 
Intervention, and Suppression', i.e. 'instituted in order to 
obtain redress for an alleged wrong, or to enforce com- 
pliance with a line of policy which commends itself to the 
blockading power, or to queU usurped authority in the state's 
own territory.' ^ It is undoubtedly true that it is possible 
to trace these three motives as actuating the various powers 
who have from time to time instituted pacific blockades ; 
but the different motives from which the blockades are 
undertaken do not of themselves determine any difference^ 

^ Faloke, in his table of contents, divides the cases up to 1850 under 
(1) blockades, (2) reprisals, and (3) intervention, but does not appear 
to draw any distinction. Bulmerincq (p. 573) similarly classifies the 
blockades he mentions as (1) illegitimate interventions in internal 
affairs, (2) illegal reprisals, (3) blockade against one power for the wrong- 
doing of a third, (4) blockade in the blockading power's own interests. 

• HoUand, pp. 132 and 140. 


in the procedure. In the same way the conduct of a war 
is not affected by the fact that from a moral standpoint 
its inception was just or unjust^ A legal definition has 
nothing to do with ethical theory. Besides, in all three cases 
the determining motive is really the same — to impose the 
will of the blockading power on that blockaded without 
recourse to war. 

Further, it is more than doubtful whether the examples 
cited in the third of Professor Holland's classes really 
deserve the name of pacific blockades at all.^ The institution 
of a blockade implies two distinct powers, the one blockading 
and the other blockaded. If the port which is said to be 
blockaded belongs in fact to the state whose ships are 
blockading it, the operation is really nothing more or less 
than the closing of the port to maritime traffic by administra- 
tive action supported by the state forces. A state is master 
over its own territory and can determine to which of its 
ports its own vessels and those of foreign nations shall be 
admitted, and if it declares that certain ports are not to 
be open for ships it is at liberty to support its decree in its 
own waters by force.^ If other nations consider that such 
a declaration is more or less a sham, because the state can 
no longer maintain its authority in its own territory, their 
remedy is obvious. They can recognize the rebellious sub- 
jects of the blockading state as a belligerent community, as 
was done in the case of the Southern States in the American 
Civil War, whereupon the blockade would for all intents and 
purposes be treated as an operation of war and the recog- 
nizing states as neutrals. It is, however, difficult to see 

^ For a oritidsm disagreeing with this classification vide Oppenheim, 

* The blockade of the Southern States during the American Civil War 
was undoubtedly an operation of war. The remaining two cases, viz. 
the Circassian insurrection in 1836 (as to which vide Wheaton, Elemenis 
of IrUemaikmal Law, 8th (Dana's) edition, 1866, p. 688 n.) and Crete in 
1866-8, were really nothing more than oases of the administrative shutting 
of certain ports against its own subjects by the territorial sovereign. 

* Cf . Oppenheim, ii, § 44 : 'A blockade instituted by a state against such 
portions of its own territory as are in revolt is not a blockade for the purpose 
of settling international difficulties.' It is 'a matter of internal police '. 


any intermediate stage to which the term pacific blockade 
could rightly be applied. Either the so-called blockade 
is a perfectly legitimate exercise of a state's sovereignty 
over its own territory, or it is an operation of war involving 
the usual consequences. 

Although, therefore, pacific blockades can scarcely be 
classified according to the motives inducing them, it is 
curious to note that the distinction which Professor Holland 
draws between the first two of his classes corresponds 
with another distinction of some importance. In the 
majority of cases where reprisals have been the object, the 
blockade has been instituted by a single state, while in 
cases of intervention several powers have taken part. This 
is not, however, by any means necessarily the case. Several 
states may combine to seek reprisals by way of pacific 
blockade, as did Great Britain, Germany and Italy against 
Venezuela in 1902-3, while a single state may intervene by 
the same method in the affairs of another, as, for example, 
happened in the case of the blockade of Gaeta and Messina 
by Piedmont-Sardinia in 1860-1.^ 

The so-called Concert of Eiurope is a combination of the 
six powers Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Austria- 
Hungary and Russia, which has been formed to deal with 
Turkish affairs in the interest of the peace of Europe. It 
has gradually assumed the right of dictation, and other 
states are apparently willing to accept its hegemony^ and 
fall in with its suggestions. The course on which it decides 
in any particular instance may therefore be regarded as 
laid down, either expressly or impliedly, by the whole body 
of civilized states. In these circumstances a somewhat wider 
latitude might well be conceded in the case of a pacific 
blockade instituted by the Great Powers, or even by some 
of them, as ' a measure of police ' ^ to guard the peace of 
Europe, than in one which is entered upon by a single 
power. Thus a difference might be made in the treat- 

^ This blockade may, hoTvever, be confiidered a measure of war. 
' The term is used by Lawrence, Eaaaya on Disputed Questions in Inier- 
national Law, and Principles of IntemaHondl Law (1896), pp. 05-7. 
' Lord Curzon, March 25, 1897 (Hansard^ 4th series, vol. zlvii, col. 1311). 

B 2 


ment of the vessels of third states, their seizure being 
allowed when several powers are blockading, but not other- 

To draw such a distinction, however, would, of course, 
be a departiure from the view of Grotius and other jurists 
as to the equaUty of states ; but it must not be forgotten 
* that International Law is no cast-iron scheme into which 
facts must be fitted at any cost, but rather a body of rational 
principles capable of adjustment to new combinations of 
circumstances ', and that its rules are derived from the 
actual practice of modem states and are not to be deduced 
from an archaic system or theory which takes no accoimt 
of present-day conditions. 

^ Cf. Calvo, § 1869, and Holland, p, 145. 


Ik considermg whether by the existing rules of Interna- 
tional Law the practice of pacific blockade may be justified 
it is necessary in the first place to draw a distinction between 
the blockade itself and the incidents with which it is accom- 
panied. The mere fact that some act performed during 
the continuance of a blockade is illegal (contrary, that is, 
to accepted practice) does not necessarily render the blockade 
itself illegal. Again, if it is proved that a pacific blockade 
can in fact be instituted without a violation of the rules 
of International Law, that fact would not necessarily legalize 
all its incidents. This distinction is of importance because 
many writers ^ have pronounced pacific blockade illegal on 
the ground that the vessels of third states have been seized 
and confiscated. Thus in 1875 a committee of the members 
of the Institute of International Law, composed of MM. 
Bulmerincq, Bolin, Vidari, Westlak^ and Woolsey, had 
the following question under consideration : ' Le blocus 
pacifique constitue-t-il, suivant les regies du droit inter- 
national actuellement admises, un moyen de contrainte 
r^gulier pouvant donner lieu k la saisie et k la confiscation 
des navires qui tenteraient de le rompre ? ' The majority 
gave a negative answer.^ A pacific blockade can be con- 

* The tenn ' legal ' is used, although not striotly in aocordanoe with 
Atustinian usage, as equivalent to ' in accordance with the rules of Inter- 
national Law '• 

* Assensio, Les questions du droit maritime au conqrks de NaTples, p. 43 ; 
De Burgh, The Elements of Maritime IntemoHontd Law (1868), p. 120 ; 
F. de Martens, VdlkerrecJU (1883), t. ii, p. 105 ; Von Neumann, Grundriss 
des heuHgen efuropdischen VOlkerrechis, p. 26. Besides these writers, 
De Negrin {Tratado elemental de derecho international marUimo, p. 262), 
Oppenheim (System des Vdlkerreehts, p. 265), and Wurm (Staaidexicon, 
t. xii, p. 132) are against pacific blockade because they consider that it 
is inconsistent with the general principles of the liberty of commerce and 
navigation in time of peace. 

* Bevue de Droit international et de Liffidation comparSe, t. vii, 1875, 
pp. 611-2, * une extension illicite du droit de blocus dans la guerre.' 


ducted without any interference whatever with the vessels 
belonging to third states, as is witnessed by the blockades 
of Greece in 1850 and 1886, of the Tagus in 1831, the 
Netherlands in 1832-3 and Brazil in 1862-3. If, therefore, 
it can be shown that when so conducted a pacific blockade 
is in accordance with the rules of International Law, the 
whole practice ought not to be branded as illegal because 
of the occurrence in some cases of acts alleged to be illegaL 
Assuming for the moment that it is illegal to meddle with 
the vessels of third states, the argument of these opponents 
of pacific blockade might be stated as follows : Because 
a certain practice has in the past been sometimes accom- 
panied by incidents which are illegal, therefore that practice 
cannot in any circumstances be legal. Stated in this bald 
way the fallacy underlying this reasoning is obvious. It 
foUows that the solution of the question whether a pacific 
blockade is legally possible does not depend on the further 
question as to what treatment should be accorded to the 
vessels of third states during such blockade. This latter 
question will therefore be left for discussion in a subsequent 

Hautefeuille argues that blockade can only exist because 
of the conquest of an enemy's territory, and that, as con- 
quest can only take place in time of war, a blockade is 
necessarily an operation of war.^ But the premiss on which 
he bases his argument is unsound. Blockade does not 
exist on account of the conquest of an enemy's territory. 
In the first place it is somewhat doubtful whether a state 
has any territorial rights in the waters surrounding its shores. 
Next, even if it is assumed that territorial rights exist in 
such waters, it frequently happens that the cruisers of 
a blockading squadron are stationed outside this maritime 
zone. To quote one instance, Riga was blockaded by 

^ Hautefeuille, Des droits et des devoirs dea nations nmtres en temps de 
guerre mariUme^ 3rd ed., 1868, t. ii, p. 183 : ' Le blocus 6tajit le r^ultat 
de la conqu^ d'une partie du temtoire ennemi, et, par consequent, de 
rexercice du droit de la guerre, ne peut exister en temps de paix ; ' and 
again, p. 273: ' Admettre Texistence du blocus pacifique serait k mes yeux 
une violation de tous les prmcipes de la loi primitive et secondaire.' 


a ship sixty miles away, but this did not in the least affect 
the efficacy of the blockade. 

Other jurists deny the possibility of a blockade being 
carried on in time of peace. They assert that all acts of 
force are acts of war, and that the term pacific blockade 
involves a contradiction in terms. This view of the matter 
was put forward in 1827 by the Turkish authorities on the 
occasion of the first use of a pacific blockade, when the Beis 
Effendi made the well-known statement : ' C'est absolument 
comme si, cassant la tete d'un homme, je I'assurerais en 
meme temps de mon amitie.'^ The supporters of this 
argument include Bonfils,^ Calvo,^ FauchiUe,* MM. Funck- 
Brentano et Sorel,^ Gessner,® libbrecht,' F. de Martens,® 
Nys,» MM. Pistoye et Duverdy^^ and Testa.^ 

* Quoted by Holland, p. 137. 

' Mamtd de droit intemaHofud yiMic (4th ed., by FauohiUe, 1905), 
§ 992 : *' Nous pensons . . . que le blocus soi-disant paoifique ne peut se 
justifier, ni au nom de rhumanit6, ni au point de vne du bon sens ; ' and 
§ 993 : ' Au fond, c'est bel et bien un aote de guerre, un fait d'hostiIit6.' 

' § 1859 : * Tout d'abord, le blocus pacifique nous semble un aote 
inoontestablement agressif, hostile et portant gravement atteinte aux 
droits imprescriptibles de tout 6tat ind^pendant ; en un mot, un acte de 

* p. 38 : ' Le blocus ne peut exister qu'en temps de guerre, il ne peut pas 
y avoir de blocus en temps de paix: les pr^tendus blocus pacifiques 
n'existent pas.' 

* Precis du droit des gens (1887), iii, p. 408 : * Le blocus pacifique . . . 
constitue, sous quelque forme qu'il soit pr6sent6, un veritable aote de 

' Le droit dea neutrea sti/r mer (1st ed., Berlin, 1865), pp. 215-23: 
* En effet I'^tablissement d'un blocus 6tant I'emploi de la force ... est 
un acte d'hostilit6 qui constitue [I'^t] en 6tat de guerre.' 

' La guerre maritime, pp. 114 et seq. 

* Traiti de droit international (French translation by Leo, 1887), p. 177 : 
*Nous ne croyons pas que le droit international modeme reconnaisse 
le blocus pacifique comme un moyen l^time de contrainte dans les 
relations entre les peuples.' 

* La guerre maritime, p. 69 (Bruxelles et Leipzig, 1881) : ' Le blocus est 
un acte de guerre. Le terme de blocus paoifique implique ainsl con- 

^* Traite des prises maritimes (1855), t. i, pp. 376 et seq. : ' On n'a pas 
d6clai4 la guerre, mais on la fait r^Uement.' 
" Le droit pMic intemaHondl mariUme, p. 229: 'Ce genre de blocus . . , 


Many statesmen, also, could be quoted to somewhat 
similar effect. Mr. Balfour, for example, speaking in the 
House of Commons on the subject of the Venezuelan 
blockade, said, ' I think it is very likely that the United 
States will think there can be no such thing as a pacific 
blockade, and I personally take the same view. Evidently 
a blockade does involve a state of war.'^ The idea behind 
this and ether similar statements is that the use of force 
is incompatible with the continuance of a state of peace. 
Against this must be put the fact that International Law 
recognizes that embargo, retorsion, and reprisals, which 
are acts of force, may be carried on during peace. Indeed 
Bynkershoek says, ' observa represaliis locum non esse nisi 
in pace.' ^ 

Reprisals are of very ancient origin, the expression 
occurring in a treaty between France and England in 1360.^ 
They consist in the violation by one state of the right of 
another by an act of force in order to induce the latter to 
give up some line of conduct which is displeasing to the 
former, or to make reparation for some injiury which it has 
committed.^ A good example is afforded by an incident 
in the time of the Commonwealth. English seamen had 
suffered various wrongs at the hands of the French, and 
Cromwell found it impossible to obtain redress. In these 
circumstances the English fleet was sent out into the Channel 
and some French merchant vessels were seized. These 
were sold, the claims of the English seamen satisfied, and 
the balance, with a strict account of the transaction, sent 
to the French Government of the day. Many other instances 
of reprisals might be cited, but the above shows clearly 
that acts of force within certain limits are permitted by 
international usage in time of peace, and do not prevent its 

ne peut Stare regard^ oomme l^al . . . H n'y a done qu'ime seule esp^ 
de bloous.' 

^ Hansard, 4th series, vol. oxvi, ool. 1490, Dec. 17, 1902. 

' Bynkershoek, QuaesHanes iwria pMid^ i, 1, c. 24. 

• Cited by Ducrooq, p. 9. 

' Cf . Oppenheim, ii, § 33 : ' Reprisals are otherwise illegal acts per- 
formed by a state for the purpose of obtaining justice for an international 
delinquency by taking the law into its own hands.' 


continuance. Admitting this principle, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to say that there is any degree of violence which 
is incompatible with a state of peace,^ and it therefore 
follows that the employment of acts of force does not 
make a pacific blockade incompatible with a state of peace. 
M. Bulmerincq ^ sums up the matter in the following pas- 
sage : ' Que le blocus soit, en regie g6n^rale, un acte de 
guerre, c'est ce que personne ne pent contester, mais il 
n'a point n^cessairement ce caractere. Done il n'est point 
vrai que le blocus, parce qu'il est un acte de violence, ne 
puisse etre pratiqu6 par les nations en paix, car autrement 
la retorsion et les represailles devraient etre respectivement 
interdites quand ils s'exercent par la force entre nations en 
etat de paix ; et cependant ce n'est point le cas d'apres 
le droit des gens. Au contraire, il est loisible aux £tats 
d'employer de semblables moyens avant de recourir au 
moyen extreme, la guerre, car c'est seulement la guerre, 
et non point le blocus, qui est le dernier moyen.' 

Another argument which is sometimes alleged against 
the legality of pacific blockade is founded on the fact that 
in some cases exceptions have been made to the universal 
application of the blockade. Thus in 1886 the blockade 
of the Greek coast was only enforced against ships 
belonging to Greece or to one of the blockading powers, 
while in 1897 the proclamation of the blockade of Crete 
contained the following notice : ' Ships of the six powers 
or neutral powers may enter into the ports occupied by 
the powers and land their merchandise, but only if it is 
not for the Greek troops or the interior of the Island.' It 
is argued that a blockade is the shutting up of a port to all 
commerce, and that if exceptions are made these will in- 
validate the blockade. This is true of a warlike blockade ; ^ 

^ Geffcken {Anmiaire, p. 287), however, argues that reprisals ought to 
consist of isolated acts, and that when they become general reprisals they 
are tantamount to war and usually regarded as such, and that pacific 
blockade is really only a form of general reprisals. ' p. 575. 

' Of. Phillimore, CommetUariea upon Internatiandl Law, 3rd ed., vol. iii, 
p. 487 : ' The Court will hold that merchants generally are justified in 
treating the blockade as taken off in a case in which some ships have been 
allowed to enter or come out from motives of civility or other considera- 


but It does not follow that every rule governing a blockade 
in time of war is necessarily applicable to a pacific blockade. 
They possess analogous characteristics, and hence the simi- 
larity in name, but the analogy must not be pressed too 
far. A blockade properly so called is a measure of war 
instituted under certain conditions in order that a belligerent 
may prevent neutral commerce from coming to the blockaded 
port. Without it he would still be able to interfere with and 
capture the shipping of the blockaded state, but it is his 
adherence to the necessary conditions that gives him the 
right to touch neutral shipping. A pacific blockade, on 
the other hand, is an act of force primarily directed against 
the state blockaded with a view to coercing it to follow the 
line of policy desired. As it occurs in time of peace there 
are no belligerents, and therefore no neutrals, since neutrality 
is merely the condition of a state in relation to two opposing 
belligerents.^ The rules, therefore, which deal with neutral 
states are not applicable. It might, of course, be argued 
that in these circumstances there is no need whatever for 
a state which wishes to interrupt the commerce of another 
by way of reprisals to adhere to any rules at all, and that 
therefore pacific blockade has no existence as a separate 
institution.^ But the facts do not support this argument. 
Pacific blockades have occurred in the past, and although 
possibly there may be no abstract necessity for any rules 
on the subject, yet it is distinctly desirable that, just as a state 
has to observe certain rules in the conduct of a war, so it 
should be subject to a certain amount of restraint in the 
conduct of a pacific blockade ; indeed, the obvious oppor- 
tunities for oppression which an unbridled use of this method 

tions (The RoUa, 6 C. Rob. Adm. Rep., p. 372 ; The By field, Edw., p. 168 ; 
The Juno, 2 C. Rob. Adm. Rep., p. 162). Therefoie a relaxation of blockade 
in favour of belligerents to the exolndon of neutrals, or vice versa, vitiates 
the blockade (The Francisha, 2 Spinks, p. 135 ; 10 Mooie, P. C. Rep., 
p. 32).' Of. Geffcken, Anwrnire, p. 289. 

^ Cf. Westlake, Revm de Droit IrUematianal, t. vii, p. 611 : * D'ailleurs 
point de bellig^rants, point de neutres, et puisqu'il n'y a que les neutres 
que les blocus touchent, il n'y a personne qui ait k respecter un blocus 
paoifique ; ' and Geffoken, Anwuaire, pp. 290-1. 

* Cf. Fauchille, p. 38: ' Les pr6tendus blocus paoifiques n'existent pas.^ 


of settling international disputes might give to an unscru- 
pulous power, render it imperative that the limits of the 
practice should be most accurately defined. 

Another argument is based on the fact that in treaties 
dealing with blockade, such as the Declaration of Paris, 
the terms enemy, belligerent, and neutral continually recur.^ 
But this is due to the fact that the treaties in question 
deal with blockades in time of war, and not with pacific 
blockades at all.^ It is unfortunate that many jurists, and 
statesmen also, have used these terms, since they are really 
inapplicable to pacific blockade; but the fact that the 
difference between a blockade in time of war and a 
pacific blockade has not been clearly defined does not 
warrant the assumption that there is no difference between 
them, or that a pacific blockade is an impossibility. 
Bather it points to the conclusion that in the particular 
case in which such terms were used it was thought that the 
blockade was warlike and not pacific. As a matter of fact, 
it is sometimes extremely difficult to decide whether a 
blockade is warlike or pacific, and one of the strongest 
arguments that can be raised against the practice is that 
it tends to blur that clear line of demarcation which for 
the general good of the body of states should be drawn 
between peace and war. Cauchy, indeed, describes it as 
a ' melange de la guerre avec la paix ' ; ® but although its 
rules are undoubtedly a compromise between those of war 
and peace, yet every blockade must of necessity be either 
peaceful or warlike. 

As matters stand it depends wholly on the action of the 
blockaded state whether a blockade shall be considered 
as warlike or pacific. It is agreed that one state can treat 
as an act of war what was intended by another merely 
as an embargo or as reprisals.^ So a blockaded state can 

* Cf. Fauchille, pp. 44-6 ; Geffcken, Anmuiire, pp. 290-1. 

* A similar remark applies to the judgment of the Supreme Court of the 
United States in TheFox, which declared that blockade is a belligerent right. 

» Le droU marUitne intemationca, t. ii, pp. 426-8. Cf. De Burgh, The 
Elements of MariHme InternatUynal Law (1868), p. 121. 

* Cf . F. de Martens, Traite de droit internationdl, t. iii, § 106 •. * II y a 


treat the institution of a pacific blockade as an act of war, 
and thereupon a state of war will immediately ensue. But 
there is no necessity for a state to take this extreme course. 
It can put up with the affront and remain at peace, although 
relations are likely to become somewhat strained between 
it and the blockading power. But the position which the 
blockaded state takes up is a matter for itseK alone, and 
on its action depends whether a state of war is or is not 
set up. 

It is a frequent objection that pacific blockades are 
always directed against weak and never against power- 
ful states,^ and that if any attempt to coerce a powerful 
state in this way was made it would inevitably result in 
war. These premisses are undoubtedly correct, but the 
conclusion derived from them, that pacific blockade is 
necessarily a wrongful act, is unsound. While it is true 
that pacific blockades have only been directed against 
comparatively weak states, there is nothing whatever in 
the essential nature of a pacific blockade which would 
prevent its being put into operation against a powerful 
state. Directly such a pacific blockade was instituted 
the powerful state, equally with a weak one, would have 
to consider whether it would regard the affront as an act 
of war or not, and the fact that it is highly probable that 
war would follow is really immaterial.^ 

This theoretical aspect of the case was admitted by 
Great Britain in a convention entered into with the Argen- 

repr^sailles si r£tat centre lequel elles sont exerc6es n'y r6pond pas par 
des actes d'hostilit^. Si, au contraire, il ouvre k son tour les hostilit^y 
c'est la guerre.' 

^ Mr. Westlake, for example, sa3rs : * II n'est pas digne d'un grand £tat 
qui croit avoir k se plaindre d'un petit de chercher k s'approprier les 
c6t6s faciles de la guerre sans en courir les risques ; ' cf . the Russian protest 
against the blockade of Greece in 1850. See also Geffcken, 4th (French) 
ed. of HefiPter, and Anmiaire, p. 293 : ' Dans tous les autres oas [except 
Greece, 1886] je ne peux reconnattre qu'un abus de la force du plus fort 
contre le faible ; ' Bards, p. 84. 

* Cf. Oppenheim, ii, § 49 : 'It may nevertheless find appfication with 
success against a powerful naval state if exercised by the united navies of 
several powers.* 


tine Confederation on November 24, 1849. In this she 
acknowledged that the line of conduct pursued against 
the latter power would have been applicable in similar 
circumstances against Great Britain.^ 

It must also be remembered that small states presume 
on the fact that they aire small,^ and have been responsible 
for most of the petty annoyances which have caused the 
majority of the pacific blockades of the past. The only 
sanction known to International Law is force, and if states 
will not conduct their affairs in accordance with ordinary 
usage and courtesy, forcible means of compulsion must be 
adopted. Some method less severe than war is required 
for the ' performance of the necessary police duties of 
enforcing the laws which have to exist between all the 
nations of the world ',^ and pacific blockade has been shown 
in the past to be an effective means of compulsion for that 
purpose. Its effects are much less damaging to the citizens 
of the blockaded state than a war, and if recourse has to 
be had to force it is surely wise to confine its exercise within 
as narrow limits as possible.^ 

It is sometimes urged as a reason for doubting the legality 
of the practice, that it is a comparatively new institution. 
It is, of course, true that the first instance did not occur 
tilji 1827, but since that date there have been nearly a score 
of cases, and even if at first it could be argued that the 
practice had not become recognized by International Law, 
suph a contention is no longer tenable.^ Several of the 
more recent writers adopt the view that it has been in- 

* Art. 6, Hertslet, TretOies, vol. viii, p. 105. 

* Lord Palmerston, in his great speech on June 25, 1850, asked the 
pertinent question, *Does the smaUness of a country justify the magnitude 
of its evil acts ? ' Hansard, 3rd series, vol. cxii, col. 397. 

* Lord Cranbome, on the blockade of Venezuela, in the House of Com- 
mons, December 15, 1902, Hansard, 4th series, vol. cxvi, col. 1202, 

* The advantages of pacific blockade from a humanitarian point of view 
are insisted on by Cauchy, Le droit maritime interruaianal (1862), t. ii, 
pp. 426-8 ; Gessner, Le droit dee neutrea aur m>er, 1st ed., pp. 215-23. 

* But cf. Calvo, Dictionnaire de droit international (1885), t. i, p. 102 : 
* La pratique des bloous pacifiques . . . n'a pas non plus re^u la sanction 
du droit conventionnel.' 


corporated in those rules for the conduct of states which 
we call International Law. Thus M. Rivier writes : ' II 
n'est gudre possible aujourd'hui de d6nier au blocus le 
caractdre d'une institution du droit des gens actuel.'^ 
Oppenheim regards ' the institution of pacific blockade as 
of great value, be it as an act of reprisals or of intervention.' ^ 
Hall comes to the conclusion that, ' subject to the limitation 
that it shall be felt only by the blockaded country, it is 
a convenient practice, it is a moderate one in its effects 
on that country, and it may sometimes be of use as a 
measure of international police when hostile action would 
be inappropriate and no action less stringent would be effec- 
tive.'^ Lawrence lays down the proposition that 'if no 
trade other than that of the blockaded and the blockading 
powers is molested it is impossible to say that any inter- 
national offence is committed. The parties immediately 
concerned must be allowed to settle their disagreements 
in their own way.' * Westlake, who in 1874 ^ was distinctly 
opposed to the practice, writes in 1907 that: 'Pacific 
Blockade as against the quasi-enemy is too well established 
as a recognized institution to be longer attacked with serious 
hope of success.'® Mr. P. E. Smith considers that the 
legality of the practice is now well settled by the general 
practice of Europe.' Heffter also says 'la 16galit6 de 
cette mesure ne pent faire I'objet d'aucun doute '.® M. 
Ducrocq, the most modem investigator of the subject, 
comes to the following conclusion : ' Nous pouvons, k mon 
avis, declarer que les nombreux blocus pacifiques du sidcle 
. . . s'ils ne suffisent pas a 16gitimer ce mode de contraint 
au point de vue juridique, constituent tout au moins et 

* Principes du droit des gens (1896), t. ii, pp. 198-9. He appears, 
however, to be opposed to the practice on theoretical grounds. 

* ii, § 49. 

' International Law, 6th ed., p. 376. 

* The Principles of International Law (1900), § 169, 

* Revue de droit international, t. vii, p. 611. 

* Westl&ke, International Law, Part II, * War' (1907), p. 16. 
' International Law (1900), pp. 91-2. 

* Le droit international de V Europe (3rd French ed. by Bergson, 1873), 
pp. 216-6. 


k n'en pas douter un usage international.'^ Besides the 
above-mentioned jurists, Barte,* Bluntschli,^ Ferguson,* 
Fiore^ and Perels ® must also be cited as supporters of the 
practice, while the Institute of International Law, at its 
meeting in 1887, recognized its legality and laid down the 
following rules for its conduct: "L'^tablissement d'un 
blocus en dehors de I'^tat de guerre ne doit etre consid6r6 
comme permis par le droit des gens que sous les conditions 
suivantes : — 

' L Les navires de pavilion Stranger peuvent entrer libre- 
ment malgr6 le blocus. 

' 2. Le blocus pacifique doit etre d6clar6 et notifi6 officielle- 
ment, et maintenu par ime force sufi&sante. 

' 3. Les navires de la puissance bloqu6e qui ne respectent 
pas un pareil blocus peuvent etre s6questr6s. Le blocus 
ayant cess6 ils doivent etre restitu^s avec leurs cargaisons 
k leurs propri6taires, mais sans d6dommagement k aucun 

On the whole, therefore, it may be laid down with some 
assurance that theory, practice, and modem juristic opinion 
are united in recognizing pacific blockade as having become 
a legitimate weapon of coercion in the armoury of states, 
a view which is shared by the present author. 

* p. 77, and cf. p. 64. 
» p. 166. 

* Das modeme VUiherrecht der civHisierten Staaten (1872), § 606. 

* Manual of International Law, vol. ii. pp. 240-1. 

* TrattatodiJ[HrUU>InternazionalePtablico (2nd ed., 1882), t.ii, pp. 498-9. 
' Daa internatimale 6ffenUiche Seerecht der Oegentvart (1882), pp. 167-9, 

and Annuaire, p. 286. CaJvo, § 1868, also quotes Oauohy, Boeok, and 
Bolin-Jacquemyns as in favour of pacific blockade. 
' Annuaire, p. 300. 


On the institution of a blockade in time of war it is 
necessary that the belligerent's ' intention must have in 
some way been brought to the knowledge of the neutrals 
affected . . . but opinions differ widely as to whether it is 
sufficient, in order to justify the belligerent in seizing the 
property of the neutral, that the knowledge of the latter 
shall be proved or whether a formal notification must be 
served upon him.' ^ 

By the English theory, knowledge of the blockade, how- 
ever acquired, is a condition precedent to condemnation, 
A notification to neutral governments is the usual, though 
not the only, means of imparting that knowledge. Accord- 
ing to French practice, however, a notification to neutral 
governments is a mere matter of courtesy, and a vessel can 
only be condemned after it has been warned by one of 
the blockading squadron and an endorsement of the date 
and time of such warning has been made on its papers.^ 

It has been generally assumed^ that the rules as to 
notice in a pacific blockade should be the same as those 
for a blockade in time of war. But as a matter of fact 
the two cases are distinct and require different treatment. 

In determining what notice is necessary, different con- 
siderations apply to the blockaded state, third states and. 
the ships themselves. 

A notice to the blockaded state is not strictly necessary. 
The effect and validity of a pacific blockade depend upon 
f orce, and not upon the delivery of any formal notification. 
If the state whose coasts are thus blockaded is unwilling 

^ Hall, InternaUanal Law, 5th ed., p. 694. 
■ Ibid., pp. 693-0. 

• Ducrocq, p. 78 ; Annuaire^ pp. 300-1 ; Bulmerincq, pp. 678-9 ; Calvo, 
§ 1859. Bar^, p. 124, is an exception. 


to submit to the necessary consequences of the operation, 
it has a remedy — ^war ; but unless it takes this means of 
resisting the blockade, any protest on the ground of lack of 
notice would have little effect. 

As a matter of fact, however, some notice or warning 
is almost invariably given. The object of a pacific blockade 
is to induce the blockaded state to alter its policy in some 
one or more particulars, and it is greatly to the benefit 
of the blockading state if that object can be achieved 
without the necessity of a blockade. Accordingly, it is 
not until diplomatic means have failed that recourse is 
had to a blockade, and the last weapon of diplomacy is 
usually a threat that unless the demands made are com- 
plied with within a specified time other means will be 
adopted. With the exception of the blockades of Zanzibar 
and of Gaeta and Messina, both of which were of an excep- 
tional nature, and the latter perhaps warlike, it would 
appear that some ultimatum or warning preceded the 
institution of each of the blockades considered in Part II> 
In many of these ultimatums the states were warned as 
to the exact nature of the measures which it was proposed 
to take against them, but even in those cases in which 
this was not done the situation of affairs was such that no 
surprise could be felt at the commencement of coercive 

With regard to the necessity of notice to third states 
there seems to be considerable confusion of thought. The 
Institute of International Law, when considering this subject, 
declared that one of the conditions to which a pacific block- 

^ For details as to these ultimatums see the historical studies of the 
blockades in Part U. It is not clear that any ultimatums or warnings 
were given before the institution of the blockades of Carthagena, San Juan 
de Nicaragua, and San Salvador, but the strong probability is that there 

* Oppenheim, ii, § 48, contains the following dictum on the subject : 
' As blockade, being a violation of the territorial supremacy of the blockaded 
state, is prima facie of a hostile character, it is necessary for such state 
as intends in time of peace to blockade another, to notify its intention 
to the latter, and to fix the day and hour for the establishment of the 



ade ought to conform before it could be considered as in 
accordance with International Law was, * (2) Le blocus 
pacifique doit etre d6clar6 et notifi6 officiellement ... '.^ 
This declaration is, however, manifestly inconsistent with 
the previous statement, ' (1) Les navires de pavilion 
6tranger peuvent entrer librement malgr6 le blocus.' ^ If 
the vessels of third states are put under no disability on 
accoimt of the blockade, and are allowed to continue their 
commerce as if there were no blockade in existence, there is 
surely no reason why notice of the blockade should be given 
to them or to the states to which they belong. Notice of 
a blockade in time of war is only given to neutrals because 
the blockading state intends to exercise its right of prevent- 
ing neutral vessels from communicating with the shores 
blockaded. So, therefore, notification to third states should 
only be necessary in the case of a pacific blockade where its 
operations extend to their vessels. Practice, however, on 
this point shows some variation. No formal official notice 
to third states appears to have been given in the blockades 
of Greece (1827), the Netherlands (1832-3) and Brazil 
(1862-3), in none of which were the vessels of third states 
Uable to capture.® On the other hand, in the blockade of 
the Tagus by France, in 1831, the French admiral gave 
notice to the British representative* at Lisbon. Notice 
of the institution of the blockade of Greece, in 1860, was. 
also given to thirteen of the consul-generals and consuls 
at Athens.^ Again, in 1886, when the coasts of Greece were 
blockaded by five of the Great Powers, a copy of the in- 
structions to the British commander as to the blockade was 
sent to the British representatives abroad,® and presumably 

* Anrmaire, p. 300. 

■ Bulmerincq (p. 260), however, says that the blockade of Greece, 1827, 
was binding on neutrals. 

* B. S. P. 1831, * Correspondence relative to the French demands upon 
the Government of Portugal,' p. 47. 

* B. S. P. 1850, * Further correspondence respecting the demands 
made upon the Greek Government' (bound in vol. Ivi. at p. 407), pp. 
46-7, and vide Appendix, pp. 168-70. 

* B. S. P. Greece, No. 4 (1886), p. 1. 


communicated by them to the governments to which they 
were accredited. But in none of the last three cases were 
the vessels of third states interfered with. 

In those blockades in which the vessels of third states 
were liable to seizure it would appear that notice has almost 
always been given to such states. France gave notice to 
Great Britain of her blockades of the Argentine Republic 
(1838-40),! Mexico (1838),^ Formosa (1884-5)* and Siam 
(1893),* and to Sardinia of her blockade of the coasts of 
the Argentine Republic from 1846 to I860.* The blockade 
of Gaeta by the Sardinia squadron was notified to Great 
Britain ; • that of Crete by the six powers to the United 
States,*^ and that of Zanzibar by Germany to Great Britain 
and the other powers.* Although no details of the notifica- 
tion of these blockades to other states can be quoted, there 
can scarcely be any doubt that having been notified to one 
state they were notified to all. 

Notices of all the remaining blockades in which Great 
Britain took part appeared in the London Oazette^ and 
would therefore probably be communicated to the repre^ 
sentatives of other states in London. Moreover, in two 
cases it is certain that one of the other states at least 
had notice. While the blockade of Nicaragua in 1844 
was in progress, the Consul-General of France applied 
for a relaxation of the blockade on behalf of a French 
ship ; ^^ and in 1889, during the blockade of Zanzibar, the 
French Government informed the French consul that it 

* L. G. June 22, 1838; vide Appendix, p. 161. 

* L. O. June 6, 1838 ; vide Appendix, pp. 169-60. 

» L. O. October 24, 1884 ; vide Appendix, pp. 171-3. 

* B. S. P. Siam, No. 1 (1894). 

* Pistoye et Duverdy, p. 382. 

* L. O, February 8, 1861 ; vide Appendix, p. 171. 
' Bar;^ p. 52. 

* B. S. P. Africa, No. 10 (1888), p. 102, and vide Appendix, pp, 176-6. 

* Nicaragua, 1842 (L. O. August 19, 1842); Nicaragua, 1844 (X. 0. June 
11, 1844) ; Zanzibar, 1888-9 (L. G. December 4, 1888) ; Venezuela, 1902-3 
(L. G. December 20, 1902). Vide Appendix, pp. 161-2, 176 and 183. 

^' Vide mention of a dispatch on the subject in the Admiralty Register 
at the Public Record Office. 



had no objection to the search of dhows under the French 
flag by the English and German ships. 

Four blockades only remain to be considered. Little is 
known as to the details of the blockades of Carthagena and 
San Salvador by France, and of Bolivia by Chili, except 
that all were comparatively unimportant and that the 
third soon became warlike.* The fourth and only remain- 
ing blockade, that of New Granada by Great Britain, in 
1837, was very short. Before a dispatch announcing its 
institution could have reached England the blockade had 
been raised. A declaration of its institution had been 
made at Jamaica,^ but whether this was communicated to 
other states is not known ; nor is it known whether the 
one French vessel that was detained had been previously 

It may, therefore, be fairly stated that it has been the 
general practice in the past to give notice to other states 
of the institution of a pacific blockade when the seizure 
or detention of their vessels has been contemplated. This 

i indeed is only reasonable, and the practice will doubtless 
continue. If, however, in any future pacific blockade it 

.'is decided not to seize or detain the vessels of third states, 
there should be no obligation to give such states notice, 

! although it might, perhaps, be useful to do so. Some inter- 

I ference, for example, with a vessel might be necessary to 
verify its flag, £ts was the case in the blockade of Greece 
in 1860. 

Practice, as might have been expected, has differed as 
to the necessity of notice to the vessels themselves. We 
have already seen that it is not essential to give notice of 
the institution of a blockade to the blockaded state. Neither 
is it necessary to give notice to the vessels of such a state. 
Notice is not usually given beforehand when another state's 
vessels are seized by way of embargo or reprisals, and there 
is no reason why a different rule should obtain in the case 
of a pacific blockade. Moreover, in a blockade in time of 
war it is unnecessary to prove any notice of the blockade 

1 L. G. April 22, 1879. 
* Vide Appendix, p. 158. 


to condemn a vessel of the blockaded state : the mere 
fact of its nationality is quite sufficient alone for that 

With regard to the vessels of other states, however, the 
position is different. In a warlike blockade the Enghsh 
practice is that where a notice has been given to the neutral 
state at such a time that the captain of any vessel ought 
to have known of the blockade, the vessel ia liable to capture 
and condemnation if it sets out for a blockaded port, unless 
that port is a great distance away and a clear intimation 
of inquiry at an intermediate port as to the existence of 
the blockade is shown. On the other hand, French practice 
requires a notice or warning to be given to each vessel 
individually, whether notice has been given to the state 
to which it belongs or not,^ a practice which, as Woolsey 
says, ' is like giving notice to a burglar trying to break into 
a house.' ^ 

The head note of the case of La Louisa states : ' Pour 
qu'un navire neutre puisse etre 16gitimement captur6 
comme ayant viol6 le blocus ^tabli par les forces navales 
franfaises, il ne suffit pas que ledit blocus ait 6t6 notifi^ 
aux agents des puissances ^trangeres. n faut, en outre, 
que le navire ait it& sp^cialement averti de Texistence 
et de r^tendue du blocus et que la mention de cet avertisse- 
ment ait 6t6 inscrite sur son role k 6quipage.' * 

It might have been expected that the above distinction 

* In the blockade of Greeoe in 1886 ihe instructions to the British 
commander directed that ' the officer who boards will enter in the log of 
any ship allowed to proceed the fact of her haying been visited and allowed 
to proceed: also day and at what place such visit occurred' (B. S. P. 
Greece, No. 4 (1886), p. 1). This cannot be construed, however, as directing 
that notice should precede seizure, as the same instructions order the 
detention of all Greek vessels attempting to enter or come out from the 
blockaded ports. 

■ Cf. the dispatch of Count Mol6 re Mexican blockade quoted by 
Woolsey, IntroductUm to Study of IfUemational Law, 4th ed., p. 463. 

* Ibid., p. 464. 

* Pistoye et Duverdy, Traite des prises maritimes (1866), t. i, p. 382, 
Consea cTStat of December 21, 1847, on appeal from a decision of the jwize 
court of Monte Video of July 18, 1846. 


would have reappeared in the ease of pacific blockades, and 
to some extent it has done so, although in the main the 
French practice has been adhered to. No notice was given 
to the vessels individually in the blockades of New Granada 
(1837), Zanzibar (1888-9) and Crete (1897). In the first of 
these blockades, however, only one ship of a third state 
was detained ; in the second the operations were mainly 
confined to the native dhows ; and in the third the blockade 
was specifically directed against Greek vessels, and others 
were allowed to enter if the cargoes were not intended for 
the insurgents. This does not, therefore, constitute a large 
body of practice. 

On the other hand, notice was given to the vessels them- 
selves in the blockades of Mexico (1838), the Argentine Repub- 
lic (1838-40 and 1845-60) and Formosa (1884^5), instituted 
by France. The blockade of the Menam, in 1893, was of 
too short a duration to produce any definite evidence, but 
doubtless the usual French practice would have been fol- 
lowed had it continued. In the blockades of Nicaragua 
by Great Britain, in 1842 and 1844, a similar method was 
adopted. That of 1842 was a de facto blockade, and it 
was, therefore, necessary to give an individual warning to 
any vessels which approached, while in that of 1844 
Genoese, French and English vessels were turned away, 
without being actually detained, The blockade of Vene- 
zuela (1902-3) affords another instance in which the French 
practice was adopted. In the elaborate instructions^ which 
were issued for the guidance of the British officers it was 
directed that 'every merchant vessel ... is to receive a 
special notification ', and full details were added of the 
manner in which this was to be done. 

It cannot be said that any rule has as yet been estab- 
lished allowing interference with the vessels of third states. 
If, therefore, it is proposed in any blockade to interfere with 
them in any way it would seem better to adopt the practice 
of warning vessels individually, as well as giving a notice to 
third states wherever that is possible. 

One of the essential conditions of a blockade in time of 
' Vide infra, pp. 163-4. 


war is that it should be effective.^ The Institute of Inter- 
national Law, in considering the subject of pacific blockade, 
laid down : ' (2) Le blocus pacifique doit ^tre . . . maintenu 
par ime force suffisante.' * Here again the Institute appears 
to have been inconsistent, in view of its former declara- 
tion that ' (1) Les navires de pavilion Stranger peuvent 
entrer librement malgr6 le blocus \^ The necessity for 
a warlike blockade to be effective is due to the desire that 
it shall be respected by neutrals and that their vessels may 
be liable to condemnation if they attempt to break the 
blockade. Vessels of the blockaded state may be captured , 
and condemned quite apart from the fact that there is/ 
a blockade, and whether that blockade is effective or not. 
If, therefore, a pacific blockade is to be restricted in its 
operation to the vessels of the blockaded state, there seems 
no vaKd reason why the blockade need be eflfective.* 
If, however, the vessels of third states are liable to capture 
and condemnation, the blockade should undoubtedly be 
effective, as that is one of the conditions which legalize 
such condemnation. But if the vessels are only liable to 
be turned away there seems no abstract reason why this 
rule should be insisted on. The only result of its absence 
would be that the vessels would have a better chance of 
evading the blockading force. 

* Of. Declaratioii of Paris, 1856. 

* Annuaire^ p. 300, aad of. Bulmerincq, pp. 678-9 ; Oppenheim, ii, § 48. 

* Bui cf . Bards, p. 122 : * La condition d'effectivit^ est dono si ^vidente 
qn'il est superflu de I'exiger et inutile de la formuler.' 




The object of a blockade is to prevent — by force, if 

'necessary — ^vessels from communicating with the port or 

part of the coast blockaded. This is so whether the 

\ blockade is an operation of war or whether it is merely 

•pacific. In war, if a ship after due warning persists in an 

endeavour to communicate with the shore, or, as it is termed, 

' run the blockade,' it is seized by the blockading squadron, 

taken before a prize court, and, if the oflfence is fully proved, 

condemned with its cargo as a prize. In a pacific blockade, 

^' however, the procedure is somewhat diflferent. It is true 

that if vessels attempt to break the blockade they are 

seized and detained, although this rule is not without some 

exceptions. But here the analogy to a warlike blockade 

usually ends, for they are not in general taken before a prize 

court, and when the blockade is raised are usually handed 

back to their owners uninjured save for the ordinary chances 

of wear and tear. 

In considering what force is permissible towards vessels 
breaking or attempting to break a blockade, different con- 
siderations apply according to the nationality of the vessels. 
It is obvious that a state has a right to lay down what 
rules it pleases for the guidance of its own subjects, and to 
punish those that disobey. Therefore no question can 
arise as to the authority of a blockading state to compel 
its own vessels to obey the rules of any blockade it may 

The object of a pacific blockade is to force the blockaded 
state to comply with the requirements, whatever they may 
be, of the blockading state. To effect its purpose the latter 
cuts off the commerce of the former by preventing its 
vessels from entering or leaving their home ports. With 


the possible exception of the case of Crete in 1897, (pacific 

blockades in the past have always been directed against the I 
vessels of the state actually blockaded. The case of Crete 
is pecuUar. A Turkish island with a mixed Christian and 
Mohammedan population, it was at the beginning of 1897 
in the midst of an insurrection fomented by Greek agitators 
and having as its object the abolition of Turkish rule and 
the annexation of the island to Greece. The Great Powers 
who compose what is known as the Concert of Europe 
were endeavouring to quiet the insurrection and arrange 
matters between Greece and Turkey. In spite of this, 
however, the Cretan insurgents proclaimed their union 
with Greece, Greek troops landed on the island,^ and Colonel 
Vassos, their commander, issued a proclamation : ' In the name 
of H.M. George the First, King of the Hellenes, I occupy the 
island of Crete.' * The withdrawal of the Greek forces was 
demanded but refused, and in consequence ' a blockade of 
the island was instituted by the Great Powers. This was 
made general for Greek ships, while other vessels were 
admitted on the condition ' that their cargoes should not 
be intended for the Greek troops or the interior '. This 
practically amounted to no restriction whatever being 
placed on Turkish vessels, and, as Crete was a Turkish 
island, forms an exception to the general rule. It should 
be remembered, however, that if Crete had been regarded 
as annexed to Greece by the act of Colonel Vassos, the 
* blockade would have been one of Greek territory and quite 
in line with other cases ; and although the Great Powers 
did not take this view, yet the fact remains that the blockade 
was instituted because of the presence of Colonel Vassos, 
and was intended to place constraint on Greece and not 
on Turkey. In view, therefore, of these considerations the 
exception appears to be more nominal than real. 

Certain other slight exceptions to the general rule that 
all vessels sailing under the flag of the blockaded state are 
subject to the blockade may be noticed. In one case — 

• Anntud Register, 1897, p. 308. 

• B. S. P. Turkey, No. 10 (1897), p. 80. 

• B. S. P. Turkey, No. 9 (1897), p. 33 ; and vide infra, p. 143. 


that of Mexico in 1838 — native fishing-boats were exempted 
from the operation of the blockade.^ This followed the 
ordinary rule of warfare that inshore fishing-boats are not 
interfered with unless they become dangerous, as, for example, 
in the ease of the projected invasion of England by Napoleon. 
But this particular exemption does not seem to have been 
repeated in any other case.^ The prevention of famine has 
been another reason for exemption in a few cases. Thus 
in 1827, when the allied squadrons were blockading the coast 
of Greece, Turkish transports with supplies, and under 
the convoy of French or English men of war, were allowed 
to leave the Dardanelles regularly in order to revictual the 
Egyptian and Turkish fleet of Ibrahim Pasha in Navarino 
Bay.® Again, when the coasts of Greece were blockaded in 
1886 by the Great Powers, the following orders from home 
were communicated to the British admiral : ' Should any 
actual distress arise in the island [Euboea] from food being 
scarce pending the receipt of supplies from the Greek 
Government you have authority to do all that you think 
necessary to relieve it, and even special permission may be 
granted to vessels carrying provisions under such regulations 
as you may permit, which are to be sufficiently stringent.'* 
In three instances the blockade was confined to a particular 
kind of traffic, and did not apply to all cargoes. The case 
of Crete has already been mentioned, in which the only 
restriction on the landing of goods was that they should 
not be intended for the use of the Greek troops or for the 
interior of the island.^ In the case of Zanzibar the blockade 
was directed against the importation of arms and war 
material and the exportation of slaves,^ and ordinary 
commerce was not prohibited. The net result of four montlw 
of this blockade by the British vessels appears to have been 

^ Ducrocq, p. 112. 

■ At the second Hague Conference, 1907, a regulation was adopted 
exempting coast fishing-boats from capture so long as they do not partici- 
pate in hostilities. [B. S. P. Miscellaneous No. 1 (1908), pp. 127-32]. 

» Annual Register, 1827. 

* B. S. P. Greece, No. 4 (1886), p. 9. 

» B. S. P. Turkey, No. 10 (1897), p. 123. 

• B. S. P. Africa, No. 1 (1889), p. 9, and vide Appendix, pp. 174-9. 


the visiting of 3,876 dhows, with three small captures, of 
which two were subsequently released, while the remaining 
one had ten slaves on board.^ The blockade, however, 
had a depressing effect generally on trade.^ The third case 
is that of Gaeta, where the blockade in the first instance 
merely applied to contraband of war.^ 

Another cause of exemption is found in the carrying of 
foreign cargo in the ships of the blockaded state. This 
would make very little difference if the vessels of third 
states were themselves subject to the blockade, but where this 
is not the case, some relaxation of the rule might be looked for. 
In three cases this occurred. In 1850, when the coasts of 
Greece were blockaded by Great Britain, the local authorities 
at the Piraeus were informed that ' no Greek vessel can be 
allowed to quit a Greek port unless previously chartered 
to carry a cargo or part of a cargo belonging to foreign 
merchants. Such vessels will be allowed to put to sea ; 
but this exception cannot be applied to any Greek vessel 
chart^ed by foreign merchants after the present notifica- 
tion.'^ This exemption led to a great deal of antedating of 
charter-parties and pseudo-sales of vessels ; indeed, the British 
admiral reported to the Admiralty that 'every subterfuge 
has been resorted to by tampering with the papers of Greek 
ships to exempt them and their cargoes from detention '.^ 
Austria and Russia claimed a further exemption on the 
ground that insurances had been effected and bottomry 
bonds taken on certain vessels by residents in those countries, 
but these claims were not allowed by Great Britain.* Again, 
when Great Britain was blockading the coast of Brazil, in 
1862-3, the British consul was informed that ' if any vessel 
seized by Admiral Warren's orders shall contain property 
belonging to parties who are not Brazilians the admiral 
will, on the nationality of the owners being proved to his 
satisfaction, give every facility in his power for the delivery 
of the property to the owners without any delay which 

* B. S. P. Africa, No. 1 (1889). ■ Vide Appendix, p. 170. 

' B. S. P. 1850, * Further correspondence respecting the demands made 
upon the Greek Government ' (bound in vol. Ivi, at p. 407), p. 46 

* Ibid., p. 117. 


can be avoided '> The blockade of Greece, in 1886, produced 
a somewhat similar exemption to that allowed in 1850. The 
British commander-in-chief received instructions which 
contain the following reservation : ' Should, however, the 
cargo or any part of the cargo on board any ship belong to 
a subject or citizen of a foreign power other than Greece 
and other than the blockading powers, and should such 
cargo have been shipped before the notification of the 
blockade, or after euch notification but under a charter made 
anterior to the notification, such ship or vessel is not to be 
detained. '2 In the remaning blockades where the vessels 
of third states were not interfered with, there is no evidence 
as to what treatment was accorded to vessels of the blockaded 
state which had on board property belonging to the sub- 
jects of another state. It may, therefore, be laid down with 
some confidence that in such blockades it is customary 
to give f aciUties for the arrival or departure of merchandise 
belonging to citizens of other states in vessels flying the 
flag of the blockaded state,provided that the arrangements for 
such method of transport were made before the announce- 
ment of the blockade. 

In one case, also, it would seem from the wording of the 
official notice of blockade that the government vessels of 
the blockaded state were exempt from the operation of the 
blockade. The proclamation instituting ah embargo on 
the vessels of the Netherlands, in 1832, orders all British 
commanders to ' detain and bring into port all merchant 
ships and vessels bearing the flag of the Netherlands '.' 
This was carried out by a blockade of the coast, but there 
is no evidence to show that its operation was confined to 
merchant vesdels. Even if it was, the example does not 
appear to have been followed, and in at least five cases — 
Greece 1827, Portugal 1831, Argentine Republic 1845-60, 
Greece 1860 and Venezuela 1902-3 — the opposite course was 
taken. In all these cases the first vessels interfered with 

^ B. S. P. 1863, ' Correspondence respecting the plunder of the wreck 
of the British barque Prince of Wales, &c.,' p. 138. 

• B. S. P. Greece, No. 4, 1886, p. 1. 

• L. O. November 7, 1832 ; vide Appendix, p. 168. 


appear to have been those belonging to the governments 
of the respective countries blockaded. 

With the above exceptions, therefore, it may be laid 
down as a general rule that in all past pacific blockades all 
kinds of vessels flying the flag of the blockaded state have 
been subject to the blockade. What treatment should be 
accorded them must next be considered.^ 

This is purely a question between the states concerned 
in each case.^ The state which is subjected to the blockade 
must itself judge how far it will allow the blockading state 
to go without treating its acts as hostile and so instituting 
a state of war. It is obvious, therefore, that in some cases 
much more might be permitted than in others. It is difficult, 
in these circumstances, to lay down any definite rule which 
it might be expected that a blockading state would follow, 
in dealing with the vessels of the state blockaded, except 
that it would use a measure of compulsion sufficient to force 
the state blockaded to comply with its demands.^ 

In practice it has been usual to detain the vessels of the 
blockaded state during the continuance of the blockade 
and to hand them back to their owners at its conclusion. 
But this has not been so in all oases. The vessels of the 
Turkish and Egyptian fleet were destroyed in the battle of 
Navarino, in 1827, when the British, French and Russian 
squadrons were blockading the coasts of Greece. Again, in 
1902, the Germans seem to have sunk two of the Venezuelan 
Government vessels which had been captured by their boats, 
although no resistance had been offered.* Three native 
boats were sunk by H.M.S. Dryad during the blockade of 
Crete, in 1897, owing to the bad weather.* These cases are, 

^ Most writers — e.g. Bulmerincq, pp. 578-9; Oppenheim, ii, § 47— agree 
that the vessels ought to be restored at the end of the blockade. 

' Of. Dncrocq, p. 66 : ' Tout individu qui se met en opposition aveo les 
mesnres de contrainte qu*un gouyemement Stranger croit devoir appliquer 
h, sa patrie ne i)eut le faire qu*& ses risques et perils.' 

* Of. Hall, IfUerruUunud Law, 4th ed., p. 385. 

* B. S. P. Venezuela, No. 1 (1903), p. 167. One vessel which could not 
be brought out appears also to have been disabled by the boats from 
H.M.S. BeiHbutian. 

* B. S. P. Turkey, No. 10 (1897). p. 163. 


however, exceptional, but as a blockade once instituted 
must be maintained, destruction of any vessels which refuse 
to obey the orders of the blockading squadron must be con- 
sidered as a possibility. 

In certain cases where pecuniary demands were made, 
and the failure to comply with them was the cause of the 
blockade, ships appear to have been seized with the idea of 
raising the money demanded by their sale. Thus when Rio 
de Janeiro was blockaded, in 1862-3, by Great Britain, the 
admiral in command of the British forces wrote that he 
was going to ' proceed to sea this day and seize on such 
Brazilian ships as may be considered necessary as an equi- 
valent for the demands of Her Majesty's Government '.^ 

Prize courts were established in a few instances.^ But, 
if the case of Zanzibar is excepted, where condemnation 
followed seizure on account of participation in the slave 
trade, the only occasion on which the blockading state 
refused to give up the vessels of the blockaded state seized 
during the blockade occurred in the blockade of Portugal 
by France, in 1831.* In this case various merchant vessels 
and two Government vessels, the Orestes and the Urania, 
had been seized by the French before forcing the mouth 
of the Tagus, and these had been sent to France. On 
entering the Tagus the Portuguese forts fired on the French 
fleet, causing a loss of three killed and eleven wounded ; ^ 
but the Portuguese warships surrendered without firing a 
shot. The Portuguese gave in to the French demands, and 
a treaty was concluded on July 14, 1831, Articles 17 and 18 
of which provided for the return of the two above-mentioned 
Government vessels and the merchant vessels and their 
cargoes. Nothing was said, probably by accident, about 

* B. S. P. 1863, * Correspondence respecting the plunder of the wreck 
of the British barque Prince of Wales, &c.,' p. 133. 

* Both blockades of the Argentine, and those of Zanzibar and Venezuela. 
' Argentine vessels were condemned by the prize court at Monte Video 

during the first Argentine blockade, but it seems best to regard this as 
warlike, and not pacific (Pistoye et Duverdy, Traite des prises maritimes, 
1866, t. i, p. 383). 

* B. S. P. 1831, ' Correspondence relative to the French demands upon 
the Government of Portugal,' p. 64. 


the Portuguese fleet captured in the Tagus, and the French 
refused to hand the vessels back, claiming them as legitimate 
prize of war. In the course of a report made to Lord 
Palmerston by the then King's Advocate the following 
opinion is given : The right to detention ' will depend 
upon the terms of the convention subsequently entered 
into ... for those ships, having surrendered after the 
declaration and during the pendency of hostilities, although 
they made no resistance, are to be considered as legitimate 
prize of war, and not as seized by way of reprisals only'.^ 
It is evident that this opinion is based on the idea that 
a state of war existed between Portugal and France, but 
from a consideration of the general course of events it would 
appear probable that Portugal did not intend to engage in 
war with France.* 

Apart from the above-mentioned case of Portugal, specific 
agreements were made for the return of vessels seized at 
the close of the blockade of Buenos Ayres, which was in- 
stituted in 1845,^ of the blockade of the coasts of Greece in 
1860* and of Venezuela in 1902.* 

Mr. Hall says that ' positive covenants are not inserted in 
treaties merely to embody obligations which without them 
would be of equal stringency ',• and it might, therefore, be 
argued that it was not customary to return vessels detained 
because in several instances agreements to that effect were 
entered into.' On the other hand, however, when the 
uncertainty which has surrounded the practice of pacific 

^ B.S.P. 1831, 'Correspondence relative to the Frenoh demands upon 
the Government of Portugal,' p. 79. 
■ Ibid., and vide infra, pp. 77-80. 

• B. S. P. 1850, vol. Ivi, p. 1. Convention between Her Majesty and 
the Argentine Confederation, signed November 24, 1849, at Buenos Ayres. 
Batifications exchanged May 16, 1850. Clauses 1 and 2. 

• B. S. P. 1850, vol. Ivi, at p. 407 : * Further correspondence respecting 
the demands made upon the Greek Government,' pp. 372 et seq. 

' B. S. P. 1903, Venezuela, No. 1, pp. 226-7. Protocol between Great 
Britain and Venezuela, Article VIII. The German and Italian protocols 
were in similar form. 

• HaU,4thed.,§211,p.610. 

' In the second Argentine blockade several native vessels were condemned; 


blockade in the past, and indeed still does surround it, 
is considered, it is not to be wondered at that some states 
should have preferred to have their exact position strictly 
defined. The verdict, therefore, from the past practice 
in pacific blockades is undoubtedly that all vessels of the 
blockaded state which have been detained during the 
blockade should with their cargoes be handed back on its 
conclusion.^ But this declaration is naturally subject to 
any right which the blockading state might have in the 
way of reprisals, if, instead of continuing the blockade, it 
preferred to sell the ships it had seized and so obtain 
satisfaction for the demands for which it had instituted the 

In two of the three cases above mentioned where agree- 
ments were entered into for the return of the vessels detained, 
viz. those of Greece in 1850 and Venezuela in 1902-3, it was 
also provided that no claims of any kind should be made 
against the blockading power on accoimt of damage or 
injury to the vessels during their detention. This provision 
seems to have been inserted through an excess of caution^ 
as it is difficult to see in what way or on what ground the 

by the French prize court at Monte Video, e. g. VIndependencia 
Americana (Pistoye et Duverdy, Traite des prises maritimes, 1866, t. i, 
p. 384). 

^ A number of authors state that it is the custom of Great Britain to 
confiscate the vessels of the blockaded state. They include F. de Martens, 
Traite de droit internatiorud (1887), t. iii, p. 174 ; Ducrocq, p. 74 ; Haute- 
feuille, Des droits et des devoirs des nations neutres (1868), t. ii, p. 271 ; 
Fauchille, pp. 38-67 ; Bards, pp. 77 and 143, The statement appears to 
be inaccurate. In Reports of Prize Cases determined in the High Court 
of Admiralty before the Lords Commissioners of Appeals in Prize Causes^ 
and before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council from 1743 to 
1869, edited by E. S. Roseve (2 vols., 1906), which is a complete digest 
of British prize cases, not one single instance is quoted in which a vessel 
was condemned for the violation of a pacific blockade* 

■ Mr. Hall's statement (International Law, 4th ed., § 123, p. 397) that 
* the legitimacy of the appropriation of private property depends upon 
the existence of a state of war ', seems rather too wide, especially when 
taken in conjunction with his further statement (pp. 383-4), that ' vessels 
or other property, seized otherwise than by way of embargo . . . may be 
confiscated as soon as it appears that their mere seizure will not constrain 
the wrong-doing state to give proper redress '• 


blockading state could be made liable. Days of grace are 
not allowed to vessels of the blockaded state> although 
occasionally given to the vessels of third states where these 
come within the scope of the blockade. In this, practice 
follows the analogy of an ordinary warlike blockade, although 
in the latter case there is the right to seize, detain and 
confiscate the vessels of the one belligerent quite apart 
from the fact of the blockade. 

There remains to be considered the position of vessels 
detained when the blockade was originally pacific, but the 
relations of the states concerned have subsequently deve« 
loped into war. This has occurred twlce.^ The first occa- 
sion was that of the French blockade of the coast of Mexico 
in 1838, A pacific blockade had continued fo^ some time^ 
but as it did not effect its puriK)se, further measures were 
taken and the fortress of St. Juan d'Ulloa was stormed 
and captured; thereupon Mexico declared war.^ Before 
this date four Mexican ships had been captured and de- 
tained and the question arose what should be done with 
them. Eventually they were restored to their owners.^ 
The other occasion on which a blockade, at first pacific, 
became warlike occurred when, in February 1879, Chili 
blockaded the coasts of Bolivia.* There is, however, no 
evidence whether any Bolivian vessels were captured before 
the declaration of war, or, if so, what was their ultimate 

The single instance of the Mexican blockade is not of 
sufGicient authority to enable us to say that it would be 
followed if similar circumstances were reproduced. In an 
embargo the vessels of the offending state are seized and 
their ultimate fate depends on whether war breaks out or 
not.^ ' If peace is confirmed they are released as of course ; 
if war breaks out they become liable to confiscation.' • 

^ Perhaps the blockade of Gaeta was also of this character. 
■ Vide infra, p. 87. 
' Ducrocq, p. 112, 

* Vide infra, pp. 120-2. 

» The Boedes Lusi, 6 Bob. 246. 

* Hall, InkmaHond Law, 4th ed., § 120, p. 383, 

900AN P 

60 PACariC BLOCKADE part i 

The position of vessels seized during a pacific blockade which 
subsequently became warlike would seem to be very nearly 
the same as that of ships seized under an embargo where 
war breaks out afterwards, and there seems no reason 
why they should not be treated in a similar manner. In 
all probabiUty the cases would be treated as analogous if 
the question were again to arise. 

To sum up, therefore, it would probably not be wide of 
the mark to say that in a pacific blockade the blockading 
state may seize and detain all the vessels of the blockaded 
state or such of them as it thinks best ; that it should do no 
more injury to them than is necessary to their effective 
seizure and detention ; and that at the close of the blockade 
such vessels* with their cargo should be restored to their 
owners, unless they have been disposed of by way of reprisals 
to satisfy the demands of the blockading state. 



The most important problem in connexion with pacific I 
blockade is the question what treatment must be accorded 
to the ships of states other than those blockading or ' 
blockaded. It is the assumption of a right to seize and 
detain such vessels that has led many writers to decline 
to recognize the legality of the practice at all.^ But, as 
has been pointed out, it is quite possible to conduct a pacific 
blockade without interfering in any way with the vessels 
of other states, although its efficacy under such conditions 
would undoubtedly be less.^ So far as can be ascertained, 
it would appear that in six' of the blockades of the past 
the vessels of third states have not been seized or detained, 
although in all probability they were visited by the vessels 
of the blockading squadron. In all other cases,^ however, 
they have been liable to seizure and detention, and occa* 
sionaUy to capture, and it is therefore important to deter- 
mine whether such treatment can be upheld or not. The 
opinions of international jurists are, on the whole, opposed 
to conceding any right to a blockading state to interfere 
with the vessels of a third state. The Institute of Inter- 
national Law in 1887 laid down as a rule for the proper 

* Vide mpray p. 21, n. 2. 

■ Cf. Gessner, Le droit des neutres sur mer, p. 168; Pillet, Les lots 
adudlea de la guerre, p. 143 ; and Fauohille, p. 53 : ' Prohiber seulement 
Tentr^ ou la sortie des navires de la nation attaqu^e, alors qu'on penhet 
auz navires Strangers de p^n^trer dans le lieu bloqu^, n'entrainera 
jamais nn prejudice suffisant pour obliger nne nation k satisfaire auz 
demandes d'une autre nation.' 

* Viz. Greece 1827, Portugal 1831, Netherlands 1832-3, Greece 18S0, 
Brazil 1862-3, Greece 1886. 

« Except perhaps the cases of Carthagena 1834 and San Salvador 1842, 
blockaded by France, as to which see Part II, pp. 82 and 91. 



conduct of a pacific blockade : ' les navires de pavilion 
etranger peuvent entrer librement malgr6 le blocns.'^ 
This was substituted for the proposal of M. Perels : * les 
navires de paviUon Stranger peuvent simplement ^tre 
emp6ch6s de passer la ligne de blocus.'^ M. GeflFcken says : 
* on n'a aucun droit d'imposer k des £tats tiers une loi que 
le bellig^rant seul a le droit d'appliquer . . . le seul fait de 
I'interdiction est un prejudice pour leur commerce et ils 
ne sont nullement tenus de s'y soumettre.'' De Burgh, 
while admitting that pacific blockade may be considered 
as a pacific measure in regard to the blockaded state, adds 
that ' as regards neutral coimtries it can only be viewed as 
a direct act of war '•* Holland writes : * A pacific blockade 
by way of reprisal ought to be directed only against the 
commerce of the state blockaded. It is still an open 
question whether, when the blockade is instituted for other 
purposes, it may not be directed against the commerce of 
third states also,' ^ Lawrence considers that ^ if the com- 
merce of states unconnected with the quarrel is forcibly 
stopped, an illegal act is done '.• Bluntschli writes : ^ Les 
£tats neutres . . . ont dans ce cas le droit d'exiger pour les 
navires neutres la libre entree et la libre sortie.'^ And 
again : ' Die neutralen Staaten erkennen kein Prisenrecht an, 
wenn die Seeblokade nicht zugleich Kriegsblokade ist, und 
sind berechtigt fiir die neutralen Schiflfe freie Ein- und 
Ausfahrt zu fordem.' ^ F. de Martens comes to the con- 
clusion that * ce blocus est admissible pourvu que ses eflfets 
n'atteignent que les navires de I'fitat bloqu6'.* Lord 
Palmerston, writing to Lord Normanby on December 7, 
1846, says, ' Unless you are at war with a state you have 
no right to prevent ships of other states from communi- 

' Annuaire, pp. 300-1. 

• Ibid., p. 286. • Ibid., p. 290-1, 

• The Elements of Maritime International Law (1868), p. 121. 

• p. 145. 

• Principlea of International Law (1900), § 169. 

• Droit international codifie. Article 607. 

• Das modeme Vclkerrecht der civUisierten Staaten, 1872, § 607 

• Traiti de droit international, t. iii, p. 166. 


eating with the ports of that state. *^ Lord GranviUe, in 
a dispatch of November 11, 1884, to M. Waddington, 
writes : ' The contention of the French Government that' 
a pacific blockade confers on a blockading power the right 
to capture and condemn the ships of third nations for 
breach of such a blockade is opposed to the opinions of 
the most eminent statesmen and jurists of France and tdl 
the decisions of its tribimals, and it is in conflict with^ 
well-established principles of International Law.' * Among 
other writers who are also opposed to any interference 
with the vessels of third states may be mentioned Calvo,^ 
Fiore,* Hall,^ Neumann,* Oppenheim^ and Smith.* On 
the other hand, there are a few jurists who maintain that 
third states must submit to the commerce of their subjects 
being interfered with, e.g. Bards,* Bulmerincq,^* Heffter,^ 
Perels^ and Pillet,^ but these are in the minority.^* 

Looking at the matter from a purely theoretical stand-; 
point, it is at first di£Bicult to come to any other conclusion/ 
than that interference with the vessels of third states is; 
unjustifiable. It is true, of course, that such vessels are 
Uable to capture during a warlike blockade or for carrying 
contraband, but this liability depends on the existence of 
a state of war, and as pacific blockade is an operation — 
nominally at any rate— of peace, this justification is not 

• Life of Palmerston, by Rt. Hon. Sir H. Lytton-Bulwer, p. 327. 

• B. S. P. Prance, No. 1 (1884). • Calvo, § 1869. 

• TraUato di diritto irUernazionale ptibblico, 2nd ed. (Turin, 1882), t. ii, 

• Intematiandl Law, 5th ed., p. 376. 

' Ulementa du droit des gens moderne, 3rd ed., p. 142. 
' Oppenheim, § 46. 

• Intemationdl Law (1900), p. 92. • p. 150 
^' Journal du droit iniemaHorud, t. ii, pp. 669 et seq. 

" Le droit international de V Europe (3rd French ed., by Bergson, 1873), 
p. 216 ; and cf. Das europaische VOlkerrecht der Gegenwart (7th ed., by 
Geffcken, 1882), pp. 237-8. 

" Annuaire, p. 286, and also Das internationale dffenUiche Seerecht der 
Gegenwart (1882), pp. 167-9. 

^* Les lois actueUes de la guerre, p. 143. 

** Weetlake (International Law, Part II, *War,' p. 17) considers that 
the practice of pacific blockade as against quasi-nentrals is ambiguous. 


present. Again, a state has no jurisdiction outside its own 
territorial waters over vessels other than its own, except 
in case of piracy or fresh pursuit.^ Great Britain, indeed, 
in its endeavours to put down the slave trade, for some 
time did stop and search all suspicious dhows, whatever 
flag they bore ; but the practice was discontinued in view 
of French protests. The consequence was that by hoisting 
false colours slave dhows were able to carry on their traffic 
with impimity, and were only suppressed when the various 
powers interested came to an agreement allowing each 
other's warships a mutual right of search within a limited 

Although, however, a state has no right to visit and 
search the vessels of other states on the high seas, it has 
a certain amoimt of jurisdiction over such vessels in its own 
territorial waters, and would be within its strict rights if it 
forbade their entrance to any particular port. It might, 
therefore, be argued that when one state has proclaimed 
a pacific blockade of ports of another, and the latter has 
acquiesced therein, the jurisdiction of the blockaded state 
over the territorial waters surrounding the blockaded port 
has been transferred to the blockading state. Accordingly 
any notice issued by it excluding the vessels of other states 
from such port would have to be construed as a notice 
closing such port, given by the blockaded state in virtue 
of its territorial sovereignty, but through the medium of 
the blockading state to whom it had delegated such sove- 
reignty for the time being.^ The argument as stated above 
is undoubtedly far-fetched, but so, for the matter of that, 
are other arguments on which accepted rules of Inter- 
national Law are based. It does imdoubtedly give some 

* Case of Le Louis (1817), 2 Dodson, 210, in which Sir William Scott 
said, ' I can find no authority that gives the right of interruption to the 
navigation of states in amity upon the high seas, excepting that which 
the rights of war give to both belligerents against neutrals.' 

' That one state has an inherent right to close its ports against the 
commerce of another state is unquestionable, and it has been acted upon 
in various instances (cf. Wheaton, Elements of InUrncOumal Law, 
8th (Dana's) ed., 1866, p. 688), but claims for damage on the ground of the 
breach of stipulations in treaties of commerce, &g., might arise. 


theoretical basis to justify interference with the vessels of 
third states by a blockading squadron in time of peace. 
If this line of reasoning were adopted by the blockading 
state, and it were to declare that it was acting in virtue 
of such delegated authority, the state blockaded would 
either have to acquiesce in the assumption by the other ofi 
part of its sovereignty or else go to war, in which latter caso 
the blockade would become warlike and any interference witii 
the vessels of third states justifiable. If a blockading state 
wished to rest the justification of its actions on the above 
plea, it would have to be careful to confine its interference 
with the vessels of other states within the limits of the 
territorial waters of the blockaded state,^ so that any 
operation like the blockade of Riga by a vessel sixty miles 
away, or of Buenos Ayres by vessels stationed off Monte 
Video, would become impossible. It would seem that, even 
in these circumstances, any interference should strictly 
be confined to the prevention of such vessels from entering 
the port, as is suggested by Perels ^ and Bulmerincq.* If, 
however, after being warned not to communicate with the 
port in question, a vessel attempted to do so, it would be 
perfectly justifiable to detain such vessel on the ground of 
its refusing to obey the rules which the territorial sovereign, 
acting through its agent the blockading state, had laid 
down. And if it were once necessary to detain the vessel 
there would seem to be no reason why such detention 
should not last as long as the closing of the port lasted. 
But in view of the fact that ' the legitimacy of the appro- 
priation of private property depends upon the existence 

^ It is generally considered that the territorial waters of a state extend 
for a distance of three miles from the low-water mark, but it should be 
remembered that this limit was fixed on the basis of that being the extreme 
range of canon. There is a growing tendency to extend this limit, of 
which the opinion of the Institut de Droit Intemational at Paris, in 18d4, 
is a sign on the theoretical, and the blockades of Zanzibar (vide infra, p. 179), 
and of the coasts of Epirus and Salonica in the Greco-Turkish war of 1897 
(B. S. P. Turkey, No. 10, 1897, p. 229), in which the limit was extended 
to five miles, on the practical side. 

* Annuairef p. 286. 

• pp. 678-9. 


^ of a state of war,' ^ the vessel could not be confiscated, but 
would ultimately have to be delivered up to its owners at 
the conclusion of the blockade. 

It is a frequent complaint that states use pacific blockade 
as a means of compulsion to avoid restrictions to which 
they would be exposed as belligerents.* There is a con- 
siderable amount of truth in this criticism, but, as M. Jules 
Ferry said in the Chamber of Deputies, ' il 6tait d'une 
sagesse ^l^mentaire de ne pas compliquer notre confiit . . . 
de diff6rends ou de difficult^s avec les puissances neutres.' ^ 
It is, indeed, to prevent the enforcement of the rules of 
neutrality that pacific blockade has been so much employed. 
Before the passing of the United States Neutrality Act 
of 1794 the rights of neutrals were very ill defined, and 
there was little check on the conduct of a belligerent. There 
was no hard-and-fast rule that a neutral must not assist 
a beUigerent, and therefore there was no reason why a 
belligerent should wish to maintain a state of peace if he 
was employing forcible means of coercion against another 
state. But during the last century the present law of 
neutrality has been built up, and the duties of belligerents 
are now much stricter than they were a hundred years ago. 
Hence has arisen the desire to escape their effect, at any 
rate where the matter in dispute is small, and there seems 
no reason why this result should not be accomplished by 
means of a compromise, just as many of the existing rules 
of International Law have been formed. It is necessary, 
therefore, to consider the exact reason for the present rules 
as to the capture of neutral property by belligerents. When 
two states are at war, the object of each is to cripple the 
resources of the other and force it to acquiesce in its oppo- 
nent's demands. The issues at stake between belligerent 
Btates are deemed of such magnitude as to override the 
less important rights of other states not directly engaged 
in the struggle. These are called neutrals. Each of the 

^ Hall, IfUerruUumcd Law (4th ed.), p. 392. 

* e.g. Westlake, Bevue de droit intemoHonal, t. yii» p. 611 ; Geffcken, 
Annuaire, p. 290. 

• Jovmal Officid, November 27, 1884, p. 246. 


combatants is entitled to prevent the subjects of a neutral 
state giving assistance to the other in certain specified 
ways, such as supplying munitions of war or revictualling 
a blockaded port. On the other hand, neutral states are 
subject to a duty to each of the combatants not to give 
assistance to the other in certain ways, such as allowing 
the use of their ports as a base or coaling station. Accord- 
ingly most states have laid down regulations stating exactly 
what may and may not be allowed to a belligerent. If, 
however, a neutral state allows one belligerent to obtain 
more assistance than is permitted by the rules of Inter- 
national Law, the other belligerent is entitled to ask for 
and obtain compensation for the damage it has thereby 
suffered, as was the case over the Alabama claims. But 
such a claim for compensation can only be made by a 
belligerent ; and it is only because two states are actually 
at war that this duty devolves upon other states. It is 
obvious, therefore, that if one state, although subjected to 
coercion by another, does not regard itself as at war, it 
can have no claim as a belligerent for compensation against 
a third state for any assistance that that state may render 
to the coercing state. It follows further from this, that 
if the only reason for enforcing the rules of neutrality has 
been taken away, there is no need to enforce such rules 
against the coercing state. The coercing state would, 
therefore, be right in protesting against the enforcement 
of rules which are intended no longer for the benefit of 
a neutral, but for that of a combatant who ex hypothesi 
would not in such a case exist.^ On the other hand, a state 
engaged in war has the right of interfering in some degree 
with neutral commerce. Although, however, the measure 
of force used in a pacific blockade does not approach that 
which might be used in a war, yet the reason for its use 
at all — that the state against which it is used may be coerced 

^ Bnt cf. Woolsey, IniroducUan to Study of Iniemational Law, 4th ed., 
p. 444. Where violence has occuned ' the party injured has a right in 
snch cases to regard the condition of things as one of war, and neutral 
states, in the event of a so-caUed pacific blockade, would have an equal 
right to claim that a state of war existed '. Why ? 


into falling in with the views of the state coercing — ^is the 
same. It is, therefore, arguable that, as the reasons for 
the employment of force are identical, the results as to 
third states should be identical also, and that the coercing 
state should have the right of interfering with the com- 
merce of such third states to the extent necessary for accom- 
pUshing its aims. It is obvious that if the coercing state 
thought it essential that the commerce of other states 
'Should be prevented from coming to the blockaded port, 
it might achieve its object by declaring that it was at war 
with the state whose ports were blockaded. In such a case 
it would have the usual war rights, not merely of inter- 
ference and detention, but also of capture and confiscation. 
. It surely, therefore, is more convenient to a third state 
not to put in force its neutrality regulations if it is not to 
be called to account for any breach of them by the blockaded 
state, and it surely also is a great advantage to it if its 
vessels are only liable to detention instead of confiscation.^ 
Both these advantages can be obtained by a third state 
by acquiescing in the interference with its commerce to 
the extent above suggested. If a third state will not 
accept these terms the alternative is clear. War will be 
declared, and it will be in a much worse position than it 
would have been had it not protested. This tact was 
fully recognized in the case of the Formosan blockade. 
Great Britain and France came to an agreement that the 
former on the one hand would not make any formal declara- 
tion of neutrality, while the latter would refrain from the 
search or capture of neutral vessels on the high seas. This 
agreement was beneficial to both parties, and, although it 
was not of long duration in this instance, owing to China 
regarding the blockade as warlike and insisting on its 
rights as a belligerent, it affords a good precedent for cases 
in which the blockaded state is ready to recognize the 

^ Cf. Fillet, Les loia acitieUea de la guerre, p. 143 : ' £vidBinment un 
blocuB pacifique ne prodiura bob effet qu'^ la condition d'interdiie anx 
neutres Tacc^s do la place bloqu6e ; cela est rigottreux, mais combien 
serait plus rigonieuz encore une guerre qui, interyenant, or^rait k, leur 
charge des obligations multiples et singuli^rement plus 6tendues ! ' 


pacific nature of the blockade. The whole of the present 
law of neutrality has been gradually built up by com- 
promises between the conflicting interests of belligerents 
and neutrals, and it would seem, therefore, better for all 
parties concerned that some such compromise between the 
conflicting rights of the blockading state and other states 
not concerned in the quarrel should be definitely ceached. 
Moreover, if the grounds on which pacific blockades in the 
past have been instituted are studied, it will be found that 
in almost every case the blockaded state has first violated 
some well-known rule of International Law, and that the 
weapon of pacific blockade has been used to make it con- 
form to the ordinary rules of International Law and cour- 
tesy. In other words, that it is used as a measure of inter- 
national police. And, since all states are equally concerned 
that every state which has been admitted to the rights and 
privileges of membership of the family of nations should 
carry out the duties imposed on it by such a position, it 
might have been supposed that they would have been 
willing to co-operate with any state or body of states which 
was endeavouring to compel another to conform to the 
rules of International Law. Such an argument must not, 
however, be pushed too far, for it practically amounts to 
saying that a third state should acquiesce in interference 
with its commerce in the case of a pacific blockade if it is 
instituted in a just and righteous cause. But whatever 
influence the existence of a proper motive may have on the 
politician pr the moralist. International Law cannot take 
account of such matters.^ Its province is to determine 
what results must follow from certain acts quite apart 
from the question as to the morality of such a^ts in any 
particular circumstances. 

' The Institnte of International Law refused by fourteen votes to ten 
to add the words ' s'il est motiv^ par une juste cause ' to the rules it 
adopted with regard to pacific blockade {AnnMaire, p. 299). But cf. Oppen- 
heim, ii, § 48, who lays down that a pacific blockade is only justifiable 
after the failure of negotiations ; also Bulmerincq, pp. 678-9, who states 
that there should be a just cause and that this should be stated in the 


The argument in favour of interfering with the vessels 
of third states is considerably stronger where a number of 
states have combined to enforce a pacific blockade. The 
basis of International Law, according to Grotius, was the 
equality of all states before the law, whatever their size ; 
but of late signs have not been wanting to show that this 
theoretical equality is not in accordance with present-day 
facts. Lawrence,^ in dealing with the question of the 
Concert of Europe, has called attention to the fact that the 
Great Powers of Europe have gradually assumed a right of 
dictation in certain international matters, and particularly 
as to Turkish affairs, and although this hegemony, as he 
terms it, is in conflict with the fundamental principle of 
Grotius, yet the student of International Law is forced 
by the logic of facts to recognize its existence. The Concert 
of Europe has been responsible for two pacific blockades 
— those of Greece in 1886 and of Crete in 1897 — ^while 
several others have been undertaken by a combination of 
states, notably the blockade of Venezuela by Great Britain, 
Germany and Italy, and that of Zanzibar by the same 
powers with the co-operation of Portugal and France. In 
all of these cases except that of Greece the vessels of third 
states have been subjected to some interference, and it 
might, therefore, be very well argued that where the block- 
ading force is composed of the vessels of various states their 
collective action ought to be endorsed by the remaining 
states permitting some interference with their commerce. 

This view is apparently taken by a French jurist who 
has Uttle sympathy, on the whole, with the pacific blockades 
of the past. M. Calvo writes : ' Nous voudrions qu'un blocus 
pacifique ne fut et ne put 6tre consid6re comme legitime 
par I'ensemble des nations que quand il aurait ^t6 jug6 
necessaire et justement motive, comme dans le cas de 
1886, par le consentement unanime d'un nombre suffisant 
d'hommes d'etat, repr6sentant assez de points de vue 
divers et d'int6r6ts opposes pour qu'on puisse croire que 
I'opinion de la majority se rapproche autant de P^quite 

^ Essays on Dispttted Questions in International Law, and Principles of 
International Law, pp. 66-7. 


absolue qu*on pout Pattendre des jugements humains.' ^ 
After mentioning various other conditions, he concludes: 
* Soumisik de pareilles conditions, le blocus pacifique change- 
rait de caractdre : d'arme dans la main des grandes puis- 
sances pour imposer leur volont6 aux puissances secon-* 
daires, il deviendrait un moyen r6serv6 au concert des nations 
pour reprimer les actes politiques soulevant la reprobation 
universeUe, et ^videmment contraire k la justice et au bon 

Apart from the somewhat sophistical justifications for 
interference with the vessels of third states during a pacific 
blockade, which have been put forward above, there is 
the much more substantial argument based on the fact 
that, although such vessels have been interfered with in 
nearly all the pacific blockades of the past, there have been 
very few protests against such interference, and that third 
states must therefore, on the whole, be taken to have im- 
pliedly consented to such interference. In 1838 the Hanse 
towns of Bremen, Lubeck and Hamburg protested against 
the confiscation of their vessels during the blockade of 
Mexico by France ; ' while in 1846 the representatives of 
the United States, Portugal and Bolivia protested against 
the blockade of the Argentine ports by Great Britain and 
France.^ The absence of any other formal protests* is not 
due to any lack of initiative on the part of the traders 
and merchants concerned. In 1838 the British merchants 
petitioned Lord Palmerston to make representations to 
France on their behalf with regard to her conduct of the 
blockades of Mexico and Buenos Ayres, but he refused to 
do so.^ In 1884, when France was blockading the island 

» Calvo, § 1869. 

* Ducrocq, p. 114. In a note on p. 69, however, the same anthor refers 
this incident to the blockade of Buenos Ayres by France in the same year* 

* Faloke, footnote, p. 37, 

^ The protest which Russia addressed to Great Britain (B. S. P. 1850, 
vol. Ivi, Annuai Begister, 1850, pp. 279 et seq.) in 1850 against the blockade 
of Greece was directed against the blockade as a whole, and not in particular 
against the treatment accorded to the vessels of third states ; as a matter 
of fact, in this case the vessels of third states were unmolested. 

* B, S. P. 1839, vol, zlviii at p. 275 ; ' Memorials and Correspondence 


of Formosa, which was then in Chinese hands, Lord Gran- 
ville wrote to M. Waddington that ' Her Majesty's Govern- 
ment cannot admit any such novel doctrine as that British 
ships are liable to capture for entering certain treaty ports 
of China in time of peace. But they maintain that a state 
of war exists, and therefore do not deny the right of the 
French Government to establish an effective blockade of 
the ports in question.' ^ In other words, a protest would 
have been made if the operations had merely amounted 
to a pacific blockade. Again, in the blockade of the coasts 
of Siam which was instituted by France in 1893, a protest 
would undoubtedly have been made by Great Britain if 
the blockade had lasted longer than two or three days. 
Of the shipping at Bangkok 87 per cent, in tonnage and 
93 per cent, in value was British,^ and Lord Rosebery was 
repeatedly urged by merchants and companies trading 
with those parts' to protest formally against the French 
action. That this was not done was probably due to the 
fact that he was still waiting for definite information when 
the blockade was raised. 

Another blockade in which a protest was made but 
subsequently withdrawn was that of Zanzibar. This 
blockade arose out of the obligation to suppress the slave 
trade, and was reaUy in the nature of a measure of inter- 
national police. A dhow sailing under the French flag 
was stopped by the British men of war, and the French 
consul at Zanzibar protested. Subsequently, however, the 
French Government informed their consul that they had 
no objection to the search of their dhows by the English 
and German admirals under the delegated authority of the 
Sultan in his territorial waters.* 

It may, of course, be that, as in the case of Formosa, 

relative to the Protection of British Commerce against the Blockades of 
Mexico and Buenos Ayres instituted by the Governments of France.' 

* B. S. P. Prance, No. 1 (1886), p. 4. Letter of November 11, 1884. 

* B. S. P. Siam, No. 1 (1894), p. 82. 
» B. S. P. Siam, No. 1 (1894). 

* B. S. P. Africa, No. 1 (1889), p. 40 ; vide also notice, p. 66, reproduced 
Appendix, p. 179. - ^ 


protests have failed to be made because the states whose 
ships have been interfered with believed that the operations 
carried on were those of war, and that therefore the inter- 
ference was justifiable by the rights of belligerents. But, 
whether this be so or not, the fact remains that third states 
have in the past failed to protest against the exercise of 
jurisdiction over their vessels by a state conducting a pacific 
blockade, and, seeing that this failure is not confined to one 
solitary instance, but has extended over a number of cases, 
it may weU be argued that a rule allowing a state conducting 
a pacific blockade to have some jurisdiction over the vessels 
of other states entering the waters of the blockaded state is 
in course of formation. Unless a rule of International Law 
is agreed on at some united conference, such as that of Paris 
or The Hague, it must always be a question of gradual growth, 
and it is often doubtful whether it has been sufficiently 
observed to have actually become recognized. Such is the 
position of the practice of interfering with the vessels of 
third states during a pacific blockade to-day. Additional 
weight to the arguments for its reception is, however, 
undoubtedly given by the fact that several of the most 
important maritime powers^ have, in conducting pacific 
blockades, themselves interfered with the vessels of third 
states, and may therefore be considered as debarred from 
denying that such conduct is permissible. As a matter of 
fact, this would not probably prevent a state protesting 
if it thought its interests were endangered, as states axe 
not always constant in their adherence to one particular 
point of view ; but it would certainly greatly lessen the 
force of the protest. 

Coming now to the actual practice of states, we find 
that in six blockades the vessels of third states were not 
made liable to capture and detention, while in three more, 
namely, those of Carthagena by France in 1834, San Salva- 
dor by France in- 1842, and Bolivia by Chili in 1879, there 
is no definite information as to the method in which they 
were treated. In all other cases it would appear that the 

* Viz. Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and Austria- 


vessels of third states were at least liable to be turned away 
from the blockaded ports. 

In only one case does it appear that any vessels belonging 
to a third state were sunk. During the blockade of Crete 
by the Great Powers, in 1897, an Austrian warship sank a 
schooner that was engaged in disembarking arms for the 
insurgents,^ while on another occasion the British warship 
Dryad, after removing the cargo of flour from three boats 
she had captured, sank them, owing to the bad weather 
preventing her taking them into harbour. Such action 
cannot be too strongly condemned. The recent Busso^ 
Japanese war has presented several cases of the sinking 
of neutral vessels ' before condemnation by a prize court, 
and opinion generally has been unfavourable to the assump* 
tion of such a right. The property in neutral goods and 
ships is not definitely transferred until a competent court 
has declared that the capture was justifiable, and therefore 
if a neutral ship cannot be brought in for adjudication 
it ought to be released.' If this is so in time of war with 
regard to neutral vessels, much more ought the rule to be 
followed with regard to the vessels of third states when, 
nominally at any rate, peace prevails. 

In three blockades vessels of third states were condemned 
by prize courts set up by the blockading states. Before 
the blockade of Mexico, in 1838, became warlike, some forty- 
six vessels belonging to various third states were seized by 
the French warships and condemned for breaking the 
blockade.^ The Hanse towns of Bremen, Hamburg and 
Liibeck protested against this condemnation, but without 
effect.^ Vessels belonging to third states were also cap- 
tured and condemned during the two blockades of the 
La Plata,^ but the first of these was probably an operation 
of war, and the second has been so considered by several 

» B. S. P. Turkey, No. 9 (1897), p. 26, 

• e.g. the case of the Knight Commander. 

• Hall, International Law, 6th ed., pp. 734-6 ; The Zee Star, iv Rob. 71 ; 
The Fdicity, ii Dodson, 383 ; The Lefucade, Spinks, 211. 

• Duorocq, p. 114. 

• Vide infra, pp. 90 and 103, 


writel's, in spite of the declaration of the French Conseil 
d'£tat to the contrary.^ The published notices with regard 
to the blockades of Nicaragua^ in 1842 and Venezuela* 
in 1902-3 show that in these cases the vessels of third states 
were liable to capture and condemnation, though there is 
no evidence of any having been condemned. Again, the 
Zanzibar (Prize Court) Order in Council of 1888,* by con- 
stituting a prize court to deal with cases arising during the 
blockade of Zanzibar and giving the Consul-Grcneral the 
jurisdiction of a Court of Vice- Admiralty, clearly shows 
a similar intention. 

In several other blockades the notices are not very clear 
as to the treatment to be accorded to the vessels of third 
states. Thus in the blockades of Nicaragua (1844), Buceo 
(1845), Gaeta (1860-1), Formosa (1884-6) and Siam (1893),^ 
it is declared that the 'measures sanctioned by the law 
of nations ' will be taken against such vessels, or that they 
will be treated 'in conformity with International Law 
and the treaties in force. '• But 'the only thing certain 
about the situation is that International Law suppUes no 
rules applicable to the situation.* "^ As a matter of fact, 
however, these expressions probably meant that vessels 
would be warned of the existence of the blockade, and that 
if they then attempted to violate it they would be liable 
to capture and condemnation. 

In the blockade of Nicaragua, in 1844, the two foreign 
vessels which approached the port of San Juan during the 
blockade were warned and turned away ; but in that of 
New Granada, in 1837, a French brig was detained for a few 
days, although no previous warning seems to have been 
given it. 

* Pistoye et Duverdy, Traiti dea prisea maritimea, t. i, p. 390 : Le ConUe 

* Vide infra, p. 161 

* Vide infra, p. 183. 

* L. Q. December 21, 1888. 

' Of these the blockades of Formosa and Gaeta (the latter at any rate 
after the notice to the powers) should properly be considered as warlike. 

* For actual text vide the notices in Appendix. 
' Law Times, November 1, 1884. 



The blockades of Crete and Zanzibar are in many respects 
analogous. In both a portion of the dominions of the 
reigning Sultan was in more or less open rebellion, which he 
was practically powerless to subdue. In the one case the 
Sultan of Turkey wished to put down the insurgents in order 
that the island of Crete might be peaceably and quietly 
governed, and in the other the Sultan of Zanzibar, under 
the pressure of Great Britain, wished to put down the slave 
trade and the importation of arms which made it possible. 
In both the blockade was instituted by the blockading 
states with the consent of the nominal sovereign of the 
district blockaded. In both the check on commerce was 
not universal, but only extended to a particular class, and 
in both again the object was to secure a different condition 
of affairs, which the reigning monarch was perfectly willing, 
but powerless, to bring about. In these cases interference 
with the limitations of the commerce of other states was 
not great and was confijcied to what was necessary for the 
successful carrying out of these measures of international 

In view of the diversity of practice described above, 

it is difficult to say that any general agreement has been 

arrived at as to the treatment which should be accorded 

to the ships of third states. It may, however, be said that 

while they have been, as a general rule, interfered with to 

some extent, that interference has rarely gone beyond 

detention, and the only cases of actual confiscation took place 

more than fifty years ago, when the practice of pacific 

I blockade was of recent growth, and when the basis on 

1 which it could be justified had hardly been realized. 

\ Detention, on the whole, seems to have been the fate of 

\those vessels of third states which did attempt to violate 

rpacific blockades in the past, although in a few cases, 

like that of Nicaragua in 1844, they were merely turned 

away. It is clear, therefore, that practically the same result 

is arrived at by a consideration of the actual treatment 

of such vessels in the pacific blockades of the past as from 

the examination of the amount of interference which may 

theoretically be justifiable, and it may, therefore, be laid 


down with some degree of assurance that the proper treat- 
ment of vessels of third states which attempt to violate a 
pacific blockade is in any case to turn them away, and 
perhaps also to detain them until the ends for which the 
pacific blockade was instituted have been attained and 
the blockade itself raised. 

Several minor questions with regard to the treatment of 
such vessels remain to be considered. In an ordinary 
warlike blockade it has become customary to allow certain 
days of grace for neutral vessels to clear from a blockaded 
port. Hall * says : ' The period which is allowed for the exit 
of ships is usually fixed at fifteen days, and during this time 
vessels may issue freely in ballast or with a cargo bona fide 
'bought and shipped before the commencement of the 
blockade.' A pacific blockade should certainly not be 
more stringent, and accordingly it is found that in several 
cases days of grace have been allowed. In the blockade of 
Mexico by France fifteen days were allowed, a period which 
was extended to forty-two days in the blockade of Buenos 
Ayres the same year. In the second blockade of La Plata 
eleven days were allowed in the case of the port of Buceo 
and fifteen for Buenos Ayres, the latter period being subse- 
quently extended to thirty-seven days. Three days only 
were allowed by France in her blockades of Formosa and 
Siam ; but in the latest blockade — that of Venezuela — a 
period of fifteen days was granted. In the case of Gaeta 
eight days' notice of the commencement of the blockade 
was given, and it only applied to contraband of war. Even 
then it appears that, after the protests of the captains of 
certain vessels, British and American ships were not inter-, 
fered with. Subsequently, when notice of the blockade 
was officially given by the Sardinian (Jovemment, no days 
of grace were, allowed and the blockade was universal.^ 
Probably, however, it did not actually affect any vessels and 
was of short duration. With regard to the other pa.cifio 
blockades, six, it will be remembered, did not apply to the 
vessels of third states, while those of Crete and Zanzibar 
Q^pplied only to a particular kind of traffic^ In none of these 
* 6th ed., p. 707. * Vide infra, pp. 114-7, and Appendix, p, 17L 

S 2 


cases, therefore, would any declaration as to days of grace 
be required. In the case of the two blockades of San Juan 
de Nicaragua, it is probable that there was no foreign shipping 
in the harbour ; ^ while the blockade of New Granada by 
Great Britain, in 1837, was extremely short, and, so far as 
can be ascertained, only applied to inward-bound vessels. 
This leaves the blockades of Carthagena and San Salvador 
by France and Bolivia by Chili as to which no information 
is available. It may, therefore, be laid down that it has been 
customary in pacific blockades to aUow the vessels of third 
states Ipng in a blockaded port certain days of grace for 
their departure. The usual term has apparently been 
fifteen days.^ 

The recent blockade of Venezuela was the occasion for 
an innovation which, it is conceivable, may be followed in 
the future. Vessels which had before the notification sailed 
for Venezuelan ports had a certain period, varying with their 
port of departure and according as they were steam or sail- 
ing vessels, allowed them to enter such ports and discharge.* 
This seems a very reasonable arrangement, and one which is 
likely to do much to reconcile third states to the rigour 
of a blockade. It may be contrasted with the conduct of 
the blockade of Nicaragua in 1844, which was instituted 
because the three principal cargoes of the year were just 
expected to arrive.* 

In only three cases has any exception been made with 
regard to mail-packets. They were allowed free entry into 
the ports when the coasts of Mexico were blockaded by 
France in 1838, while in the blockade of Buenos Ayres, in 
the same year, the British representative was informed that 

^ In 1844 the three principal cargoes of the year were expected just as 
the blockade was instituted. 

• Bulmerincq, pp. 578-9. 

' But Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia, 1902, p. 829, notes the case of the 
American merchantman Caracas, which had started on a voyage to La 
Guayra and had been permitted to enter that port, and then, before she had 
discharged half her cargo, was compelled to leave on December 23 by the 
German naval forces. 

* Report of J. Bainbridge to Commodore Sharpe, C.B., dated April 26» 
1841. P. B.O. Bundle 5642. 


' Her Majesty's branch packets conveying the mails between 
Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Ayres would meet with no 
interruption from the blockading squadron upon the con- 
dition that the commanders of the said packets should 
declare upon their word of honour that they are not bearers 
of any merchandize (sic) subject to Custom House duties.'^ 
The third instance is that of Siam, in 1893, where the French 
admiral announced : ' I have ordered the cruisers which are 
guarding the line of blockade to allow mail-steamers from 
Europe to approach as near as the anchorage of Koh-si- 
Chang, where they will have to hand over their mails to the 
French minister, who is willing to undertake to have them 
transmitted to you by the quickest means.' ^ 

In a warlike blockade ' the right possessed by a belligerent 
of excluding neutral ships of war from a blockaded place 
is usually waived in practice as a matter of international 
courtesy '.^ The only occasion on which such an exemption 
was specifically notified in the course of a pacific blockade 
occurred in that of Mexico by France, in 1838,* while in 
view of the fact that it was announced that warships were 
subject to the three days' grace ^ which was allowed to 
vessels in the blockade of Siam in 1893, it may be inferred 
that in that case the French admiral intended to subject 
them to the ordinary rules of the blockade. 

^ L, O. June 22, 1838, and vide Appendix, p. 161. 

• B. S. P. Siam, No. 1 (1894), p, 174, and vide Appendix, p. 182. 
»HaU,6tlied.,p. 711. 

• Dacrocq^ p. 113. 

• B. S. P. Siam, No. 1 (1894), p. 167, letter of IVench admiral covering 
notice of blockade 



In the preceding chapters an attempt has been made to 
estimate how far the practice of pacific blockade has been 
accepted as an integral part of International Law. The 
results of that investigation may perhaps best be sum- 
marized in the following series of propositions : — 

1. Any state or states may blockade the coasts and ports 
of another state in time of peace to coerce the latter into 
acting in accordance with the wishes of the blockading 
state or states.^ If the state whose coasts or ports are 
blockaded is not prepared to regard the blockade as an act 
of war, the blockade is termed pacific. 

2. It is usual to warn the state to be blockaded of the 
impending blockade. 

3. If vessels flying the flag of any state other than those 
blockading or blockaded are to be interfered with in any 
way, notice of the blockade must be given to the state whose 
flag they fly. It is also usual to give a separate warning 
to each particular vessel before any action, other than that 
of turning such vessels away, is taken with regard to them. 

In such cases, vessels flying the flag of any state other than 
those blockading or blockaded, which are in the port blockaded 
at the time of the institution of the blockade, must be given 
a reasonable time to leave such port without interference 
from the blockading squadron. 

4. The blockading state may treat vessels flying its own 
flag in any way it thinks best. 

5. It is desirable that the blockade should be efiective. 

6. The blockade need not be universal, but may be con- 

1 This must now be read subject to the provisions of the * Convention 
respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery 
of Contract Debts ', which embodies the ' Drago ' doctrine, and was agreed 
to at the second Hague Conference, 1907. [B. S. P. Miscellaneous, No. 1 
(1908), pp. 64-68.] 


fined to some particular commodity or commodities, or to 
the vessels of the state blockaded* 

7. As a general rule all vessels flying the flag of the state 
blockaded, which have been seized during the blockade, 
must be handed back on the raising of the blockade ; 

(a) Where the demands made on the state blockaded, 
being of a pecuniary character, have not been satisfied, such 
vessels may be retained to satisfy them. 

(b) Where any damage has been done to such vessels 
there can be no claim against the state or states blockading 
to make good such damage. 

(c) In exceptional cases, where the blockade is directed 
against some practice, such as slavery, which is contrary to 
international morality, any vessels seized which are engaged 
in such practice may be condemned. 

8. Vessels flying the flag of any state other than those 
blockading or blockaded may not be interfered with except — 

(a) In cases where the blockade has been instituted by 
the Concert of Europe. 

(&) With the consent of the state whose flag they fly, 
such consent to be implied in the absence of any protest 
from such state. 

9. Where, under the exceptions to the last preceding rule, 
interference with vessels flying the flag of a state other than 
those blockading or blockaded is permissible, such inter- 
ference must not go beyond the detention of such vessels 
during the existence of the blockade. 

It is believed that these propositions faithfully represent 
the present rules of International Law on the subject, but 
it cannot be said that anything like a final settlement has 
yet been reached. At present it is policy and not law 
which guides third states in their attitude towards a pacific 
blockade, and if such blockade is detrimental to their 
interests they are not likely to allow the blockading state 
a free hand. Disputes, therefore, are bound to occur, but 
with ea^h, a nearer approach should be made to the formula- 
tion of a definite code of rules on the subject. It is, perhaps, 
a little difficult to foresee exactly on what lines the practice 


will eventually crystallize, but the tendency undoubtedly is 
to make pacific blockades apply to all vessels, to whatever 
state they belong. That this would be an invasion of the 
rights of third states as at present understood, is undoubted, 
but they have been slow in the past to insist on their rights 
in this respect, and they would probably gain more than 
they lost by allowing sufficient interference with their 
vessels to make the blockade effective. It is certainly 
desirable, in the interests of peace, that states should not 
be prevented from making use of this method of settling 
international difficulties. But such a result would inevi- 
tably f oUow from limiting the scope of a pacific blockade 
to the vessels of the states blockading and blockaded. It 
is probable, therefore, that, as the disinclination for war 
becomes greater, the rules of neutrality stricter, and the 
hegemony of the Great Powers more pronounced, some 
definite compromise will be reached on this point. Such 
a compromise might well be that third states should allow 
vessels flying their flag to be detained if they attempted 
to enter the blockaded ports. By so doing they would 
confer on the blockading state a right of interference with 
their vessels which strictly it had not formerly possessed, 
but on the other hand it would guard such vessels from 
capture and confiscation, which might well have been their 
lot had the blockading state been forced to go to war instead 
of using a pacific blockade to gain its ends. 



GREECE, 1827 1 

The Greek movement for independence started in 1821, 
but no active intervention of the other powers took place 
mitil 1827, although there had been a considerable amount 
of private assistance before that date. The general con- 
dition of aflEairs could scarcely have been worse. ' Piracy, 
the consequence of the strife which has desolated during 
five years the provinces of Greece, is rife in the Archipelago. 
The security of navigation is destroyed. No flag is respected. 
Ships are seized, cargoes are pillaged ; the crews, often ill- 
treated, esteem themselves happy if they escape with their 
lives. Finally, the squadrons of several Governments, main- 
tained at great cost in the waters of the Levant, do not 
suffice to protect commerce.' * 

After the death of the Emperor Alexander of Russia, on 
December 1, 1826, Great Britain and Russia entered into 
a protocol which was signed at St. Petersburg on April 4, 
1826.^ It was agreed that a suggestion should be made 
to the Porte that Greece should become a tributary depen- 
dency with internal freedom. This mediation was refused 
by the Porte in a manifesto dated June 9, 1827.* The 
other powers were then asked to join in coercing the Porte. 

^ (a) B. S. P. 1863, * Conespondenoe with Russia relative to the affairs 
of Greece previous to the conclusion of the treaty of July 6, 1827 ' 
B. S. P. 1828, vol. xiv ; Falcke, 02-82. 

(6) Annual RegiOer, 1827, pp. 310 et seq. ; Bar^ pp. 18-25 ; Bui 
merincq, p. 570 ; Calvo, S§ 1833 and 171 ; Ducrocq, pp. 92-100 ; Haute 
feuiUe, Dea droits et dea devoirs dee nations nenUres, 3rd ed« (1868), 
pp. 259-^. 

(c) Finlay, History of Greece (1877), voL vii, pp. 1-27. 

' B. S. P. 1863, op. cit., p. 12. Letter, Mr. Stratford Canning to Beis 
£ffendi, June 13, 1826. * Ibid., p. 5. 

* B. S. P. 1828, xiv, p. 1042. 


Austria and Prussia declined, but France agreed to act in 
conjunction with Great Britain and Russia, and entered 
into a protocol with those powers, which was signed at 
London on July 6, 1827. This bore the title ' Treaty for 
the Pacification of Greece.'^ By it the three powers agreed 
to offer their mediation to the Porte ; while an additional 
secret article provided that if the Porte did not accept the 
mediation within one month ' the said High Powers intend 
to exert all the means circumstances may suggest to their 
prudence for the purpose of obtaining the immediate effect 
of the armistice of which they desire the execution by 
preventing as far as possible all collision between the con- 
tending parties ',2 and that they would transmit to their 
adniiral& ' conditional instructions in conformity to the 
arrangement above declared \ 

Mediation was offered in accordance with this treaty. 
It was rejected by the Porte, but accepted by the Greeks 
in August, 1827.^ Thereupon a fresh note was presented 
by which the three powers declared that they would take 
the necessary measures to enforce a suspension of hostilities, 
but without in any way interrupting the friendly relations 
subsisting between themselves and the Turkish Government. 

On September 10 a communication was addressed to the 
consulates that orders would be sent immediately to the 
commander of the allied squadrons to act on the regula- 
tions already laid down, and that if any Turkish or Egyptian 
vessel endeavoured to send supplies or succour by force 
to the Morea the attempt was to be resisted by force. 

The Egyptian fleet of ninety-two sail, with five thousand 
troops on board, had, in the meantime, arrived at the Morea. 
The Turkish commander, Ibrahim Pasha, was informed by 
the English commander of the negotiations that were pro- 

* B. S. P. 1803, op. cit., p. 7 ; Hertslet, Treaties, vol. iv, pp. 304-13. 

• Count Nesselrode, in a letter to Prince lieven, June 21, 1827 (B. S. P. 
1863, op. cit., p. 26), had mentioned as the ultimate resort of a graduated 
series of coercive measures the 'union of the squadrons of the con- 
tracting powers with the object of preventing all help of men, arms, 
or of Egyptian or Turkish vessels from arriving in Greece or in the Archi- 
pelago '. 

» B. S. P. 1828, op. cit., p. 1048. 

PARTU GREECE, 1827 75 

ceeding, and told that he would be allowed to enter the 
bay of Navarino without molestation, but that if any of 
his vessels subsequently ventured out they would be driven 
in again. 

On September 19 Ibrahim sent out a small squadron^ 
but this was immediately turned back by Sir E. Codrington, 
and Ibrahim then agreed to await orders from his master 
the Sultan* The French squadron arrived on the 21st, 
and a few days later Ibrahim met the French and EngUsh 
admirals in a conference at which a sort of armistice for 
twenty days was arranged, including an agreement for 
Turkish transports to leave the Dardanelles regularly with 
provisions under the convoy (alternately) of English and 
French ships of war. The two squadrons then sailed away 
to revictual, having left a couple of vessels to watch the 
Turkish fleet. Ibrahim again ventured out on September 30, 
but was again turned back by Codrington, who returned 
for the purpose. 

Meantime there were constant negotiations and con- 
ferences at Constantinople, but the Porte kept a stubborn 
silence, and Ibrahim mercilessly put down the insurrection 
on land with fire and sword. The Russian admiral arrived 
on October 18, and a conference was immediately held 
between the three admirals as to the best method of carrying 
out their rather indefinite instructions to secure the pacifi- 
cation of the peninsula. They saw that if they merely block- 
aded the coast Ibrahim would be at liberty to continue his 
ravages in the interior. They therefore decided to enter 
the bay with their fleets and force Ibrahim to stop the 
incursions, believing that he would yield without making 
any resistance.'- Accordingly, on October 20, the three 
squadrons proceeded to take up their anchorage in the bay 
of Navarino. Orders were given that not a shot was to 
be fired imless they were opposed. But as they were 
entering the bay the Turks appear to have started firing 
on a small boat carrying messages, and in spite of attempts 
to stop the fighting the battle soon became general without 
any apparent plan or design. In four hours the Turkish 
* Monileur, November 4, 1827, and of. Bards, pp. 18-26, 


and Egyptian fleets disappeared with a loss of from seven 
to eight thousand men. The French lost forty-three killed 
and the English seventy-five, besides one hundred and 
ninety-seven wounded, while the Russians, being in the 
rear, suffered the least. Several of the English battle-ships 
had to be sent home to England for repairs. 

In spite, however, of this occurrence, Turkey committed 
no warlike act, and the ambassadors of the allied powers 
still remained at Constantinople for some time. It is true 
that an embargo was placed on foreign vessels at the Golden 
Horn, but this was as much in their interest as in that of 
the Porte, and no disorder resulted. In spite of the sarcastic 
remark of the Reis Effendi, in reply to the protestations of 
friendship of the foreign powers, that ' c'est absolument 
comme si, cassant la tete d'un homme, je Tassurerais en 
mSme temps de mon amiti6 ',^ it is fairly evident that no 
state of war existed, but that the whole proceedings came 
within the international meaning of the term ' pacific '.* 
No notification of this blockade appears to have been 
published in the London Gazette, and it is not known whether 
it actually appUed to the vessels of third states or not, 
although Hautef euille says, ' Ce blocus fut d6clar6 obliga- 
toire pour les peuples neutres.'* In all probability, how- 
ever, the constant struggle since 1821 had resulted in the 
almost complete disappearance of any neutral commerce 
from Greek waters and the point is not, therefore, of very 
great importance. 

The battle of Navarino was designated by George IV as 
' inopportune ', and its result ' a deplorable event '. But it 
effected the object of the powers. An end was put to the 
sanguinary struggle in the Morea, and Greece ultimately 
became an independent state, its independence being recog- 
nized on February 3, 1830, by a protocol of the three powers, 
which was accepted by Greece and the Porte.* 

^ Holland, p. 137. 

' Bulmerincq (p. 670) writes that the blockade of Gieeoe cannot be 
' He quotes no authority, op. cit., p. 260, 
* Bulmerincq, p. 570, 

PART n 77 

PORTUGAL, 18311 

In 1831 the usurper Dom Miguel was seated as an absolute 
monarch on the throne of Portugal. The ordinary rights 
of foreigners were completely set aside, and the scandalous 
way in which some of them were treated* caused both 
Great Britain and France to interfere on their behalf. The 
demands of Great Britain were satisfied, probably because 
of the treaty of alliance which existed between the two 
nations, but no attention was paid to those of France. 
Accordingly a naval expedition under the command of 
Vice-Admiral Roussin was dispatched to secure reparation. 
An ultimatum was delivered on May 19, 1831, demanding 
the liberation of certain Frenchmen and the payment of 
an indemnity. Forty-eight hours were given within which 
to comply.^ The Portuguese Government asked Great 
Britain to intervene, but this was refused. Nothing having 
been done to satisfy the French demands, a blockade of the 
Portuguese coast was instituted, but this was confined to 
Portuguese vessels.* No notice was given to other powers, 
and the only notice to the Portuguese authorities was the 
warning contained in the above-mentioned ultimatum. On 
July 2 the French squadron pursued a Portuguese merchant 
vessel as far as Cascale and was fired on by the fort there. 
The fire was returned and the vessel was eventually cut 
out by the boats of the squadron.^ A few days later two 
Government vessels, the Orestes and the Urania, were cap- 
tured,® and these, with the merchantmen, were sent to 
France. A fresh demand for satisfaction was made on 
July 8, and Baron Roussin, in writing to the Portuguese 
minister. Viscount de Santarem, stated that ' Dans le cas 
contraire la guerre se trouvant d6clar6e de fait entre la 

* (a) B. S. P. 1831, ' Correspondence relative to the French demands 
upon the Government of Portugal ; ' Ducrocq, pp. 100-3 ; Falcke, pp. 43-9. 

(h) Bards, pp. 26-« ; Buhnerincq, pp. 571-2 ; Calvo, { 1834. 

(c) Annual Register, 1831, pp. 444-7. 

■ Daorocq, pp. 100-3. ,^^ 

• B. S. P., op. cit., p. 23- • Dncrocq, p. 102. 

» B. S. P., op. cit., p. 44. • ^^^ 


France et le Portugal, toutes les consequences qu'eUe en- 
traine peuvent etre pr6vues.'^ 

As the Portuguese Government remained obdurate, the 
French admiral decided to take stronger measures, and on 
July 11 forced the mouth of the Tagus. The Portuguese 
fleet was drawn up in line ready to defend Lisbon, but 
surrendered without firing a shot. The forts, however, 
opened fire for a short time, and their action resulted in 
a loss to the French of three killed and eleven wounded.^ 

Similar terms were now offered to the Portuguese with 
the following exception, to quote the words of the French 
admiral : ' Je me reserve seulement, en en recueillant lea 
fruits, d'y ajouter des indemnit^s pour les victimes de la 
guerre.'^ The Portuguese Government, after some final 
hesitation, gave way, and a treaty was concluded on July 14.* 
The 17th article of this treaty provided as foUows : ' The 
conditions which precede having been settled, the Portu- 
guese prisoners of war shall immediately be restored. The 
Portuguese merchant ships detained and sent to France 
since the commencement of these hostilities shall in like 
manner be restored, the Portuguese Government being 
burdened with the pajnnent to France . . , of the expenses 
of sequestration occasioned by the detention of these 
vessels.' ^ Article 18 provided for the return of the Orestes 
and the Urania, but no mention whatever was made of 
the Portuguese fleet which had been captured in the mouth 
of the Tagus.® 

The French refused to deliver these vessels up, in spite 
of the Portuguese protests, and finally quitted the Tagua 
on July 30, 

Lord Palmerston took the opinion of the then King's 

1 B, S. P., op, cit., p, 62. • Ibid., p. 64. • Ducrocq, pp. 102-3. 

* For the treaty and the decrees carrying it into effect see Li^>on Gazette, 
July 15 and 16, 1831. • B. S. P., op. cit., p. 65. 

* Calvo (§ 1834) states that the treaty stipulated for the return of alt 
ships of war and commerce, while Ducrocq (p. 103) states that these would 
only be confiscated to the extent ot the costs of the expedition. F, de 
Martens {Traite de droit international, French ed. of 1887) states that the 
Portuguese ships were given back. None of these writers appears to be 
strictly accurate. 


Advocate on the point. After stating the question as 
follows : ' Do the hostilities which took place in the Tagus, 
and in the progress of which the Portuguese fleet gratuitously 
surrendered to the French, entitle France to retain that 
fleet after having received from Portugal complete satis- 
faction of all those demands to enforce which the hostiUties 
were commenced ? ' he repUes, The right to detention ' will 
depend upon the terms of the convention subsequently 
entered into ... for those ships, having surrendered after 
the declaration and during the pendency of hostilities, 
although they made no resistance, are to be considered as 
legitimate prize of war, and not as seized by way of reprisals 

It will be seen, therefore, that the language of both the 
French admiral and the English jurist would justify the 
conclusion that France and Portugal were at war. Even 
Viscount Santarem, the Portuguese minister, in one letter 
of protest writes ; ' It is impossible . , , to admit that 
a war rfe fado waged by France , . . could be productive 
of the same consequences as would result from a war de 
jureJ* ^ Later on, however, he says that there was no 
manifesto, or declaration of war or declaration of blockade.^ 
As a matter of fact, the probability is that no one had 
recognized the compatibiUty of acts of violence with the 
maintenance of a state of peace. It certainly looks as if 
the Portuguese Government had determined not to give 
way till the last minute, and to yield only if actual pressure 
was put upon them. The surrender of their fleet without 
firing a shot seems to point to the fact that the Government 
wished to stop just short of war.^ The actual firing on the 
French vessels may well be explained as the unauthorized 

* B. S. P, op. cit., p. 79. The opinicm, whioh gives a good summary of 
the course of events, contains an interesting discussion as to the true nature 
pf reprisals. 

* Ibid., p. 72. 

* B. S. P. 1831, * Correspondence relative to the French demands upon 
the Government of Portugal subsequent to August 30, 1831.' 

* A contemporary account (Annual Register^ op. cit.), in dealing with 
these events, makes use of the phrase ' if a war existed \ implying that 
the balance of probability was against such existence, 


acts of irresponsible Portuguese officers who could not 
calmly view the coercive action of the French fleet without 
taking some action of their own. 

On this supposition there seems no reason why the whole 
occurrence should not be regarded as an early instance of 
pacific blockade, especially as the vessels of other states 
were not interfered with, and no notification of the blockade 
was made to them, as would have been the case had the 
two powers really been at war.^ 


The Congress of Vienna in 1816 united Belgium and 
HoUand into one state. The arrangement was, however, 
far from popular, owing to their differences in customs, 
religious beUef , and national history. A desire for separa- 
tion from HoUand had accordingly arisen in Belgium, and 
this was greatly stimulated by the revolution in France of 
1830. A congress of the powers was called together at 
London, and the separation of the two countries was decided 
on by a treaty, dated November 13, 1831, and signed by 
Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia and Bel- 
gium. But as these powers were unable to agree what 
coercive measures should be taken to enforce the treaty, 
the London conference was abandoned on October 1, 1832, 
and the matter left to the individual powers. Great Britain 
and France then signed an agreement, dated October 22, 
1832, that they would use force to carry the former treaty 
into execution. This resolution was notified to the authori- 
ties at Brussels and the Hague, and the evacuation of 
Antwerp, which was still garrisoned by the Dutch, was de- 
manded, but without success. 

As HoUand seemed indisposed to yield, Marshal Gerard 

^ Bulmerincq (p. 572), however, writes: 'Ce cas nous apparait done 
encore comme contraire au droit des gens et, en outre, comme un ezcds 
de pouvoir non autoris^.' 

• (a) Ducrocq, pp. 103-9 ; Falcke, pp. 82-8 
(6) Bards, pp. 2^-32 ; Calvo, § 1836. 


with fifty thousand men entered Belgium on November 15, 
1832, and laid siege to Antwerp, which surrendered on 
December 23, after a siege of twenty-four days. 

Meanwhile, the two powers decided to force Holland to 
comply with their requests by restricting its commerce. 
An embargo was placed on Dutch ships in the ports of 
Great Britain and France, and this was notified to the 
Belgian Government on November 13.^ Besides this, the 
joint fleets sailed for HoUand to place the coasts in a state 
of blockade. Only Dutch ships were, however, interfered 
with.2 The reply of the Dutch Government to this was 
a declaration of reprisals published on November 17, by 
which (Article 1) French andEngUsh ships in Dutch waters 
were given three days in which to. leave, and (Article 2) 
French and English vessels were forbidden to enter Dutch 
ports until the Dutch vessels should be allowed to enter 
French and English ports.* This was carried into effect by 
preventing English, French and Belgian vessels from enter- 
ing the mouth of the Scheldt, although the river remained 
open to the vessels of other nations. 

It was distinctly understood that the proceedings were 
not acts of war. Diplomatic relations were not suspended, 
the envoys remained at The Hague and the consuls at 
Amsterdam, Rotterdam and the other principal Dutch 
ports. It is true that the Belgian Minister of War, Baron 
Evain, stated that the action of HoUand was ' un acte 
permanent d'hostilit6s envers les grandes puissances de 
rEiu-ope ' ; but the English Government protested against 
the use of the expression. 

^ L, O. November 7, 1832 ; for full text vide Appendix, p. 158. 

' Bar^, p. 31, writes of Admiral de Mackau : * II s'abstint avec le plus 
grand soin des violences nuisant sans utiHt6 au commerce et se boma 
k capturer les seula navires sous pavilion hollandais qui essayaient de 
franchir ses lignes.' 

' Ducrocq, pp. 107-8, from which these details are taken. The text 
oi Article 2 as given by him is as follows : ' Tous les navires naviguant 
sous le pavilion des deux nations cit^ plus haut, et qui pourraient arriver 
de la mer snr le territoire n^erlandais, seraient renvoy^ et ne seraient pas 
admis avant que les navires sous le pavilion n6erlandais ne puissent, comme 
auparavant, entrer librement dans les ports d'Angleterze et de France.' 


82 fflSTORICAL A(X)OXJNTS pabt n 

Finally, a treaty was entered into, on May 21, 1833, 
between Great Britain, France and Holland.^ By Art. I 
the two blockading powers agreed to raise ' I'embargo qu'elles 
ont mis snr les vaisseaux, batimens et marchandises appar- 
tenant aux sujets de Sa Majesty le Boi des Pays-Bas ; et 
tons les batimens detenus, avec leurs cargaisons, seront 
sur-le-champ relach^s et restitu6s k leurs propri^taires 
respectifs *. The Dutch, on their side, acquiesced in the 
separation from Belgium, and agreed not to recommence 
hostile proceedings and to allow the free navigation of the 
Scheldt. This agreement was ratified on May 29, 1833, 
and on that day the embargo was taken off, the blockade 
raised, and the Dutch ships that had been previously seized 
handed back to their owners,^ 


In a letter dated October 27, 1838,® from Admiral Baudin, 
the Commander-in-Chief of the French fleet in Mexican 
waters, to the Foreign Minister of that country, the following 
passage occurs : ^ La conduite que la France tient aujour- 
d'hui envers le Mexique est conf orme k celle qu'elle a tenue 
en vers le Portugal, en 1831, envers Carthagdne de Colombie, 
en 1834, enfin, a celle qu'elle tient encore aujourd'hui, 
envers la R^pubhque Argentine . . . Dans ces divers 6tats, 
des citoyens fran9ais avaient 6t6 victimes de violences plus 
ou moins graves : la France aurait manqu6 k ses obligations 
les plus imp^rieuses envers ses nationaux, si eUe n'eut 
poursuivi la reparation de ces violences.' 

In view of the fact that the blockades of Mexico and 
Portugal were pacific, and that the blockade of the Argentine 
was so regarded by France, the only logical conclusion to 
be derived from this extranet is that in 1834 France insti- 
tuted a pacific blockade against the Colombian port of 
Carthagena. But as not a single writer on pacific blockade 

* Hertslet, Treaties, vol. iv, p. 361. 

* Bar^s, p. 31. 

* Blanchard and Dauzats, San Juan de Ulna (Paris, 1839), p. 259, 


mentions this instance, its actuality must be an object of 
considerable scepticism, and as, even if its existence were 
beyond question, no details with regard to its conduct are 
known, it cannot be said to be of any great importance. 

NEW GRANADA, 1837 ^ 

On January 20, 1836, as Mr. Russell, the British pro- 
consul at Panama, was walking in one of the public streets, 
he was attacked by a certain Senor Justo Paredes, at the 
head of a crowd of people. Mr. Russell defended himself 
with a sword-cane, and slightly wounded Sefior Paredes, 
but was subsequently knocked down and severely hurt. 
For some time afterwards he was very ill, and, indeed, in 
some danger.^ The attack seems to have been inspired 
by the personal rancour between the parties arising out of 
a previous bill transaction.^ 

Mr. Russell was removed from the consulate to the 
hospital under a military guard, although this involved 

^ (a) B. S. P. 1837, * Gonespondenoe betT^een His Majesty's Govem- 
ment and the Government of New Granada respecting the imprisonment 
of Mr. Pro-Consul Russell at Panama.' Falcke, pp. 3-8. 

(h) Ducrocq, pp. 109-11. 

(c) Steuart, Bogota in 1836-7, pp. 256-9 (New York, 1838). 

• B. S. P. 1837, op. cit., p. 1. Letter, Mr. Pro-Consul Russell to Viscount 
Palmerston, dated January 31, 1836. 

* A contemporary account of the affair (Steuart, op. cit.) runs as 
follows : ' A certain Mr. Russell, British consul for Panama, had a grudge 
toward a citizen of the place. This he chose to repay by assaulting him with 
a sword as he passed along the public street in company with a female. 
The consul was pouring out the lowest abuse when, the police interfering, 
an alcalde struck Russell a violent blow with his cane, laying open the 
temporal artery and otherwise severely maltreating him. . . • The conduct 
of the authorities of Panama, in allowing this alcalde to go unpunished, 
and taking violent possession of the office and seals of the consulate, were 
facts in themselves very grievous to be borne by any nation possessing 
the means of redress.' It ' would have been settled . . . but for the swagger- 
ing bull3dsm and undue haste of the British minister at the capital. . . . 
Mr. Russell ... is well known ... as a low, worthless and dissipated person 
of no standing whatever.' 



an aflEront to the British flag. He was accused of premedi- 
tated assassination and sentenced, under an old Spanish 
law of 1761, to six years' imprisonment for bearing con- 
cealed arms,^ and to pay the costs of the suit. 

After careful investigation into the matter, Lord Palmer- 
ston directed the British minister to demand {inter alia) 
the immediate liberation of Mr. Russell, the dismissal of the 
local authorities concerned, an apology and the payment 
of the sum of £1,000. The British ships were ordered to 
co-operate.2 The demand was made and refused, and it was 
then suggested that ' trial ' should be made ' of what may 
be compulsion without being war ', and that operations 
should be confined ' to a rigorous blockade of the Grana- 
dian ports'.^ Accordingly a blockade was instituted on 
January 10, 1837, and notice was given to the British 
consul on shore.* Four vessels were stopped,^ of which 
one was a French barque,® but no protests were made. 
' En douze jours, sans qu'un coup de canon ait 6t6 tir6 
de part ni d'autre, le gouvemement de Carthagene acquies9a 
aux exigences anglaises.' '' Mr. Russell was released after 
an imprisonment of eleven months and fifteen days and 
the £1,000 paid.® Directly this had been done the British 
commodore raised the blockade, and the vessels detained 
were permitted to depart to their destination.® 

^ B. S. P. 1837, op. cit., p. 17. Dispatch, Consul Turner to Viscount 
Palmerston, dated May 20, 1836 ; for the actual sentence vide pp. 18-22. 

* Ibid., p. 47. Dispatch, Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Turner, dated 
August 31, 1836. 

' Ibid., p. 92. Letter, Mr. Turner to Admiral Sir Peter Halkett, dated 
December 11, 1836. 

* Ibid., p. 119. Dispatch, Commodore Peyton to Mr. Consul Kellj^ 
dated January 21, 1837 ; vide Appendix, p. 158. 

^ Ibid., p. 111. Dispatch, Commodore Peyton to Admiral Halkett, 
dated January 28, 1837. 

* Ibid., p. 120. Commodore Peyton to Mr. Turner, dated January 23, 

' Ducrocq, p. 111. 

* B. S. P. 1837, op. cit., pp. 120-1. Official note. Governor of Carthagena 
to Mr. Consul Kelly, dated January 31, 1837. 

* Ibid., pp. 125-6. Dispatch, Commodore Peyton to Mr. Turner, dated 
February 2, 1837. 

PART n 86 

MEXICO, 18381 

The cause of this blockade was the failure of the French 
Government to obtain redress for various outrages and 
insults which had been inflicted on French subjects residing 
in Mexico. An ultimatum was presented on March 21, 
1838, which, after referring to (1) the pillage and destruction 
of property, (2) the violent taking of forced taxes, and 

(3) various denials of justice and illegal acts to which French 
subjects in Mexico had been subjected, demanded ' encore 
une fois et pour la demi^re ' : (1) the payment of 600,000 
piastres to be distributed as compensation by the French 
authorities for the above claims, (2) payment of certain 
other French creditors, (3) the dismissal and pimishment 
of certain Mexican officers and officials who were responsible 
for the assassination and wounding of certain French 
subjects, together with the payment of an indemnity, and 

(4) reciprocal treatment between the two nations as to 
agents, citizens, commerce and navigation. It was declared 
that ' cette presente note est un ultimatum et la deter- 
mination de la France qu'il exprime est irr6vocable '. 
Mexico was given till April 16 to signify her willingness to 
comply with the above demands, failing which, other 
measures would be taken.^ No reply was forthcoming,^ and 
a blockade of all the Mexican ports was declared by 
France on April 14, 1838.* The conduct of the blockade 

* (a) Ducrocq, pp. 111-14 ; Falcke, pp. 8-21. 
(6) Bar^s, pp. 32-6 ; Calvo, § 1836. 

(c) B. S.P. 1839: (1) 'Papers relating to the occupation of the Fortress 
of St. Juan d*Ulloa, in the Gulf of Mexico, and of the island of Martin 
Garcia, in the Rio de la Plata, by the blockading squadrons of France ; ' 
(2) • Correspondence relative to the removal of a Mexican pilot from on 
board H.M. packet Express, by a French ship of war in the GuU of 
Mexico ; ' (3) ' Memorials and Correspondence relative to the protection 
of British Commerce against the blockades of Mexico and Buenos Ayres, 
instituted by the Government of France.' Blanchard et Dauzats, San 
Jttan de Ulua (Paris, 1839). 

* Blanchard et Dauzats, op. cit., pp. 229-50 (full text). 
» Ibid., p. 250. 

* L. O, June 6, 1838, and cf. note to the American Government, Bar^s, 
pp. 33-4 ; vide Appendix, pp. 159-60. 


was subject to the three following rules : (1) Free ingress 
and egress were allowed to Mexican fishing-boats ^ ; (2) ships 
of third powers were given fifteen days to clear ; and (3) the 
ports of Vera Cruz and Tampico remained free for mail- 
packets, ships of war, and non-commercial vessels.^ 

At first the blockade was scarcely eflEective, but after- 
wards, on the arrival of Bear-Admiral Baudin with rein- 
forcements, this defect was removed. 

The blockade caused considerable inconvenience to the 
shipping of other powers,^ which in the case of Great Britain 
was accentuated by the delay of the French Government 
in giving an official notification. Several British vessels 
which had sailed for Mexico before the commencement 
of the blockade 'were turned away and had to return to 
England,^ and in consequence several protests from English 
merchants and chambers of commerce were made to Lord 
Palmerston. He, however, refused to make any formal 
protest to the French Government, and appeared to think 
that the latter was acting within its rights in turning back 
the British vessels.^ Other countries were not, however, 
so complaisant, and protests from the Hanse towns of 
Bremen, Liibeck and Hamburg were sent.* 

Although an exception was made with regard to mail- 
packets, it does not seem to have been strictly observed, 
as on one occasion a Mexican pilot was forcibly taken out of 
a British packet coming out of Vera Cruz. Apologies were, 
however, afterwards offered by the French Government.' 

^ Cf. Begulation adopted by the second Hague Conference, 1907. 
[B. S. P. Miscellaneous, No. 1 (1908), pp. 127-32.] 

* Ducrocq, pp. 112-3. 

» Vide New York Daily Express, May 7, 1838. 

* B. S. P. 1837, op. cit., No. 3, e.g. p. 6. The Mary, which had left 
London in February with a valuable cargo, was warned off and had to 
return ; the same fate overtook the Laurina, which left Liverpool on 
March 28 with a cargo of British manufactured goods of the value of 

* Ibid. • Ducrocq, p. 114. 

' B. S. P. 1839» op. cit.. No. 2. Vide also Blanchard et Dauzats, op. cit., 
p. 305, from which it appears that, immediately before the bombardment 
of Vera Cruz» the four vessels in the harbour came out with pilots. These 
included, besides the English packet^ an American war vessel and Hamburg 

PAETii MEXICO, 1838 87 

As the blockade did not effect its purpose, further measures 
were taken, and on November 27, 1838, the French squadron 
attacked and captured the fort of St. Juan d'Ulloa, where- 
upon Mexico declared war.^ The future progress of the 
blockade, which thus became warlike, does not, therefore, 
engage our attention. 

The design of the French Government in conducting the 
above operations is sufficiently evidenced by an extract 
from a note addressed by Count Mol6 to Earl Granville, 
dated September 19, 1838 : * It is quite true that Rear- 
Admiral Baudin has been authorized eventually to employ 
force and to attack the fort of St. Juan d'Ulloa : ' it ' would 
be held by us as a simple security ' and ' evacuated on the 
very day when we should have obtained from Mexico the 
satisfaction which is due to us'.^ Admiral Baudin, also, 
in writing to the Mexican Foreign Minister on October 27, 
1838, says: ' La conduite que la France tient aujourd'hui 
envers le Mexique est conforme k celle qu'elle a tenue 
envers le Portugal, en 1831, envers Carthagdne de Colombie, 
en 1834, enfin, k celle qu'elle tient encore aujourd'hui, 
envers la B^publique Argentine. . . . Dans ces divers 6tats 
des citoyens fran9ais avaient 6t6 victimea de violences plus 
ou moins graves : la France aurait manqu^ k sea obligations 
les plus imp^rieuses envers ses nationaux, si elle n'eut 
poursuivi la reparation de ces violences.' ' 

According to M. Ducrocq,* some fifty vessels had been 
seized before the declaration of war by Mexico^ and, in 
accordance with the so-called * French ' custom, the Mexican 
ships (to the number of four) were restored, while, the 
remainder, belonging to other nations, were confiscated. 
This statement, however, does not appear to be quite 
accurate. According to the treaty of peace between 

and Belgian merchantmen. The French admiral, having no pilots, and 
needing them for his attack on Vera Cruz, gave orders to one of his vessels 
to take the pilots out of the four vessels^ which was done. 

^ For text of the 'Loi' embodying this declaration vide Blanchard et 
Dauzats, op. cit., pp. 342-3. 

■ B. S. P. 1839, op. cit., No. 1, p. 1. 

' Blanchard et Dauzats, op. cit., p. 259. 

* p. 114 ; vide also Mtmiteur, June 22, 1839. 


Mexico and France of March 9, 1839, the fate of these 
Mexican vessels was to be referred to arbitration.^ The 
Queen of England was selected as arbitrator, and by her 
award of August 1, 1844, she decided that these vessels 
could be rightly confiscated, a*nd need not be restored to 
their owners.* 


The dictatorial proceedings of Rosas, who held supreme 
sway over the Argentine Confederation from 1829 to 1852, 
were the cause of two distinct blockades, the first by the 
French alone and the second by Great Britain and France 
in conjunction.* At the time of the first blockade the 

^ 'La question de savoir si les navires mexicains et leur cargaison 
s^questr^ pendant la dur6e du blocus et post^rieuiement captures par 
les Franfais, en consequence de la declaration de guerre, devront dtre 
consider^s comme de bonne prise par les captureurs sera soumise k Tarbi- 
trage d'une tierce puissance, ainsi qu'il est stipule k Farticle 2 du trait6 
de ce jour.' Quoted by Bar^, p. 34. 

' ' 1. Que la guerre ayant 6te declar^e par le Mexique, la France avait 
acquis le droit de frapper de confiscation les navires qu'elle d6tenait sous 
s6questre et de traiter comme prises bonnes et valables les batiments de 
guerre ou de commerce captures post6rieurement k la rupture de la paiz, 
proclam^e par le g6n6ral Santa Anna. 

' 2. Qu'il n'y avait pas lieu k restitution des propri^t^s saisies, bien moins 
encore k des indenmit^s pecuniaires au profit du Mexique.' Quoted by 
Bards, p. 35. Ducrocq, p. 74, refers to this decision in a footnote. 

' (a) Falcke, pp. 21-9. 
(6) Barte, pp. 36-7 ; Calvo, §§ 1837 and 187 ; Ducrocq, pp. 114-5. 
(c) B. S. P. 1839 : (1) ' Memorials and Correspondence relative to the 
protection of British Commerce against the blockades of Mexico and 
Buenos Ayres, instituted by the Government of France ; ' (2) * Papers re- 
lating to the occupation of . . . the island of Martin Garcia, in the Bio 
de la Plata, by the blockading squadrons of France.' £jng. Twenty-four 
Years in the Argentine RepyMic, London, 1846 ; Pistoye et Duverdy, 
Traite des priaea maritimea, 1855. 

* Vide infra, pp. 98-105. It is curious that several writers state that there 
was only one blockade, and that this lasted from 1838 to 1850, e.g. Woolsey, 
Introduction to Study of International Law, 4th ed., p. 443 ; Bonfils, Manud 
de droit international ptMic, 4th ed., by Fauchille, § 987 ; Bivier, Prindpea 
du droit dea gena, t. ii, p. 199 ; F. de Martens, Traite de droit ifUemational^ 


president of the Banda Oriental or Uruguay was General 
Oribe. He emulated Rosas, under whose influence he was, 
and ' set on foot a series of measures that had drawn down 
upon him the indignation of the people '.^ A revolt took 
place, and Oribe ensconced himself at Monte Video, the 
capital, where he ' received large accumulations to his means 
of defence in the shape of ammunition, arms, and even 
troops from Buenos Ayres \^ The French minister pro- 
tested against this state of affairs, but without effect. He 
also made demands on General Rosas for reparation on 
accoimt of the murder of certain French subjects and the 
destruction and confiscation of their property.' The deter- 
mining cause of the French action, however, was, according 
to Ducrocq, the promulgation of a law, in 1838, which ren- 
dered all foreigners who had resided in the country for 
three years, and who were carrying on some trade or busi- 
ness, liable to miUtary service.* The French representative 
protested against this breach of the usual international 
custom in such matters, but, finding his remonstrances in- 
effectual, withdrew to Monte Video. Thereupon, on March 
28, 1838, the French Government proclaimed a blockade ^ 
of the ports of the Republic, and Admiral Le Blanc was 
sent to enforce it. Foreign merchant vessels in the ports 
were given till May 10 to leave, and the British packet 
boats were exempted from the operation of the blockade 
upon the condition that their commanders declared on 
their word of honour that they were not bearers of any 
merchandise subject to custom-house duties. ITie French 
made their head quarters at Monte Video, but also seized 
the small island of Martin Garcia, in the middle of the 
estuary of the La Plata, as a sort of base.* 

French ed., 1887, t. iii, p. 167 ; Barte, pp. 36-7. Hautefeuille (Dea droits el 
dea devoirs des mOUms neuires, 3rd ed., 1868, p. 261) goes further by stating 
that England and France instituted a joint blockade in 1838, and this 
lasted for ten years. So also Wheaton, IntemaUondl Law, 4th ed., by 
J. B. Attlay, § 293 B. 

• King, op. cit., p. 321. " Ibid., p. 323. 

' Ibid., p. 338. * Ducrocq, pp. 114-6. 

• L. O. June 22, 1838. For text vide Appendix, p. 161. 

• B. S. P. 1839, op. cit.. No. 2, p. 399. 


The blockade was carried on in a most rigorous manner 
and applied ' k tout navire, quel que fut son paviUon et 
quelle que fut la nationality de son propri^taire '. Lord 
Palmerston appears to have been approached by British 
traders with regard to their position, but refused to take 
any official action in the matter.^ The most interesting 
feature of this blockade is the departure from the usual 
French practice of giving a warning to each individual 
vessel of the existence of the blockade. On this occasion 
the French commander entered into an agreement with 
the Government of Monte Video, dated April 23, 1839, 
that it should not be necessary for the French squadron 
to warn individual vessels flying the flag of the Oriental 
Republic, but that it should be the duty of all such vessels 
to get their papers vis6d either by the French officers of 
the ships at the * stations de surveillance ' or by the French 
consul on shore.^ In accordance with this agreement, at 
least twenty-seven vessels were captured and condemned, 
the majority for remaining for more than sixty-six hours 
without having their papers vis6d.' Besides these, several 
packages of merchandise belonging to unknown owners 
were also condemned.* 

This blockade has generally been numbered among thode 
that can be called pacific, but it is difficult to see how it 
can lay claim to this title. M. Guizot, in the Chamber of 
Deputies, certainly said * nous f aisions un blocus, ce qui 
n'est pas la guerre complete, la guerre d6clar6e \^ and the 
French Government generally desired that the proceedings 
should not be considered as warlike ; but the only real 
test, as has been already pointed out, is the attitude of the 
state whose coast has been blockaded. In accordance 
with this test, the blockade must be pronounced warlike, 
as it appears that the Argentine Government issued letters 

* B. S. P. 1839, op. cit.. No. 1, p. 276. 

■ Pistoye et Duverdy, Traite des prises marUimes, t. i, p. 386 : Le Monte 
Aligre et La Candelaria, 
' Ibid., p. 386. • Ibid., p. 386. 

• Februarys, 1841. Vide Monitew, February 9, and Pistoye et Duverdy, 
op. cit., p. 391 ; and cf . letter of Admiral Baudin cited pp. 82 and 87* 


of marque to its subjects to prey upon French commerce, 
and in at least one instance a vessel bearing the French 
flag was seized and transferred to Argentine owners.^ This 
view of the question is supported by Pistoye et Duverdy, 
who, on considering the declarations of the prize courts at 
the time, come to the following conclusion : ' A T^poque 
du blocus de Buenos- Ayres par les forces fran9ai8es, la 
guerre existait done entre la France et la R^publique 
Argentine.' * 

Finally, after about two years, an arrangement was 
arrived at, and on October 29, 1840, a treaty was signed 
by which Rosas» on his part, recognized the validity of 
certain of the French claims, while the French had to evacu- 
ate the island of Martin Garcia within eight days and raise 
the blockade they had been enforcing.' Meanwhile, on 
October 23, 1838, General Oribe, whose term as president 
of Uruguay had still eighteen months to run, resigned that 
office and retired to Buenos Ayres. The result of the 
blockade was really more or less a failure, as the state of 
insurrection and unrest at Monte Video and Buenos Ayres 
still continued, and eventually led to a second intervention 
in 1845.* 


Mr. Roebuck, in his speech on the Don Pacifico incident 
in the House of Commons, on June 24, 1850, made the 
following remarks : * * In 1842 it appears that the French 
Government felt that injuries had been done to some 
French subjects at the small and insignificant port of San 
Salvador, amounting in the whole to one thousand dollars. 
A French ship went in immediately and the captain said, 

^ Pistoye et Du-verdj, op. cit., p. 383 : Affaire du Caiman. 

* Ibid., p. 377. 

' Calvo (§ 1837) says that France received the indemnity demanded. 

* M. Bar^, in his work on pacific blockade, appears to think that there 
was only one blockade, which started in 1838 and finished in 1849, but he 
is clearly wrong as to this. 

* Hansard, 3rd series, vol. cxii, col. 240. 


'* If you do not pay, I will at once bombard the town." 
The people refused ; the French consul retired, got on board 
the French ship, and raised the demand at once to two 
thousand dollars, and the poor people were at last obliged 
to pay the money.' 

This passage is, however, the only reference to this 
instance of a pacific blockade which the author can find. 
The French writers MM. Ducrocq and Bards do not mention 
it, nor does Professor Holland nor Herr Falcke, while the 
Annual Register and the Times Index for 1842 are alike 
silent on the point. In these circumstances its acceptance 
as authentic must remain open to some doubt.^ 

NICARAGUA, 1842 2 

Nicaragua is one of a number of small states in Central 
America. With others it broke away from the Spanish 
rule in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, and on 
July 1, 1823, entered with Guatemala, San Salvador, 
Honduras, and Costa Rica, into a federal republic, called 
the United Provinces of Central America. This union was 
not of long duration. It broke up in 1840, and the finishing 
stroke to its dissolution was given by the murder of General 
Francisco Morazan, the President of Costa Rica, on 
September 16, 1842.^ ' After the death of Morazan the 

^ The suooeeding account of tlie blockade of Nicaragua and the default 
of Salvador in complying with the British demands therein mentioned, 
point to the general unrest in Central America at the time, and the 
undoubted possibility of such an occurrence as the one mentioned by 
Mr. Roebuck having taken place. The author, however, found no refer- 
ence to any such blockade in the papers that came under his notice at 
the Public Record Office. 

• (a) P. R. 0. Nos. 6623 and 6624. 

(6) B. S. P. 1847, * Correspondence respecting the Mosquito Territory.* 
Falcke, pp. 29-31. 

(c) Wells, WcHher'a Expedition to ^tcaroj/wo (New York, 1866); Squier, 
Nicaragua (New York, 1862), and The States of Central America (New York, 
1868), pp. 347-444 and 629-64, on the general position of Nicaragua. 

• Wells, Walker's Expedition to Nicaragua, pp. 17-18. 


states became not only divided in themselves, but amongst 
themselves : . . . they were . . . reduced to . . . anarchy.' ^ 
It is not wonderful, therefore, that, with this state of affairs 
obtaining, the position of Europeans in the various republics 
was somewhat insecure, and that they were unable to obtain 
satisfaction from the courts for damage and plunder which 
they had sustained. The claims of British subjects were 
taken up by the British representative and applications for 
satisfaction were made, butrefused.^ At last, on September 
4, 1841, a circular was addressed to the Five Central American 
States that unless the claims were liquidated by December 1 
' Her Majesty's Government will proceed by means of its 
own to obtain the requisite settlement'.' At the same 
time Mr. A. Macdonald, the British representative, wrote 
to Lord John BusseU that ' all amicable negotiations are 
out of the question ', and suggested that three ports should 
be seized as a measure of coercion.' On January 4, 1842, 
the British Foreign Office moved, and in a dispatch to the 
Admiralty, after rehearsing the claims of British subjects 
in Central America, requested that the Commander-in-Chief 
in the Pacific should personally visit the defaulting states 
and endeavour to get the various matters settled, while 
the Commander-in-Chief in the West Indies, after getting 
instructions from the Governor of Jamaica, was to go to 
Belize for the same purpose. The dispatch then goes on : 
' Any measures of hostility to be adopted by the Commander- 
in-Chief should be preceded on his part by a direct applica- 
tion from himself to the Central American authorities, 
giving them a stipulated time within which the compensa- 
tion required by Her Majesty's Government must be paid.' ' 
These further negotiations were only partially successful, 
for in a dispatch from the Foreign Office to the Admiralty, 
dated August 25, 1842, it is stated that ' Vice- Admiral 
Sir Charles Adam reports that three of the states, namely, 
Costa Bica, Guatemala, and Honduras, had acceded to the 

^ Sqniei, NicaragtM, ii. 449. 

■ There is considerable correspondence (unpublished) on these claims: 
P. R. O. No. 6623. 
• Ibid. 


demands made upon them, but that the states of Nicaragua 
and Salvador had refused to do so, and that consequently 
he had directed the port of San Juan de Nicaragua to be 
blockaded'.^ This blockade was instituted on June 17, 
1842,^ and it was declared that ' ships violating the blockade 
wiU be dealt with according to the rules established for the 
breach of a de facto blockade '." The blockade applied 
to all vessels of whatever flag, and the French practice of 
giving each vessel a separate warning appears to have been 
adopted. The blockade of other ports was contemplated, 
but does not seem to have been actually carried out. In 
giving his opinion on the subject, the Queen's Advocate, 
J. Dodson, writes to Lord Aberdeen : ' With respect to 
the ports belonging to the states of Nicaragua and Salvador, 
in the Pacific Ocean, I think it would be premature to 
notify the blockade, inasmuch as Sir Charles Adam has 
merely recommended Rear- Admiral Thomas to proceed in 
a similar manner with regard to these ports, but it does not 
appear certain that any blockade has in consequence of 
such recommendation been actually imposed upon them. 
. . . The Vice- Admiralty Court in Jamaica is at hberty to 
condemn vessels for a breach of the blockade of San Juan 
de Nicaragua unless some special authority should be given 
to it for the purpose.'* 

The total British claim of 14,000 dollars* was eventually 
paid,^ and Sir Charles Adam raised the blockade on Decem- 
ber 8, 1842.® No resistance to the blockade appears to 
have been offered by the Nicaraguan Government, and 
there can be Uttle doubt that this blockade may rightly be 
regarded as ' pacific '. 

^ P. R. 0. No. 6624. 

* L. O, Aagust 19, 1842 ; for the text of the declaration vide infra, 
pp. 161-2. This declaration was also published in the Belize OazeUe and 
the Jamaica official paper (B. S. P., 1847, op. cit., p. 72). 

' Unpublished letter, August 18, 1842. P. R. 0. No. 6624 (sic). 

• B. S. P. 1847, op. cit., p. 67. 

' Precis of dispatch from Sir C. Adam, dated December 8, 1842, in the 
Admiralty Register at the Public Record Office. 

' If. O. January 24, 1843. Holland (Studies in International Law) states 
that the blockade continued until 1844, but he is clearly incorrect. 

PART U 95 

NICARAGUA, 1844 1 

The state of affairs in Nicaragua showed no improvement 
after the blockade of 1842, and it was still an impossibility 
for British subjects to obtain satisfaction from the courts 
for their claims. Two cases in particular were notorious. 
A Mr. Walter Bridge had an estate at San Antonio. This 
was raided and plundered, on October 23, 1841, by a band 
of thirty armed men, and considerable damage was done. 
The men were arrested, and confessed their participation 
in the outrage, and then, instead of being punished, were 
set at liberty and rewarded by promotion in the regular 
army. A note was addressed to the Nicaraguan Govern- 
ment on the subject, but without effect.* 

The other case was a gross denial of justice to two 
Englishmen, Messrs. Jonas Wilson Glenton and Thomas 
Manning, residing at Leon. Originally they had been 
partners in some concession with regard to which a person 
named Solorzano had obtained a judgment against them. 
This decision was subsequently set aside for fraud but, 
as in the meantime Solorzano had been acting upon 
it to the fullest possible extent, considerable damage had 
been caused to Messrs. Glenton and Manning. They had 
obtained the delivery of an award against Solorzano, but 
four years had elapsed without their being able to issue 
execution, as the Nicaraguan Government took his side. 
They had 'tried every method prescribed by law', but 
without avail.^ 

The British representatives in Nicaragua took up these 
matters, but were unable to obtain a settlement. Finally, 
on August 26, 1843, Lord Aberdeen wrote to Mr. Chatfield, 

» (a) P. R. O. Nos. 6636 and 6542. 
(6) Falcke, pp. 29-31. 

' Dispatch from Mr. Chatfield to Lord Aberdeen, dated January 16, 1843. 
P. R. 0. No. 6636 ; the dispatch encloses copies of a letter from Mr. 
Bridge and of the note addressed to the Government. 

• Dispatch, Mr. Chatfield to Lord Aberdeen, November 30, 1842. P. R. O. 
No. 6636. This dispatch has eighteen enclosures, in which the whole 
matter is disclosed. 


the British Consul-General in Central America, instructing 
him to demand compensation for Mr. Bridge and com- 
pliance with the demands of Messrs. Glenton and Manning, 
and to state that in case of non-compliance recourse would 
be had to the assistance of the fleet to obtain satisfaction.^ 
On the same date Lord Aberdeen also wrote to the Admiralty 
with the Queen's commands that the Commander-in-Chief 
in the West Indies should proceed to the coast of Nicaragua 
to obtain immediate redress for the above demands. The 
dispatch continued : ' In the case of refusal it will be 
proper to make reprisals by capturing the vessels belonging 
to the inhabitants of Nicaragua, and, if redress cannot 
otherwise be obtained, to blockade the port of San Juan ; ' 
but the latter measure was only to be used as a last resort.^ 

The Nicaraguan Government persistently refused to 
comply with the British demands, and on February 26, 
1844, the British vice-consul wrote to Sir Charles Adam: 
' Every attempt to induce the Government of Nicaragua to 
arrange these matters [of Glenton and Manning, and Bridge] 
has been ineffectual ; in fact, nothing short of the appear- 
ance of a force at the Boca San Juan and the consequent 
stoppage of their trade in that quarter will have the desired 
effect.' 8 

The next day the vice-consul also wrote to the com- 
mander of the Oriffon,^ which had been sent by Sir C. Adam 
to San Juan with a view to the establishment of a blockade,* 
requesting him to put the blockade in force. He adds: 
' I do not consider it necessary that you should take any 
measures to make pubhc the blockade beyond the precincts 
of the port, as I forward a notice to that effect to the 
authorities of the city of Granada, which is the principal 
town in that vicinity.' On the same day he also wrote 
to the Principal Secretary of the Nicaraguan Government, 
stating that the commander of the Oriffon had been ordered 
to blockade the port of * San Juan del Norte and the coast 

• Two dispatches of this date dealing respectively with the two cases. 
P. R. 0. No. 6636. 

• Ibid. • Ibid. * P. R. 0. No. 6542. 

• Precis of dispatch from Sir C. Adam in the AdnUraUif Register, P. R. O- 


adjacent ', which would not be raised until satisfaction had 
been obtained for the British demands.^ 

The letter, however, to the British naval officer, author- 
izing him to institute the blockade, had, with other letters, 
been detained by the Government officials.^ H© was aware 
of its contents, and knowing also that the three principal 
cargoes of the year — from France, Genoa and Jamaica 
respectively — ^were daily expected, and that if they were 
allowed to enter the port the blockade would be of little 
avail, he declared a blockade of the port on March 23, 1844, 
' so long as the despatches are withheld.'* The same day 
an English merchantman from Jamaica appeared off the 
port and was warned of the blockade * The Government 
now released the dispatches, and on March 30 they reached 
the British naval officer, who at once made a fresh declara- 
tion of the blockade of the port.* It was notified ' that the 
measures sanctioned by the law of nations will be adopted 
and executed with respect to aU vessels and cargoes attempt- 
ing to violate the said blockade '.® Notice was sent to the 
Principal Secretary of the State of Costa Rica,'' and appar- 
ently also to the Governor of Jamaica, for official publication.* 
On April 7, the (Jenoese vessel arrived and was turned 
away,® and a like fate befell the French vessel. The Consul- 
General of France requested a relaxation of the blockade 
in favour of this vessel, but this was refused.^® 

» P. R. 0. No. 5642. 

' Unpublished dispatch dated April 26, 1844. Ueutenant J. Bainbridge 
to Commodore Sharpe, C.B., senior officer at Jamaica. P. B. 0. No. 5542. 

' For text of notice to the Commandant of San Juan, vide Appendix, 
p. 163, and P. B. 0. No. 5542. 

• For text vide Appendix, pp. 163-4, and P. R. O. No. 6542. 
» For text vide Appendix, p. 164, and P. B. O. No. 6542. 

• L. Q. Jmie 11, 1844. 

» For text vide Appendix, pp. 164-6, and P. B. O. No. 5542. 
^ Vide precis of a dispatch from Sir C. Adam to the Admiralty in the 
Admiralty Register, P. B. O. 

• Vide dispatch of J. Bainbridge, April 26, 1844, above quoted. For 
text of the warning to the vessel vide Appendix, p. 165, and P. B. O. 
No. 5542. 

" Precis of dispatches from Mr. Chatfield of June 27, and August 14, 
1844, to the Admiralty, in the Admiralty Register, P. B. 0. . 



Nothing further is known of the blockade, or whether it 
actually achieved its object, save the bald statement of the 
British admiral, in a dispatch dated October 2, 1844, that 
it was no longer in force.^ 

In this case, as in the earUer blockade of San Juan, there 
appears to have been no resistance whatever by Nicaragua, 
and it can therefore be unquestionably regarded as a pacific 


The blockade of 1838-40 did little to curb the growing 
power of Rosas in South American affairs. No sooner had 
it ended than he began concerting measures with General 
Oribe to undermine the independence of Uruguay and force 
it to join the Argentine Confederation.' As has akeady 
been mentioned,* General Oribe had been elected President 
of Uruguay, but, owing to his dictatorial methods, had been 
forced to resign on October 23, 1838, with eighteen months 
of his term of office still unexpired.* After the end of the 
French blockade he put forward the startling proposition 
that he was entitled to finish his term of presidency. As 
the Uruguayan Authorities took a different view, Oribe, 
with the assistance of Rosas, proceeded to invade the 
Oriental Republic, and soon overran the whole country 
except Monte Video, which he besieged. Oribe threatened 

* L. O. November 1, 1844. 

' (a) Bustamante, Lo8 cincos errorea capiUdea de la intervencion AngUh 
Francesa en d Plata (Monte Video, 1849) ; Falcke, pp. 32-43. 
(6) Bar^fl, pp. 36-7 ; Calvo, §§ 1838-40 ; Ducrocq, pp. 116-8. 
(c) B. S. P. 1846, 'Instructions to Mr. Ouseley, Her Majesty's minister 
at Buenos Ayres, for his guidanoe in the joint intervention by England 
and France between Buenos Ayres and Monte Video ; ' B. S. P. 1860, 
'Convention between Her Majesty and the Argentine Confederation;' 
King, Twenty-four Tears in the Argentine Republic (London, 1846) ; Mac- 
kinnon. Steam Warfare in the Parana (London, 1848) ; Pouoel, Lee Otages 
de Durazno (Paris, 1864). 

* Mackinnon, op. cit., p. 84 * Supra, p. 89* 

* King, pp. 338-9. 


to put the town to the sword when it was captured, and 
this was really its salvation, for the resident foreigners, to 
the number of three thousand, armed, and the British and 
French commanders landed forces to help in the defence. 
Monte Video, therefore, held out in spite of the fact that the 
Argentine navy assisted in the siege by a blockade. 

On the establishment of the independence of the Banda 
Oriental, in 1828, Great Britain and France had guaranteed 
its position,^ and therefore were keenly interested in the 
matter ; but their efforts to obtain a cessation of the hostili- 
ties had been imsuccessful, mainly, perhaps, through their 
lack of decision. On August 30, 1842, the British minister, 
Mandeville, offered his mediation between Buenos Ayres 
and Monte Video,^ This was refused on October 18,^ and on 
December 16, 1842, a fresh note was presented stating that 
it was the intention of Great Britain and Stance to adopt 
the means necessary to stop the hostilities, and demanding 
their immediate cessation and the withdrawal of the Argen- 
tine troops. This was ngt, however, followed up, and the 
subsequent course of the negotiations for some time was 
marked by weakness and hesitation. No material change 
in the situation was made until 1845,. when Mr. Ouseley 
was sent out by Great Britain, and M. Deffaudis by France, 
The British minister was instructed * to endeavour to bring 
the hostilities to a conclusion. If ,^ however. General Rosas 
would not suspend hostilities, he was to wait until his 
French colleague arrived, and then join in a?i united declara' 
tion that if the Argentine army was not withdrawn and the 
blockade raised, the British and French squadrons would 
effect that purpose by force. The instructions went on to 
say that ' it would appear that a blockade of those ports 
from which the Buenos Ayrean Government are at present 
in the habit of carrying on communication with the besieg- 
ing army, more especially that of the Buceo, and if necessary 

^ King, op. oit., p. 420. 

• Bustamante, op. cit., p. 17. • Ibid., p. 19. 

* B. S. P. 1846, op. cit., and Bustamante, op. cit., pp. 40-50. The 
instructions to the French representative were very similar ; vide Busta- 
mante, pp. 50-6, 



the occupation of the lower waters of the Uruguay, would 
effectually cut oflE intercourse between Buenos Ayres and 
General Oribe's forces, and thereby compel their retreat or 
dissolution *. No operations by land, except perhaps the 
seizure of the' island of Martin Garcia as a base, were to be 
entertained, and the objects of the British Government in 
their intervention were stated to be * the restoration of 
peace and a tranquil government to the republic of Uruguay, 
the removal of pressure from its capital and the re-open- 
ing of its ports to foreign trade \ M. Ducrocq, however, 
ascribes the joint intervention to the refusal of the Argentine 
Government to give proper securities for the lives and 
property of foreigners in its dominions.^ On July 8, 1845, 
similar notes were presented by the British and French 
representatives, demanding the evacuation of Uruguayan 
territory by the Argentine army and the raising of the 
blockade of Monte Video.^ These were followed by other 
notes on the 18th and 19th, and on the 21st by an ultimatum 
asking for their passports to be given them on the 31st if 
these conditions had not then been complied with.^ General 
Rosas replied with a direct negative on the 29th.* Accord- 
ingly, on August 1, 1845, a joint blockade was declared by 
the British and French squadrons of the port of Buceo and 
*of all the other ports of the Oriental Republic occupied 
by troops under the command of General Oribe '.^ On 
August 3, the Argentine fleet blockading Monte Video was 
captured by a few small vessels.® This was immediately 
f oUowed by the seizure of a number of British and French 
residents in Uruguay by General Oribe.'' They were refused 
passports, and after the allies had seized the port of Colonia, 
on August 31, were, on September 10, conveyed some 
forty or fifty leagues to a place called Durazno,^ where, in 
spite of pressing official notes, they were kept for a long 

^ Duorocq, p. 116. King (pp. 426-7) gives a summary of the numbers 
of Bosas' victims, which he puts at 22,404. 
' Bustamante, p. 63. 

• Ibid., p. 67. • Ibid., p. 68. 

• L. O. October 31, 1845. For full text vide Appendix, p. 166. 

• Mackinnon, op. cit., p. 9. 

' Poucel, op. cit., p. 305. • Ibid., p; 310. 


time, and where some of them died. On September 18 
a last effort was made to obtain a settlement, a joint note 
being presented to Rosas,^ but without effect. On the 
24th * the blockade * of the ports and coast of the province 
of Buenos Ayres ' * started. The island of Martin Garcia 
was again seized as a sort of base,^ and the opportunity 
was taken both by French and British vessels of exploring 
the waters of the Parana and Uruguay. Merchantmen were 
convoyed both up and down, but not without some inter- 
ference, and force had to be used on several occasions to 
force a passage.^ Rosas protested against the action of 
the allies by a note of December 9, 1845,^ and negotiations 
for a settlement were continued more or less throughout 
the whole period of the blockade.'' 

. Nothing of real importance was, however, effected. Lord 
Pahnerston, writing at the end of 1846 to Lord Normanby, 
says, 'The blockade has long ceased to retain its original 
character,^ because the commerce of Buenos Ayres goes on as 
if there was no blockade, excepting only that all goods 
going to and coming from that port are obliged to be landed 
at Monte Video and to pay duty there. ... It is piracy; 
it is equivalent to stopping neutral vessels on the high sea 
and making them pay blackmail.'* Or, in other words, 
Great Britain and France were keeping their fleets in 
South American waters and spending several millions 

^ Bostamante, pp. 81-9. 

■ Ducrocq gives September 18, 1846. 

' Bustamante, p. 89, and L. O. December 26, 1845. For text vide 
Appendix, pp. 166-7. 

* Cf . the seizure of Mitylene by the allied fleets in November, 1906. 

■ Cf. Falcke, p. 36 ; Ducrocq, p. 116 ; Mackinnon, op. cit., i, pp. 218 et 
seq., 278-302, and ii, pp. 1-38. 

* Bnstamante, p. 98. 

' It is impossible, in the course of this short account, to follow these 
negotiations ; they are fully dealt with by Bustamante, who gives the full 
text (Spanish) of the more important notes and suggestions. 

' Cf. Mackinnon, p. 9. The blockade ' commenced about the middle 
of 1846 and perhaps still continues, in name at least, for it never was much 
else '. 

* Life of PaimersUm, by the Rt. Hon. Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer, edited 
by the Hon. Evelyn Ashley, M.P., p. 326. 

10^'. '::...:••. HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS part n 

annually in order to maintain aii efficient system of customi^ 
for the Argentine Republic. It is, of course, true, however, 
that their presence guaranteed the independence of Uruguay ; 
but they were powerless to obtain that recognition of the 
rights of their subjects which was deemed necessary. Other 
diplomatists came out from Europe, iSrst Hood and then 
Lord Howden for Great Britain, and Count Walewski for 
France, and on July 15, 1847, the blockade of the ports 
both of the Argentine and Oriental Republics was raised^ 
by Great Britain as the result of an armistice arranged 
between Generals Rosas and Oribe and the Uruguayan 
authorities. The blockade by France continued for some 
time longer, «ntil Baron Gros was sent out with orders to 
raise it in any circumstalices. Accordingly the blockade of 
the Argentine coast was also raised by France on June 16, 

' Perfect friendship ' was not, however, finally restored 
until the treaty of November 24, 1849,® between Great Britain 
and the Argentine Confederation,* which was followed on 
August 31^ 1850, by a similar treaty between France and 
the Argentine Confederation, and on September 13, 1850, 
by an agreement with General Oribe, when the French 
blockade of Buceo terminated.^ 

By the first of these treaties it was agreed that Great 
Britain should evacuate the island of Martin Garcia and 
return the Argentine ships of war in its possession, as far as 
possible in the same state as when captured,^ while all 
merchant vessels with their cargoes taken during the block- 
ade should be delivered back to their respective owners.^ 

^ Article I, Treaty November 24, 1849 ; Bustamante, pp. 244-5. 

■ Falcke (p. 39) quotes Article IV of the French treaty of Aiigust 31, 1850 : 
* ayant, le 16 juin 1848, lev6 le blocus qu'il avait dtabli devant le port 
de Buenos- Ayres ' ; vide also * Colecci6n de tratados celebrados por la 
repiiblica argentina con las naciones estrangeras ' (Buenos Ayies, Bem- 
heim, 1863). » Ducrocq gives November 24, 1848. 

* B. S. P. 1860, * Convention between Her Majesty and the Argentine 
Confederation ; ' Hertslet, Treaties, vol. viii, p. 105. 

' Falcke, p. 41. ' The date of the raising of this blockade is not quite 
certain, but it cannot be later than September 13.' 

•Article I. ' Article JI. 


Article V of the Treaty affords curious reading, and wad 
apparently inserted as a salve to the anumr pr(ypre of the 
Argentine Confederation. It seems scarcely credible that 
it should have been agreed to, but doubtless its insertion 
was due to the desire to retire at all costs from a fruitless 
entanglement. It runs as follows : ' It is freely acknow- 
ledged and admitted that the Argentine Republic is in the 
unquestioned enjoyment and exercise of every right, whether 
of peace or war, possessed by any independent nation, and 
that if the course^of events in the Oriental Republic has 
made it necessary for the allied powers to interrupt for 
a time the exercise of the belligerent rights of the Argentine 
Repubhc, it is fully admitted that the principles on which 
they have acted would under similar circumstances have 
been applicable either to Great Britain or France.' 

The blockade applied to all vessels without exceptioui 
and several, including British, Brazilian and Argentine 
vessels, were seized and condemned by the French prize 
courts.^ Three nations at least — ^Portugal, Bolivia and the 
United States — ^protested against the blockade,^ and com^ 
plaints were made by British and French merchants to 
their respective Governments that the blockade had practi- 
cally caused the destruction of their commerce, and that 
the situation was aggravated by the refusal of the Argentine 
Government to pay interest on the loan it had obtained in 
London. Foreign vessels were given twelve days of grace 
on the institution of the bloclMuie of Buceo, and fifteen 
days — subsequently extended to thirty-eight days — in the 
case of the blockade of Buenos Ayres itself. 

In its inception the blockade was intended to be a pacific 
one, and on the whole it would appear that it retained its 
peaceful character in spite of the acts of violence which 
accompanied it. The treaty which concluded it is strong 
evidence that the Argentine Republic regarded the opera- 

* Ulndependencia Americana (Pistoye et Duverdy, Traite des prises 
maritimes, t. i, p. 384) ; L' Aurora, p. 384 ; LElisa Cornish, p. 387 ; the 
Fame, p. 389. 

• Faloke, p. 37, in a footnote. He does not, however, adduce any 


tions as an intervention (as eveiy pacific blockade must be 
to some extent) and not as hostilities. On the other hand^ 
however, Lord Palmerston, in writing to Lord Normanby, 
speaks of ' the termination of hostilities by sea and by 
land which have been carried on for some time past on the 
banks of the Plate '.^ And further on in the same letter 
he writes : ' The real truth is, though we had better keep 
the fact to ourselves, that the French and English blockade 
of the Plate has been from first to last illegal. Peel and 
Aberdeen have always declared that we have not been at 
war with Rosas; but blockade is a belligerent right, and 
unless you are at war with a state you have no right to 
prevent ships of other states from communicating with the 
ports of that state — ^no, you cannot prevent your own 
merchant ships from doing so. I think it important, there- 
fore, in order to legalize retrospectively the operations of 
the blockade, to close the matter by a formal convention of 
peace between the two powers and Rosas.' ^ 

It will be noticed that Lord Palmerston bases his con- 
clusion that the blockade of La Plata was an act of war 
on the ground of the impossibility of a pacific blockade, 
stating that blockade only occurs in time of war. This 
fact weakens, of course, the remainder of his argument. 
Moreover, this is one of the very few pacific blockades 
which have come before the courts. In a case reported in 
Pistoye et Duverdy,* and cited as ' Le Comte de Thomar \ 
the head note runs as follows : ' En cas de blocus simple, 
c'est-k-dire sans declaration de guerre, les objets reputes 
contrebande de guerre, saisis sur des batiments neutres qui 
n'ont pas re^u de notification du blocus, ne peuvent pas 
plus que ces batiments eux-memes etre declar6s de bonne 
prise.' And in its judgment the court states : ' La saisie 
sur un navire neutre des objets de cette nature qualifies de 
contrebande de guerre, c'est dans le cas seulement ou le 
batiment capteur appartient k ime puissance bellig6rante.' 
This is practically a statement by the court that no 

^ Life of Pcdmerston, quoted supra, p. 326. 

• Ibid., p. 327. 

• Traite des prises maritimes, t. i, tit. vi, oh. 2, § 2, p. 390. 


state of wax existed between France and the Argentine 
Confederation. The facts of the case were that a Brazilian 
merchant vessel had been seized by the French blockading 
squadron and taken in for condemnation without having 
had any specific notification of the blockade. This by 
French practice prevented any decision to the eflFect that 
the ship was breaking the blockade, but as it was found 
that it was carrying powder and lead, which in case of 
a war would be contraband, the condemnation of the cargo 
was demanded. The court', however, decided that it could 
not be condemned on this ground, because there can only 
be contraband in case of a war and its seizure can only be 
made by a belligerent power.- Hence, as this would have 
been contraband if there had been a war, the plain inference 
of the court's decision is that there was no war existing 
between France and the Argentine, and presumably, there- 
fore, also no war existing between Great Britain and the 
Argentine.^ And hence this blockade may, though with 
considerable doubt, be reckoned amongst those called 
' pacific '. 

GREECE, 18602 

The blockade of Greece by Great Britain, in 1850, is 
usually associated with the name of Don Pacifico, but the 

* Cf. Ducrocq, p. 117. As a matter of fact the above decision was come 
to by the Conseil d'Etat, overruling the prize court at Monte Video. 

* (a) (1) B. S. P. 1850, ' Correspondence respecting the demands made 
upon the Greek Government and respecting the islands of Cervi and 
Sapienza ; ' (2) B. S. P. 1860, * Further correspondence respecting the de- 
mands made upon the Greek Government ' (vol. Ivi, at p. 407) ; Falcke, 
pp. 49-62 ; Charles de Martens, Causes cH^res du droit des gens, 2nd 
ed., t. V, pp. 396-631. 

(h) Annual Register, 1860, pp. 279 et seq. ; Bar^, pp. 37-8 ; Calvo, 
{§ 1814-20 and § 1841 ; Ducrocq, pp. 36-8 ; Freeman Snow, Cases and 
Opinions on International Law, pp. 246-8 ; Oppenheim, § 35. 

(c) B. S. P. 1860, ' Further correspondence respecting the demands made 
upon the Gieek Government ' (four lots of papers with this heading bound 
in vol. Ivi at pp. 799, 827, 833 and 839) ; B. S. P. 1861, * Correspondence 
respecting the. mixed commission appointed to investigate the claims of 
M. Pacifico upon the Government of Greece.' 


neglect of his claims by the Greek Government was only 
one out of several causes which led to the adoption of 
forcible means to obtain satisfaction after the ordinary 
diplomatic methods had failed. The principal causes of 
complaint against the Greek Government may be sum^ 
marized as follows : — 

1. Part of the land of a Mr. Finlay, a British subject 
resident at Athens, had been taken and enclosed in the 
grounds of the Boyal Palace in 1836. All attempts to 
obtain compensation had beeii unsuccessful,^ although there 
had ' for many years been formal demands of the British 
Government in behalf of a British subject *.* 

2. It was the custom of the Greek Christians at Athens 
to bum an effigy of Judas Iscariot at Easter time. In 1847 
they had been prevented from doing so, and a rumour got 
about that M. Pacifico, who was a Jew, had caused the 
authorities to take action. Angered by this belief, on 
Easter Sunday a Greek mob broke into and plundered his 
house,' beat his wife and son-in-law, broke up the furniture, 
stole money of his own and other people, and destroyed 
some documents which were stated to form the proofs of 
a security for a claim of over £20,000 against the Portuguese 
Grovemment. M. Pacifico was a British subject, having been 
bom at Gibraltar. Accordingly, his claim for compensation, 
amounting to a total of £31,534 1^. Id.,^ was taken up by 
the British Government, but without success. It has been 
suggested that M. Pacifico should first have endeavoured 
to obtain redress in the ordinary Greek courts,^ but, besides 
the fact that these were far from impartial, there was the 
further practical difficulty that it was impossible to deter- 
mine who had composed the mob that had sacked his 

^ B. S. P. 1850 (a). No. 1, op. cit., p. 1. Letter from Mr. Finlay to the 
Earl of Aberdeen, dated October 18, 1842. 

* Ibid., p. 35. Letter dated October 20, 1B48. Sir E. Lyons, the 
British minister at Athens, to M. Colocotroni. 

' Ibid., p. 54. Letter, M. Pacifico to Sir E. Lyons, dated April 7, 

* For details of the manner in which this amount was made up vide 
ibid., pp. 56-82, and as to the Portuguese claim, pp. 124-31. 

* e.g. Oppenheim, § 36. 

PARTH GREECE, 1850 107 

house.^ The matter did come before three Greek judges, 
and the document signed by them shows that it was found 
as a fact that the assault had actually taken place and 
considerable damage been done.^ 

3. Various outrages on natives of the Ionian Islands, 
which were at this time under the protectorate of Great 
Britain, had been committed, including the plundering of 
a trading vessel^ and some boats, and the illegal arrest 
and flogging by the police authorities of some lonians at 
Patras and Pyrgos.* Diplomatic representations and remon- 
strances were without effect, no effort being made to dis- 
cover and punish the offenders. 

4. The officer and men of a boat of H.M.S. Fantome were 
seized while on shore at Patras, in January, 1848, and taken 
to the guard-house. The boat's gear was taken by the 
soldiers, and it was only after the intervention of Her 
Majesty's vice-consul that the officer and men were re- 
leased. The outrage was increased by the fact that the 
Government organ, Le Moniteur Orec, published erroneous 
statements as to the affair.^ 

Repeated efforts to obtain satisfaction for the above 
claims having proved of no avail. Sir William Parker was 
ordered to Athens or Salamis with his squadron at the end 
of 1849, to support a demand for an immediate adjustment 
of claims, and, failing this, to take such measures as he might 
find best calculated to obtain the required satisfaction.* 

On January 17, 1850, an ultimatum was presented that 
the various claims should be settled within twenty-four 
hours, or other measures would be taken. On the 18th the 

' Lord Palmerston, in his great speech in Parliament in defence of his 
conduct in this matter, said : ' Bedress should be sought from the law 
courts of the country.; but • • • in cases where redress cannot be so had — 
and those cases are many — ^to confine a British subject to that remedy only 
would be to deprive him of the protection he is entitled to receive.' Han- 
sard, 3rd series, vol. czii, col. 383. 

* B. S. P. 1860 (a). No. 1, op. cit., p. 68. 

* Ibid., p. 177. Note, Sir E. Lyons to M. Colletti, dated November 10, 
1846. * Ibid., pp. 193-270. 

* Ibid., p. 276. Letter, Captain Le Hardy to the Governor of Patras, 
dated January 10, 1848. * Ibid., p. 316. 


Greek Grovemment vessel Oiho put to sea in spite of a warn- 
ing against doing so, and was brought back by a British 
warship.^ Other Greek vessels were seized and detained, 
and in a short while practically the whole of the Greek 
navy was in British hands. 

A blockade was proclaimed of the Piraeus,^ Patras,^ and 
Syra,* and this was subsequently extended to Spezzia, 
Hydra, and the Gulf of Lepanto.^ This blockade only 
extended to Greek vessels, and even excepted those which 
had been chartered by foreign merchants before the notifica- 
tion.* Some fifty or sixty vessels were seized at the various 
ports, but the blockade was not particularly eflFective in 
achieving its object, for two reasons. In the first place 
' the cargoes of Greek vessels being chiefly the property 
of foreign merchants . . . few vessels are to be met with 
whose cargoes and hull can be identified as exclusively 
Greek ',' and in the second place ' every subterfuge has 
been resorted to, by tampering with the papers of Greek 
vessels, to exempt them and their cargoes from detention '.* 

Russia made a strong protest against the action of Great 
Britain in instituting this blockade. In a letter from Count 
Nesselrode to Baron Brunow, the Russian ambassador 
to Great Britain, which the latter was instructed to show 
to Lord Palmerston, complaint is made of the want of 
consideration shown by Great Britain in not giving any 
information to France and Russia, the two powers who 
had been interested with her in the affairs of Greece since 
1827. The letter goes on : ' Europe . . . will decide how far 
the means that have just been taken were worthy of a great 
power like that of England towards a weak and defenceless 

» B. S. P. 1860 (a), No. 2, op. cit., p. 34. Dispatch, Vice-Admiral Sir 
W. Parker to the Secretary to the Admiralty, dated January 22, 1850. 

• Ibid., p. 46, For full text vide Appendix, pp. 167-8. 
» Ibid., p. 100. 

• Ibid., p. 101. For text vide Appendix, p. 169. 

» Ibid., p. 164. • Ibid., p. 46. 

^ Ibid., p. 89. Dispatch byVice-AdmiralSirW. Parker to the Admiralty, 
dated January 28, 1850. 

• Ibid., p. 117. Dispatch by Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker to the Admi- 
ralty, dated February 8, 1860. 

PARTn GREECE, 1860 109 

state.' ^ The Russian and Austrian consuls claimed that 
vessels which had been insured, or as to which bottomry 
bonds had been entered into, with Russian and Austrian 
subjects should be exempt from detention, but these claims 
were disallowed. Flags of other nations were hoisted by 
the Greek vessels to such an extent that instructions had 
to be issued that ' the mere hoisting of the flag of any 
country by a merchant vessel is no proof of nationality 
and cannot exempt the master of such vessel from being 
required to produce his papers '.* 

Meanwhile Lord Palmerston had accepted the good 
offices of Prance, and Baron Gros was appointed to go out 
to Greece with the idea of acting, not as an arbitrator, but 
as a peacemaker between the two nations. Orders were 
at the same time sent out to the British commander to 
suspend the coercive measures for a limited time, but to 
retain all vessels akeady captured. Accordingly, Sir W. 
Parker gave orders, on February 24, that no more cap- 
tures should be made,' and on March 1 the embargo 
was withdrawn, but all vessels seized were retained as 

Baron Gros arrived on March 5, and immediately started 
a series of conferences with the British representative, 
Mr. Wyse, at which the demands on the Greek Government 
were discussed. The two negotiators were unable, however, 
to arrive at any agreement, as Baron Gros refused to allow 
the Greek Government to give any security for the damage 
caused to the claims of Don Pacifico against the Portuguese 
Government or any guarantee against claims for damages 
arising out of the coercive measures. Baron Gros decided 
to refer home, and wanted Mr. Wyse to do the same.* Mr. 
Wyse refused, as he had been merely instructed to suspend 
the coercive measures for a reasonable time. On April 24 
Baron Gros wrote to Mr. Wyse that ' his efforts ' had * failed 
in obtaining the good result which he was entitled to 

* Annual Register, 1860, pp. 291 et seq. 

» B. S. P. 1850 (a), No. 2, op. cit., p. 206. Dispatch, Viscount Palmerston 
to Mr. Wyse, dated March 16, 1860. 

• Ibid., p. 183. Dispatch to Commander Foote. . * Ibid., p. 314. 


expect',^ thus finally acknowledging that he was unable 
to bring the parties to suitable terms. 

Accordingly, the embargo and blockade were reimppsed 
on April 25, and on April 26 Mr. Wyse sent a statement 
to M. Londos, the Greek minister,^ of the conditions on 
which alone he would withdraw them, viz. a proper official 
letter of apology, the payment of 180,000 drachmas for 
all the British claims except those connected with the 
Portuguese claims of Don Pacifico, and that the sum of 
150,000 drachmas should be deposited as security to await 
an inquiry into the validity of these latter ; further, that 
there should be a formal engagement not to bring forward 
or support any claims as to losses or damage owing to the 
doings of Her Majesty's squadron. 

On April 27 these terms were accepted, the money paid 
over, and the declaration and apology handed to Mr. Wyse, 
Thereupon the various Greek merchant and Government 
vessels were released, after a careful examination had been 
made to see what damage, if any, they had sustained.^ 
M. Pacifico offered £180 towards repairing any slight damage 
done during their detention, but this offer was refused.^ 

With regard to the settlement of this matter, both Vis- 
count Palmerston and Mr. Wyse have been accused of bad 
faith, but from a careful consideration of the documents 
it does not appear that these accusations can be upheld. 

While negotiations were proceeding in Greece between 
Baron Gros and Mr. Wyse, Viacoimt Palmerston and M. 
Drouhyn de Lhys had arranged, on April 9, that if Baron 
Gros made any reasonable proposal which Mr. Wyse could 
not altogether accept, the latter was to send it home and 
meanwhile maintain the staiiLS quo. Owing to the difficul- 
ties of communication, no messenger sent off by Viscount 
Palmerston after this agreement had been arrived at could - 
have reached. Mr. Wyse till April 28, i.e. a day later than . 

* B. S. P. 1860 (a). No. 2, op. cit., p. 358. Letter, Baron Gros to 
Mr. Wyse. • Ibid., p. 372. 

* Ibid., p. 381, Dispatch, Vioe-Admiral Sir W. Parker to the Secretary 
to the Admiralty, ApriJ 28, I860, 

* Ibid., p. 382, 


the acceptance by the Greek Government of the British 

demands. No such messenger was, however, sent, as 

meanwhile Viscount Palmerston and M. Drouhyn de Lhys 

had agreed to settle the matter by a convention in London. 

Drafts of the convention and of a letter of apology to be 

given by the Greek Government were exchanged on April 16, 

and finally agreed to and sent off on the 19th to Mr. Wyse, 

whom they reached on May 2.^ In the circumstances it 

was considered unnecessary to send out details of the first 

agreement to Mr. Wyse, as it was being superseded by the 

second ; and even if it had been sent out, the arrival of the 

dispatch would have been too late to prevent the resumption cm^ovw^ 

of the coercive measures on April ^^-(^^^^^^^.^'Q^X'^lji ) ^\r^ 

The other accusation is that the French warship VatAan 
arrived on April 24 with dispatches for Baron Gros, con- 
taining the news of the convention arrived at in London,* 
that Baron Gros communicated this intelligence to Mr. 
Wyse, and that the latter deliberately refused to act upon 
it. In the first place, even if news of the convention had 
been contained in these dispatches, Mr. Wyse was not 
boimd to act on any information not coming from his own 
Government and properly authenticated; and, secondly, 
although it is true that the Vavban did arrive at Athens 
on April 24, ' it is entirely and emphatically untrue that he 
[Baron Gros] made any such communication to me [Mr. 
Wyse].'"® Baron Gros sent three letters to Mr. Wyse on 
April 24, but there was nothing about any convention in 
them, except the following paragraph : ' Lord Palmerston 
requires some changes in the first draft of convention, which 
is very incomplete, I confess, but which has been in a singular 
degree improved as regards Enghsh views.* Baron Gros 
went on to urge Mr. Wyse ' not to wait for a convention 
which was coming out, but to refer for further instructions '.* 
These passages are obviously not such as would have been : 

* B. S. P. 1860 (o). No. 1, op. cit., p. 7.^ Letter, Viscount PaJmerston 
to the Marquis of Normanby, May 19, 1850. 

• Annual Register, 1860, p. 288. 

» B. S. P. 1860(c), No. 2, op. cit., p.l. Letter, Mr. Wyse to Viscount 
Palmerston, dated May 31, 1850. * Ibid, 


written had there been any definite news of a convention, 
and these letters were the only communications which 
passed between them. Mr. Wyse did not see Baron Gros 
between April 21 and May 1. 

This point, that Mr. Wyse had resumed coercive measures 
and forced the Greek Government to comply with the 
British demands at a time when he knew of the convention 
agreed to in London, was strongly urged by the French 
Government at the time, and it was agreed that the Marquis 
of Normanby should be allowed to go through the dispatches 
which were sent out by the Vavban. He writes that he 
had been through the dispatches with General De Lahitte 
and ' can see nothing in them to justify the expression . . . 
that the essential bases of a convention negotiated in 
London were at that time known in Athens'.^ Besides, 
if it was known, there, it is very surprising that the Greek 
Government did not raise the question at the time, and it 
does not appear that they did. 

As a matter of fact, the differences between the demands 
made by Mr. Wyse and agreed to by the Greek Grovem- 
ment and those included in the convention entered into in 
London were very slight, the chief being that by the latter 
the Greek Government would have had to pay 60,000 
drachmas more than they actually did.^ 

Eventually, the agreement entered into by Mr. Wyse was 
adhered to, with the exception that the question of the 
damages caused to the Portuguese claims of M. Pacifico 
was referred for arbitration to a mixed commission appointed 
by the Grovemments of France, Great Britain and Greece.' 

The commission sat at Lisbon and the French member 
was appointed umpire. Eventually it issued a unanimous 
report. The commissioners divided M. Pacifico's claims on 

* B. S. P. 1860 (c), No. 3, op. cit., p. 1. Dispatcli, Marquis of Normanby 
to Viscount Palmerston, dated June 13, 1850. 

* B. S. P. 1860 (a). No. 2, op. cit., p. 377. Dispatch, Viscount Palmerston 
to Marquis of Normanby, dated May 11, 1860, in which the differences are 
minutely discussed. 

. • B. S. P. 1860 (c). No. 4, op. cit. Letter, Marquis of Normanby to 
General De Lahitte, dated June 20, 1850, 

PARTH GREECE, 1850 113 

Portugal into two classes. First, as to loss sustained and 
services rendered by him during the civil war in Portugal, 
as to which they found that he had presented a petition 
to the Cortes in 1839, and were satisfied ' that the various 
certificates and papers attached to that petition are the 
originals or certified copies of the most important docu- 
ments alleged to have been destroyed at Athens '. The second 
portion of the claims was for salary and expenditure while 
Consul-General of Portugal in Greece, as to which the com- 
missioners considered that the claims were not 'prejudiced 
by any such loss, and that he is still able to establish his 
rights, if well founded, against the Portuguese Government '. 

Accordingly, ' taking into consideration the possibility 
that a few documents . . . may have been lost . . . and the 
expense he has incurred in this investigation ', the com- 
missioners awarded him the sum of £150 for the injury he 
had received.^ 

The details of the facts and diplomatic correspondence 
with regard to the case of M. Pacifico have been considered 
at some length on account of the considerable amount of 
misunderstanding and misstatement which exists on the 
subject. It is stated in many books by recognized writers 
on International Law that Great Britain ought to have been 
ashamed to back up the cause of a man who claimed nearly 
£30,000 and was awarded £150^; but such a statement 
is quite erroneous. In the first place, the claim of M. Pacifico 
was only one out of several which were being pressed by 
the British Government at the same time ; and in the next 
place the £150 awarded was only with reference to the 
damage caused to M. Pacifico's Portuguese claims. His 
other claims were paid by the Greek Government in cash 
to the extent of about two-thirds of their original amount. 
Further, with regard to the £150, the commissioners did 
not value the Portuguese claims at this amount, but said 

» B. S. P. 1851, op. cit., p. 17. 

' e.g. Oppenheim, § 35 ; Bonfils, Manud de droit iniematianal pMic 
(4th ed., byFauchiUe, 1905), §988; Holland, p. 135; Bards, pp. 98-0; 
Wheaton (4th English ed., by Attlay, 1904), § 293 a, 



that these claims could be prosecuted by M. Pacifico in 
spite of the loss of his documents at Athens. Indeed, the 
Portuguese minister, in a dispatch to Baron Gros, dated 
March 2, 1860, admitted the liability of the Portuguese 
Government to the amount of £197 4s. 3d.^ It is obvious, 
therefore, that in many respects the conduct of Great 
Britain in this affair has been maligned. As a matter 
of fact the method of conducting the blockade might 
be taken as a model,^ as foreign vessels were neither 
seized nor detained, and only occasionally visited when 
there was any doubt (which was frequently justified) as to 
the genuineness of their flag. The Greek Government made 
no resistance whatever to the blockade, and it therefore 
deserves the title of ' pacific ' both in fact and name. 


In April, 1860, a rebellion broke out at Palermo against 
Francis II. On May 6 Garibaldi set sail with an expedition 
of about one thousand men to help the insurgents.* In 
spite of two Neapolitan warships who ineffectively fired 
on the troops as they landed, he disembarked his force 
from two steamers bearing the Sardinian colours, at Messala, 
in Sicily, on May 11.^ 

Count Cavour stated that this was against the wishes 
and orders of the Piedmontese Grovemment, while the 
attitude of the Neapolitan Government may be gauged 

* B. S. P. (a), No. 2, op. cit., p. 289. 

' Bu merincq (p. 622), however, writes : ' Dans oe cas les repr^sailles 
excedaient la mesure applicable d*apr^ le droit des gens.' 

* (a) B. S. P. 1861, * Further correspondence relating to the affairs 
of Sicily ' (presented to the House of Lords by command of Her Majesty 
in pursuance of their Address dated March 1, 1861) ; Ducrocq, pp. 118-26. 

(6) Barte, pp. 38-9 ; Calvo, § 1843 ; Oppenheim, § 44. 

* B. S. P. 1860, vol. Ixviii, at p. 337, * Dispatches relating to the 
departure of a military and naval expedition from Genoa to the kingdom 
of the Two Sicilies.' 

* B. S. P. 1860, vol. Ixviii, at p. 343, 'Correspondence respecting the 
landing of General Garibaldi in Sicily.' 


from the following official dispatch : ' An act of the most 
barbarous piracy has been perpetrated by a horde of brigands, 
publicly enlisted and armed in a not-hostile state under 
the very eyes of the Government and in spite of its promises 
to prevent it.' ^ 

Sicily soon feU into the hands of the insurgents, and 
Garibaldi crossed to the mainland and entered Naples. 
Francis II retired to Gaeta, where he was surrounded, and 
on October 6, 1860, a blockade was declared of that port 
and also of Messina ^ by the ' Dictatorial Government '. 
This blockade, which was only directed against what was 
undoubtedly contraband, was notified ' to the diplomatic 
and consular body of all powers credited to the King'.^ 
The British Government, on inquiry, were informed by 
Cavour ' that His Sardinian Majesty had not ordered or 
sanctioned the blockade of Messina or of Gaeta '.^ They 
were, however, ' relieved by circumstances of various kinds 
from taking any decision upon the notification'.^ The 
captain of an American corvette told Garibaldi that he 
could not admit any interference with American vessels, 
and accordingly an order was issued that they were not to 
be stopped; a similar order was obtained in an indirect 
way with regard to British vessels.* Meanwhile, France 
had kept several warships before Gaeta as a kind of moral 
support to Francis II, and this had prevented the blockade 
being very strict. But on January 19, 1861, France with- 
drew her ships, as she could find no one to join her in inter- 
vening.'^ On the 18th Francis II had addressed a protest 
to all the European powers against the acts ' de I'aventurier 
Garibaldi et contre la scandaleuse et inqualifiable invasion 
qui, non seulement mena§ait le royaume d'une prochaine 
mine, mais qui d6truisait aussi tons les principes de droit 

* B. S. P. 1860, voL Ixviii, at p. 366, * Further oorrespondenoe respect- 
ing the landing of General Garibaldi in Sicily.' 

' For text of the declaration vide Appendix, p. 170 ; Ducrocq, .p. 120. 

* B. S. P. 1861, op. cit., pp. 16-16. 

* Ibid., p. 17. 

* Ibid. Lord John Busaell to Mr. Elliot. Dispatch, NoYember 17, 1860. 

* Ibid., p. 16. 

* Ibid., p. 27. Ducrocq, p. 122, gives January 7. 



public sur lesquels sont f ond^s la 86curit6 et I'ind^pendance 
des nations ^ *. He went on to ask the nations ' de d6clarer 
si elles reconnaitraient oui ou non les blocus qui allaient 
^tre 6tablis sans declaration de guerre *. No response was 
made to this. The blockade of Gaeta by Sardinia was 
notified to the powers on January 20,^ 1861, and Gaeta fell 
on February 13, followed by Messina on March 13.' 

It is difficult to define with any degree of accuracy the 
precise international status of the blockades above reported. 
At the time of their institution the insurrectionists under 
Garibaldi had certainly reached that state of organization 
which would have justified their recognition as a belligerent 
community and their acts of hostility against the previous 
sovereign authority as war. If, therefore, there was war 
between Francis II and the insurrectionists, the fact that 
the ships of Sardinia-Piedmont took part in the blockade 
would hardly alter the circumstances and render the block- 
ade pacific ; besides which, it is difficult to imagine that 
one sovereign could be at peace with another who had just 
assumed the sovereignty of the former's dominions at the 
request of the population.* 

With regard to the attitude of the various Governments, 
M. Calvo writes : ' Les relations entre les cabinets de Turin 
et de Naples n'avaient pas pour cela cess6 d'etre pacifiques 
et le roi de Sardaigne n'en faisait pas moins faire tous les 
jours, par son ministre, des protestations amicales au roi 
des Deux Siciles.'^ On the other hand, however, M. 
Ducrocq states that on October 7 Baron Winspeare, the 
envoy of the Two Sicilies at Turin, left, protesting against 
the occupation of Sicily ; while Lord John Russell, in reply 
to the protest of January 18, writes : ' The question of the 
legality of the blockade of Gaeta is one of International 

* B. S. P. 1861, op. cit., pp. 18-21 ; Ducrocq, p. 121. 

* B. S. P., op. cit., p. 22 ; vide Appendix, p. 171. 

* Ibid., p. 22 ; but Ducrocq (p. 121) and Bar^ (p. 38) give February 16 
for the fall of Gaeta. 

^ On October 21, 1860, a plebiscite in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies 
offered the crown to Victor Emmanuel : an offer which he subsequently 

' § 1843; and cf. Bards, p. 38. 


Law. I conceive there can be no doubt that the King of 
Sardinia is actually at war with the King of the Two Sicilies, 
and is now besieging the fortress of Gaeta, where His Majesty 
King Francis has taken refuge, having been abandoned by 
his subjects in all other parts of his dominions.'^ Dr. 
Oppenheim, the latest writer on the subject, thinks that the 
blockade was pacific at first, but was subsequently changed 
into a warlike one.' This view is shared by Professor 
Holland.^ As a matter of fact, the proceedings were wholly 
without precedent, and cannot be altogether squared with 
ordinary international practice, but it seems best to regard 
the blockade as hostile from start to finish. At first it was 
the work of the insurrectionists, and if they are not to be 
regarded as at war with their monarch the operation must 
be considered as piratical and of no efficacy as a blockade at 
all. Subsequently it is undoubtedly clear that after the 
notification of January 20, 1861, the two powers were at 
war and were so regarded by neutral nations.^ 

BRAZIL, 1862-3 » 

A British vessel, the Prince of WcUeSy was wrecked on 
the Brazilian coast near Albardao about June 8, 1861. 
No report of the occurrence was made, but on a rumour 
of it reaching the British consul he promptly investigated 
the matter, and found that many crates and barrels ' were 

^ B. S. P. 1861, op. cit., p. 21. Dispatch to the CSieyalier de Fortonato, 
dated January 31, 1861. * § 44. 

* p. 137 ; and vide Wharton, A Digest of (he International Law of the 
United States, voL iii, p. 408. 

^ Bar^ considers the blockade warlike. 

' (a) B. S. P. 1863, ' Correspondence respecting the plunder of the 
wreck of the British barque Prince of Wales, on the coast of Brazil, in 
June 1861 ; and respecting the ill-treatment of three officers of HJkf.S. 
Forte by the Brazilian police in June 1862.' There are also nine other 
lots of papers referring to subsequent correspondence with regard to this 
incident, which immediately succeed the above papers in B. S. P. 1863» 
vol. bcdiL 

{h) Buhnerincq, p. 573 ; Calvo, §§ 1820 and 1842. 


violently broken open and rifled of their contents * and 
that * every case and box had been burst open and robbed '. 
The seamen's trunks also showed evidence of having been 
brought ashore safely and then plundered.^ 

Of the ten persons on board (including two women) all 
perished. On a demand for an inquest only four bodies 
could be produced, and from their appearance and the 
xlistance of their place of burial from where they would 
have been washed ashore, if drowned, and also from the 
appearance of the boats, there was a strong probability 
that they had been murdered. Further evidence was 
forthcoming from the captain and crew of the schooner 
Hound, which was wrecked in the same gale. They * saw 
five of the bodies with knife cuts and other wounds, and 
some of them with their heads battered, their clothes rent 
and evidence of violent struggles. Three or four had got 
away a mile or two inland, but were overtaken and 

Representations were made to the Brazilian Government, 
but inquiry was burked and a reply given that ' The Im- 
perial Government is in no way responsible '.^ 

Later in 1862, three officers of H.M.S. Forte, while walking 
on shore in plain clothes, were arrested and kept in a filthy 
den for forty hours before being released, although the 
local authorities were informed that those arrested were 
British officers.* 

As no reparation was forthcoming for either of these 
outrages the British minister to Brazil was directed to 
claim compensation in the case of the Prince of Wales, and 
an apology for the ill-usage of the officers of the Forte,^ and 

* B. S. P., op. cit., p. 1. Enclosure in a letter from CJonsul Vereker 
to Lord J. Russell, dated June 25, 1861. 

* Ibid., p. 13. Letter, Mr. Stephens to Earl Bussell, January 15, 1S62. 

* Ibid., p. 29. Dispatch, Senhor Tagues to Mr. Christie, dated April 19, 
1862, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bio Janeiro. 

* Ibid., p. 51. Dispatch, Mr. Christie to Earl Russell, dated August 7, 
1862, with enclosures from Bear-Admiral Warren, Captain Saumerez 
and the three officers concerned. 

' Ibid., p. 81. Dispatch, Earl Bussell to Mr. Christie, dated October S, 
1862 ; this letter cemtains a good summary of the whole occurrmce* 

PARTH BRAZIL, 1862-3 119 

in case of refusal it was ' determined to enforce these demands 
by reprisal against Brazil \^ 

On the peremptory refusal of the Brazilian Government 
either to accept responsibility or give compensation, more 
forcible measures were adopted, and the ' mode of proceed- 
ing . . . caused a virtual blockade of the Port of Rio for 
Brazilian vessels going out from the 31st ult. [December 
1862] to the 6th of this month [January 1863]; there 
was no collision with the navy or forts of Brazil '.^ 

It was arranged on December 30 that Commander Henry 
should ' proceed to sea . . . and seize on such Brazilian 
ships as may be considered necessary as an equivalent for 
the demands of Her Majesty's Government '.' His orders 
were : ' Take care that the ships seized are the property of 
Brazilian subjects,' and remember that in certain events 
they ' must be returned to them uninjured '.* The follow- 
ing notification was also given : ' If any vessel seized by 
Admiral Warren's orders shall contain property belonging 
to parties who are not Brazilians, the admiral will, on the 
nationality of the owners being proved to his satisfaction, 
give every f aciUty in his power for the delivery of the pro- 
perty to the owners without any delay which can bo 

Five vessels were seized and brought in,' but on January 6, 
1863, notes were exchanged by which it was agreed that 
the Brazilian Government should pay compensation for the 
plunder of the Prince of Wales, and that the dispute as to 

• B. S. P., op. cit., p. 99. Dispatch, Earl Russell to Mr. Christie, Novem- 
ber 4, 1862. 

■ Ibid., p. 313, misprint for 113. Dispatch, Mr. Christie to Earl Russell, 
Januarys, 1863. 

• Ibid., p. 133. Bear-Adnural Warren to Mr. Christie, December 30, 

• Ibid., p. 160. Orders addressed to Commander Henry by Rear- 
Admiral Warren. 

• Ibid., p. 138. Dispatch, Mr. Christie to Acting-Consul HoUooombe, 
dated January 1, 1863. 

• Ibid., p. 142. Dispatch, Rear-Admiral Warren to Mr. Christie, dated 
June 4, 1863, with an enclosure giving particulars of the size and value of 
the ships. 


the officers of H.M.S. Forte should be referred to the arbitra- 
tion of the King of the Belgians. Accordingly the blockade 
was raised and the ships restored. Although this blockade 
aroused a strong feeling of resentment in Brazil, no forcible 
measures were taken to resist it, and there can be no doubt 
as to its title to the term * pacific '.^ It affords an excellent 
example of the kind of case in which a pacific blockade may 
be employed, of the methods by which it should be con- 
ducted and of the satisfactory result which may be expected 
from its adoption. 

BOLIVIA, 1879 « 

Very little is known of the details of this blockade beyond 
the actual fact of its occurrence. The dispute which led to 
it arose from the contending claims of Chili and Bolivia 
to some territory on which there were large guano deposits. 
The dispute was of long standing. On August 10, 1866, a 
treaty had been entered into by the two countries to settle 
it, but no sooner had it been signed than fresh disagree- 
ments arose and continued down to the time of this blockade. 

The proximate cause of the quarrel was the imposition 
by BoUvia of certain duties on some Chilian subjects at 
Antofagasta. Chili protested that this was contrary to the 
terms of the treaty of 1866, and, at the beginning of February 
1879, sent an ironclad to Megillones Bay* on the pretext of 
protecting her subjects. 

The Peruvian president tendered his good offices to the 
two nations, and at first it seemed as if the dispute would 

^ Bulmerincq (p. 573) states that the wreckers were Chilian subjects, 
and that therefore Great Britain had no right to demand compensation 
from Brazil. In the first place, however, the statement is inaccurate, and 
in the next, even if it were not, the Government of Brazil was responsible 
for the preservation of order and justice in its dominions. 

' (h) Calvo, § 1844 ; Fauohille, Du Uocua maritime^ p. 42 ; Holland, 
Studies in IfUemcUifmal Law, p. 135 ; Wheaton, IntenuUional Law (4th 
ed., by J. B. Attlay, 1904), § 293 B. 

(c) Annual BegiOer, 1879, pp. 304-^. 

* At this date the Bolivian territory extended to the sea-coast. 

PARTH BOLIVIA, 1879 121 

be settled. The Chilian president a43snTed the Peruvian 
representative at Santiago that the ironclad had been sent 
without any hostile intention, and that his Government 
would accept mediation. Bolivia, on its part, suspended 
the imposition of duties for the time being, and consented 
to arbitration. Fresh fuel was, however, added by Bolivia 
putting an end to a concession which a Chilian trading 
company had obtained at Antofagasta on the alleged 
ground of its non-fulfilment of certain conditions. Chili 
replied by occupjdng the district in question with her 
troops on February 16, but the ChiUan charg6 d'affaires still 
remained at La Paz. A second offer of mediation by Peru 
proved unavailing, as the Chilian Government was informed 
by Peru of a secret treaty which had been concluded in 
1873 between the latter country and Bolivia, and ' by which, 
according to an official dociunent published in Lima, each 
republic mutually guaranteed their independence and the 
integrity of their resi)ective territories against all external 
aggression \^ 

Further negotiations were broken off. On March 1 
Bolivia issued a decree expelling Chilians from the disputed 
territory and laying an embargo on their property, but by 
March 20 the Chilian troops were in possession of a large 
amount of territory, and on April 3 the Chilian chamber 
voted a declaration of war against Bolivia.^ They also 
formally declared war against Peru.' 

It does not, of course, follow that because the declaration 
of war was only made on April 3 the two countries were 
not at war previously, but there seems to be little doubt 
that, at any rate, during the first half of February a state 
of peace still existed, and that at that time the blockade 
(if it can be called a blockade) was really ' pacific '. This 
view, too, is supported by the unanimous opinion of the 
few writers who do mention this blockade. But, although 

^ Annual Eegiskr, op. dt., from which most of these details are taken. 

■ Calvo, op. cit. 

' A notice was contained in L. 0. April 22, 1879, that Lord Salisbury 
had received notice on April 7 that Chili had declared war against Peru 
and Bolivia. 


pacific at first, the blockade soon became ah act of war, 
and in this respect resembled the blockade of Mexico in 
1838. It is unfortunate that it is not known whether any 
vessels were seized during this blockade, or, if seized, what 
became of them ; nor is it known whether any notice of the 
blockade was given or whether the vessels of third states 
were subject to it. 

FORMOSA, 1884-61 

By the treaty of Tien-Tsin of May 11, 1884, China agreed 
with France ' k retirer sur ses frontieres les gamisons 
chinoises de Tonkin '.^ This evacuation was to have been 
completed by June 26, but on June 23 a French column 
of eight hundred men, who were marching to occupy Lang- 
Son, were attacked by a Chinese force. A protest was made 
by France at Pekin, in reply to which it was urged that 
the Chinese text of the treaty differed from that of the 
French, and that in any case the convention that had been 
signed had not been ratified and was merely preliminary 
to a proper treaty. 

On July 24, 1884, France presented an ultimatum demand- 
ing that Article II of the above treaty should be immediately 
executed, that an Imperial Decree should be pubUshed in 
the Pekin Gazette ordering the Chinese troops to with- 
draw from Tonkin and that an indemnity of at least ten 
millions sterling should be paid. This demand was rejected 
by the Tsong Li Yamen, although the indemnity demanded 
was reduced to fiifty million francs payable in two or three 
years or eighty million francs payable in annual instalments 

» (a) B. S. P. 1886, France, No. 1 ; Ducrocq, pp. 129-44 ; French 
State Papers, * Affaires de Chine ' (1886), pp. 1-16. 

(6) Bar^, pp. 39-40 ; Bonfils, Mawud de droU irOenuUional public 
(4bh ed., by FauchiUe, 1906), § 989 ; Bulmerincq, pp. 679 et seq. ; Calvo, 
§§ 1846-62 ; La Revue de droit intematiofial et de legislation comparee, 
t. xvii (1886), article by M. Geffcken, *La France en Chine et le droit 
international,* pp. 146 et seq. ; Westlake, IrUemational Law, Part II, 
*War» (1907), pp. 14-6. . 

• Article II. 

PARTH FORMOSA, 1884-5 123 

of eight millions.^ On August 1 Admiral Courbet was 
ordered to occupy the port and coal-mines around Kelung 
as an ' acte conservatoire \^ He was also ordered to 
blockade Foochow and the river Min, and to stop the im- 
portation of all contraband by seizing any Chinese boats 
that might try to run the blockade. The idea underlying 
these instructions was to ' produire la plus grande intimida- 
tion possible sans guerre d6clar6e '. On August 23 Foochow 
was bombarded, and the arsenal, the defensive works and 
some Chinese vessels were destroyed. 

France then notified the other powers of a blockade 
commencing October 23, 1884, of ' all the ports and road- 
steads of the island of Formosa included between South 
Cape or Cape Nansha and the Soo-au Bay passing west and 
north '? 

It was further announced that ' friendly ships will be 
allowed a delay of three days to effect their loading and 
leave the blockaded places. Any ship attempting to violate 
the above-mentioned blockade will be proceeded against 
in conformity with International Law and the treaties in 
force.' On this the Law Tiroes^ remarked: ' But the only 
thing certain about the situation is that International Law 
supplies no rules applicable to the situation.' 

France agreed with Great Britain not to exercise any 
right of search or of capturing neutral vessels on the high 
seas, and Great Britain, in return, refrained from issuing 
a formal proclamation of neutraUty. China, however, 
protested against the lenient treatment accorded to French 
vessels at Hong Kong, and, in consequence, the Foreign 
Enlistment Act was put in force.^ ' The new situation 
thus created ' then determined the French ' Government 
to hasten the time which they would have chosen for claim- 

* Idvre Jaune, ' Affaires de Chine et du Tonkin, 1884-6,' No. 20, p. 17, 
quoted by Calvo. 

■ Ibid., 'Affaire du Tonkin, 1885:' Letter of M. Jules Ferry to 
M. Patenotre, quoted by Ducrocq, p. 133. 

» JoMTwoi OHiGid, October 23, 1884 ; L. O. October 24, 1884. For fuU 
text vide Appendix, pp. 171-3. 

* November 1, 1884. VCalvo, § 1861, . 


ing full and entire exercise of the rights of belligerents as 
recognized by International Law '.^ 

Following this came the announcement in the London 
OazeUe of February 13, 1886: * It is hereby notified for 
public information that it has been announced to Her 
Majesty's Government by the Government of the French 
Republic that it is their intention to exercise, during the 
continuance of the present hostiUties between France and 
China, the rights of belligerents which are recognized by 
the law of nations, including the right to search neutral 
vessels on the high seas for contraband of war.' 

It seems fairly clear that the operations on this occasion 
were regarded by all parties concerned as something more 
than a pacific blockade and in reality as war.^ 

Admiral Courbet writes : * Cette manidre de faire la guerre 
nous est absolument d6favorable.' • M. Jules Ferry is 
reported to have said, on November 26, 1884, in the Chamber 
of Deputies : ' II y avait de trte grands avantages k suivre 
la politique des gages sans declaration de guerre, it faire la 
guerre comme nous la faiaons sans recourir k une declara- 
tion pr^alable.' * He then goes on to point out what these 
great advantages are : ' Cette manidre de procMer avait k 
nos yeux trois sortes d'avantages. Le premier, c'est de 
laisser la porte ouverte aux n6gociations ; le second, c'est de 
laisser subsister I'^tat conventionnel ant^rieur. Et enfin, 
il etait d'une sagesse ei6mentaire de ne pas compliquer 
notre conflit avec la Chine de diS6rends ou de difl&cultes 
avec les puissances neutres.' These advantages, however, 
would hardly arise from the state of war that then un- 
doubtedly existed, although they admirably express what 
might be expected to follow if a pacific blockade, merely 
had been instituted. The fact, too, that orders were given 

* B. S. P. France, No. 1 (1886), p. 11 : Letter, M. Waddington to Earl 
Granville, dated January 29, 1885. Idvre Jaime, 'Affaires de Chine et 
du Tonkin, 1884-6,' No. 3, p. 2. 

* Bar^ (pp. 39-40) considers it warlike; so also Hall {Intemaiional 
Law, 4th ed., § 121) and Oppenheim (§ 46). 

' Letter to the Minister for Marine, dated from Foutch6ou, August 30, 

* Journal Officid, 1884, November 27, p. 246. 

PARTH FORMOSA, 1884-6 125 

to Admiral Coiirbet to occupy the coal-mines around Kelung 
is evidence that the French Government considered the 
blockade to be warlike, and expected that, being at war, 
they would not be able to use the British coaling stations. 
Probably M. de Martens, in his Droit International, sums up 
the French position when he says that ' the French Govern- 
ment called a state of reprisals what was in reality a state 
of war'> 

On the Chinese side the language of Marquis Tseng, in 
a communication to Lord Granville,^ shows that he recog- 
nized that France and China were at war; moreover, 
China officially asked Japan to observe neutrality,^ and, 
as Mr. Westlake observes, ' point de bellig^rants, point de 
neutres.' * 

From the English point of view there was no doubt about 
the matter. Lord Granville wrote to M. Waddington on 
November 11, 1884, that Her Majesty's Government ' cannot 
admit that the blockade of the ports of Formosa which 
has been notified to neutral powers can be considered in 
the light of a pacific blockade. Actual hostilities have 
already taken place between France and China on a large 
scale and of a character which is quite inconsistent with 
a state of peace.' ^ And again : ' They maintain that a state 
of war exists, and therefore they do not deny the right of 
the French Government to establish an effective blockade 
of the ports in question, according to the laws of war, and 
to capture neutral vessels attempting to force it.' * 

There could be little doubt that this was not a pacific 
blockade, were it not that M. Calvo, who appears to be 
strongly opposed to pacific blockades, as they are usually 
carried out, writes : ' Consid6r6 en soi et ind6pendamment 
des regies encore si mal d6finies du droit des gens, ce blocus 

• But of. M. Billot, Un Diphmate, *L' Affaire du Tonkin,' p. 223, who 
regards the operations as reprisals. 

■ B. S. P., op. cit., p. 7, dated November 21, 1884 

• Ducrocq, p. 139. 

• Revue de droit international, t. vii, p. 61 L 

• B. S. P., op. cit., p. 4. 

• Ibid., p. 8. Lord Granville to M. Waddington, November 26, 1884. 


nous apparatt comme une mesure dont, en definitive, 
rhumanite a profit^. 

' Quelque ill^gale et surprenante qu'ait 6t6, de la part 
de la France, dans les circonstances oii elle s'est 61ev6e, 
cette pretention de rester en paix avec la Chine tout en 
bombardant ses ports et en bloquant ses cotes, U est positif 
que Tun et I'autre peuples lui en sont redevables d'avoir 
6chapp6 k toutes les calamit6s qu'eussent surement en- 
train6es les longueurs et les vicissitudes d'une guerre com- 
plete si lointaine.'^ 

This opinion was probably due to the French bias of the 
writer, and as the Chinese, who were the proper judges of 
the question, considered the blockade an act of war, we 
must conclude that it cannot rightly be termed a pacific 

GREECE, 1886 2 

At the Congress of Berlin the question of Greece had been 
brought forward, but no very definite conclusion was 
arrived at. The powers had recommended the Porte to 
grant Greece a rectified frontier, and reserved their right of 
future mediation on the subject. The Turkish delay caused 
a fierce agitation to break out in Greece, which threatened 
to culminate in armed conflict. At this point the powers 
intervened, and on January 26, 1886, the following declara- 
tion was made to the Greek Government by Italy, France, 

* Calvo, vol. iii, p. 643. 
(a) B. S. P. 1886, Greece, No. 1, * Copies of Collective Notes presented 
to the Hellenic Government and of the Replies thereto ; ' B. S. P. 1886, 
Greece, No. 2, * Copy of a Circular Dispatch to Her Majesty's Representa- 
tives abroad respecting the Affairs of Greece : ' this gives a summary of 
the progress of affairs up to the start of the blockade ; B. S. P. 1886, 
Greece, No, 3 ; B. S. P. 1886, Greece, No. 4 ; Duorocq, pp. 146-61. 

{b) Bar^, pp. 40-4 ; Bonfils, Mawud de droit inUrnationcd ptMic 
(4th ed., by Fauchille, 1906), § 990 ; Za Revue de droit international 
et de legidation comparee, t. xviii (1886), article by Rolin-Jacquemyns, 
pp. 618-23; Calvo, §§ 1863-7, who also quotes AiTrKofiariKa tfyypaffnt 
KararfOivra ug rqv /SovX^v vno rov eVt t»v €^<idT(piK&v virovpyov (Athens, 

PART II GREECE, 1886 127 

iRussia, Germany, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary : 
' En vue de I'absence de tout motif legitime de guerre de la 
part de la Grece contre la Turquie et du prejudice qu'une 
pareille guerre porterait aux int6rets pacifiques et notam- 
ment au commerce des autres nations, aucune attaque 
navale de la Grdce contre La SubUme Porte ne saurait etre 
admise.'^ M. Delyannis, the Greek premier, made an 
unsatisfactory reply to this note on February 2, 1886, 
insisting that any interference with Greece would be a viola- 
tion of its position as an independent state. 

France up to this point had been acting with the other 
powers, but now refused to join in any coercive measures, 
so that the ultimatum presented to Greece, April 26, 1886, 
was only signed by the representatives of the remaining 
five powers. This demanded that Greece should put her 
forces on a peace footing as soon as possible and give assur- 
ances of her intention of doing so within a week. 

On May 8, 1886, a declaration was made at Athens by 
the representatives of the five powers of their intention 
' to establish a blockade of the coasts of Greece against all 
ships under the Greek flag. ... All ships under the Greek 
flag attempting to run the blockade will render themselves 
Kable to be detained.' ^ 

A draft of this notice had been sent by the Earl of Bose- 
bery to Sir E. Malet on May 3, 1886, and it appears that 
the last word ' detained ' had been altered from ' captured ' 
in deference to the wishes of some of the powers.' 

The regulations with regard to the blockade were amplified 
in a memorandum of instructions to the British commander- 
in-chief in the Mediterranean : ' Her Majesty's Govern- 
ment, in concert with the Governments of Germany, Austria, 
Italy and Russia, have established against vessels under 
the Greek flag blockade of the coast of Greece, extending 
from Cape Malea to Cape Colonna, thence to the northern 
frontier of Greece, including the island of Euboea, also 

* Ducrooq, pp. 146-7 ; B. S. P. 1886, Greece, No. 3. 

■ B. S. P. 1886, Greece, No. 1, p. 7 ; No. 4, p. 6; andcf. L. Q. May 14, 
.1886. For full text vide Appendix, pp. 173-4. 

• B. S. P. 1886, Greece, No. 3, p. 126. 


comprising on the West Coast the entrance of the Gulf 
of Corinth. 

* You will give orders to all commanding officers of Her 
Majesty's ships under your command to detain every ship 
under the Greek flag which may attempt to go out from 
or enter into any of the ports or harbours or communicate 
with any part of the coast within these limits. 

' Should any part of the cargo on board of such ship belong 
to any subject or citizen of any foreign power other than 
Greece, and other than the powers above mentioned, and 
should the same have been shipped before notification of 
the blockade or after such notification, but under a charter 
made before the notification, such ship or vessel shall not 
be detained. 

' The officer who boards will enter in the log of any ship 
allowed to proceed, the fact of her having been visited and 
allowed to proceed : also day and at what place such visit 
occurred. In order to secure as much as possible imif ormity 
in action on the part of foreign officers acting in concert 
with Her Majesty's ships you will communicate these 
instructions to your foreign colleagues : in each case of 
detention steps must be adopted as far as practicable to 
ensure safety of ship and cargo.' ^ 

It would appear that the number of ships detained under 
this blockade was about seventy.* The only unsatisfactory 
incident in the conduct of the blockade was that the 
Austrians were reported to have canied oflP the telegraphic 
apparatus from Skiathos, and also requisitioned some 
provisions,' but it is by no means clear exactly what 
happened, and the incident is subsequently stated in 
dispatches to have been considerably * exaggerated '. 

The blockade was stated to have occasioned some scarcity 

^ Enclosed by the Earl of Rosebery in commnnicationfl to Her Majesty's 
representatives abroad : B. S. P. 1886, Greece, No. 4, p. 1. Also, with 
slight verbal alterations, enclosed in a letter from Sir J. Pauncef ote to the 
Secretary to the Admiralty, dated May 13, 1886 : B. S. P. 1886, Greece, 
No. 3, p. 163. 

■ B. S. P. 1886, Greece, No. 4, pp. 38 and 81. 

' Dispatch from Baring to Lord Rosebery, B. S. P. 1886, Greece, 
No. 4, p. 3. 

PARTH GREECE, 1886 129 

of provisions in various places, and to obviate this the 
British oommander-in-chief was instructed that ' should 
any actual distress arise in the islands from food being 
scarce pending the receipt of suppUes from the Greek 
Government you have authority to do all that you think 
necessary to relieve it, and even special treatment may 
be granted to vessels carrying provisions under such regu- 
lations as you may frame, which are to be sufficiently 
stringent '.^ It was, however, quite open to the Greek 
Government to charter vessels belonging to other powers 
to convey provisions to any of the islands. 

Meantime, M. Delyannis had resigned, and a new cabinet 
had been formed by M. Tricoupi to carry out the wishes 
of the powers, and although there was a conflict on the 
frontier from May 20 to May 24, disarmament steadily 
proceeded. After a good deal of diplomatic correspondence 
between the powers, an agreement was reached, and a joint 
note, signed by the representatives of the powers at Athens, 
was handed to the Greek Government on June 7 : 'In 
consequence of the official communication of a dispatch 
from His Excellency [the Greek foreign minister], dated the 
19th (31st) May of the present year, respecting the measures 
with regard to disarmament which have been taken by the 
Hellenic Government, and in view of the pacific assurances 
of the cabinet of Athens following this communication, 
the above-mentioned Governments [the five powers], taking 
note of these assurances, have the satisfaction of recognizing 
that in the present circumstances there is no longer need 
for the prolongation of the rigorous measures to which 
they have had recourse in the interests of the general 

* Consequently the undersigned, in the names of their 
respective Governments, have the honour to announce to 
His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the 
officers commanding the combined squadrons have received 
orders to raise the blockade of the coasts of Greece.' ^ The 

^ Dispatch, Secretary to the Admiralty to H.B.H. the Duke of Edin- 
burgh, B. S. P. 1886, Greece, No. 4, p. 9. 
' B. S. P. 1886, Greece, No. 4, p. 88. 



blockade was accordingly raised on June 7, 1886,^ but a 
small squadron was left at Suda Bay to see that the wishes 
of the powers were carried out. 

On the raising of the blockade the Greek vessels that 
had been detained were released, but without any indemnity. 
The British instructions as to this were quite clear : ' It 
appears to Lord Bosebery that as soon as the blockade is 
raised any vessels which have been detained should be 
released and that all proper facilities should be given to 
enable them to return to the ports to which they belong. 
. . . Her Majesty*s Government do not, of course, admit 
any liabiUty whatever to make compensation.' * 

No forcible means of opposition were used by the Greek 
Government during the course of this blockade, and there 
can, therefore, be no question as to its pacific nature. It 
is generally held up as a model of what a pacific blockade 
ought to be.® 

ZANZIBAR, 1888-9* 

The main object of the blockade of Zanzibar was to put 
down the slave trade and the importation of arms which 
was largely prevalent in that district. 

The Grerman East Africa Company had been granted 
large concessions by the Sultan, but it found great difficulty 
in establishing itself on the coast, as the natives disliked 
being handed over to German rule.^ There were a number 

^ B. S. P. 1886, Greece, No. 4, p. 86 ; vide also Bar^, pp. 40-4, who gives 
June S; L,0. June 29, 1886. 

■ Letter, Sir J. Pauncefote to the Secretary to the Admiralty, dated 
May 22, 1886, B. S. P. 1886, Greece, No. 4, p. 22. 

' e.g. Oalvo, § 1859. Geffcken {Anmuiire, p. 294) comes to the curious 
conclusion: 'La mesure r^ente contre la Gr^e . . . n'6tait pas un blocus.' 

* (a) B. S. P. 1888, Africa, No. 10 ; B. S. P. 1889, Africa, No. 1. 

(b) Bar^, p. 45 ; Bonfils, Manuel de droit intenuUional piMic (4th ed., 
by Fauchille, 1905), § 990, 990^ ; Ducrocq, pp. 161-3. 

(c) Appleton's Anmud Cyclopaedia, 1888, pp. 850-2 ; 1889, pp. 830-1. 

• B. S. P. 1888, Africa, No. 10, pp. 61-7. Report, Colonel Euan-Smith 
to Marquess of Salisbury, -with enclosures, dated September 21, 1888. 
This report gives a good statement as to the progress of affairs* 

PARTH ZANZIBAR, 1888-9 131 

of coast disturbances, including the firing on a boat belonging 
to H.M.S. Algerine, flying the British ensign, at Pangani,^ 
and also on unarmed boats of the German gunboat M&we.^ 
On the other hand, it must be admitted that the German 
officials did not act with proper tact and discretion : thus 
in September, 1888, on the report that a man had been 
fired at in Bagamayo, a party landed, and, attacking the 
natives, killed no fewer than one hundred and five and 
wounded many more.^ The disturbances were practically 
confined to the German sphere of activity, but there was 
great danger of the rising spreading to the British sphere, 
where concessions had been granted to the Imperial British 
East Africa Company.' The position of the missionaries 
also was one of great danger. Slave-dealing was rampant 
in the whole district, and the importation of arms and 
munitions of war to satisfy the needs of the Arab dealers 
was carried on on a large scale. The Sultan was powerless 
to stop or prevent this, and therefore consented to the 
establishment of a joint blockade of the coast by EngUsh 
and German men of war. This was strictly limited to the 
stoppage of the import of munitions of war and the export 
of slaves.* Italy agreed to join with the other two powers 
and sent out a man-of-war to assist,^ while Portugal agreed 
to co-operate with ' a blockade of required extent of 
Mozambique coast by their own naval forces only in sufficient 
strength '.* ' AuxiUary steps were taken on the mainland 
by the Congo State and the Netherlands.' "^ 

The blockade was accordingly commenced on December 2, 
1888.® The proclamation was contained in the London 
Gazette of December 4,* and also in the Imperial Gazette 

^ B. S. P. 1888, Africa, No. 10, p. 46. 

■ Ibid., p. 68. Dispatch, Colonel Euan-Smith to Marquess of Salisbury, 
dated September 25, 1888. 

» Ibid., pp. 90-4. * Ibid., p. 80. 

• Ibid., p. 86. • Ibid., p. 86. 

' HoUand, p. 140, and cf. Bolin-Jacquemyns, Revtie de droit inter- 
national, t. xzi, p. 207. 

• B. S. P. 1889, Africa, No. 1, p. 121. For full text of the proclamation 
by the British and German admirals, vide Appendix, pp. 174-5. 

• Vide Appendix, p. 176. 



published in Berlin on the same date. Germany directed 
its ambassadors to announce the fact of the blockade to 
the various countries to which they were accredited.^ The 
Portuguese proclamation was made by Royal Decree at 
Lisbon, and is contained in the Diario de Gfoverno published 
there on December 7, 1888, and in the Bcletim Official of 
December 8, published at Mozambique.^ The provisions 
of this decree ' respecting the trade in arms ' were further 
extended to Lorenjo Marques by a decree of December 22.^ 
The Italian proclamation is given in the Italian Official 
Oazette of December 19, 1888. With regard to the scope 
and character of the blockade, it is similar to the other 
proclamations, but it does not express the fact that the 
blockade was made by^ the consent and authority of the 

That the Sultan did give his consent and authority to the 
British and German blockade is clearly seen by the procla- 
mation he issued at Zanzibar, the concluding paragraph 
of which runs as follows : ' Be it known to all men that 
the blockade is done with our full consent and sanction ; 
and that it wiQ be directed against vessels carryiog flags 
of all nations, but only against the trade in slaves and 
arms and munitions of war. Ordinary conmierce wiU be 
in no way interfered with.' ^ 

To add to the efficacy of the blockade, Her Majesty's 
consul-general at Zanzibar was, by the Zanzibar (Prize 
Court) Order in Council, 1888, authorized to take cognizance 
of, and proceed judicially in, matters of prize.® And by 
a further order of the same date, styled the ' Zanzibar Order 
in Council, 1888,' he was given power to make regulations 
for peace, order and good government, which should be 

* B. S. P. 1888, Africa, No. 10, p. 102. For text vide Appendix, 
pp. 175-6. 

* B. S. P. 1889, Africa, No. 1, p. 16. For text vide Appendix, p. 177. 
» Ibid., p. 35, quoting Boleiim Official, December 29, 1888. Vide Ap- 
pendix, p. 177. 

* Ibid., p. 18, and vide Appendix, pp. 177-8. 

* Ibid., p. 9. For full text vide Appendix, pp. 178-9, 

* Ibid., p. 14, and vide also L. Q. December 21, 1888. 

PABTH ZANZIBAR, 188»-9 133 

binding on all British subjects and British protected persons 
in Zanzibar.^ 

Beyond depressing trade generally, the blockade did not 
effect much. A great many dhows were boarded, but with- 
out result, and for some time the only captures made were 
a dhow with some eighty slaves, by the Germans, off Pangani, 
and one by the British with forty-eight sniders (which were 
subsequently restored) belonging to men who were going to 
Kilimanjaro to join an English shooting party.' One 
French dhow was stopped by H.M.S. Algeriney having 
a few guns and powder on board, and with a pass signed 
by the French consul. The captain of the British warship 
did not detain it, but was satisfied with the assurance of 
the ^ nahoda ' of the dhow that he would take it straight 
back to Zanzibar.^ The first real capture by the British 
was of a slave dhow with twelve slaves on board, two and 
a half months after the start of the blockade.^ 

Meanwhile, both English and German missionaries had 
been murdered, and there was constant fighting between 
the Germans and the Arabs. Matters were, on the whole, 
fairly quiet in the British sphere, which extended, from 
Wanga to Lamu. 

On February 19 a public proclamation was made by the 
Sultan, prohibiting in Zanzibar and Pemba the importation, 
exportation and trade in arms and ammunition, and the 
Sultan delegated to the admirals his sovereign rights of 
search of all Arab vessels in territorial waters.** There was 
at first a protest from the French consul, but he was informed 
by his Government that they had no objection to the search 
of French dhows by the English and German admirals 
under the delegated authority of the Sultan in the territory 
of the two islands.^ 

The English took Pemba and Zanzibar harbour, and the 

^ L. O. December 21, 1888. By the ' Zanzibar Order in Ck>uncil, 1889 ' 
{L, O, March 8, 1889), he was given the farther power of prohibiting such 
persons from being in Zanzibar for two years. 

• B. 8. P. 1889, Afrioa, No. 1, p. 33. 

• Ibid., p. 46. * Ibid., p. 68. 

• IWd., p. 40. 


GermanB the Tomainder of the territory of the two islands, 
to look after. 

On March 1 notice was given that ships would be searched 
in the territorial waters of the Sultan, which included the 
channel between Zanzibar and the mainland, and five miles 
round the islands (gunshot of modem guns).^ 

Meanwhile, on February 27, the Germans added to the 
stringency of the blockade in that part of the coast con- 
trolled by them between Kilwa and Saadani, by extending 
it to provisions, dhows being only allowed sufficient for 
three days.' Shortly afterwards they notified the applicsr 
tion of martial law to Dar-es-Salaam, Bagamayo, and 
a radius of one German mile round each.' 

The e^lanation of these tactics on the part of the Germans 
is curious. Lord Salisbury writes that Count Hatzfeldt 
had informed him that the prohibition of importation of 
provisions was a police measure, independent of the block- 
ade. The German forces were engaged in two distinct 
operations — ^the suppression of the slave trade, by means 
of the blockade, and the suppression of the revolt in the 
German sphere. The second operation involved a state of 
war, and this necessitated the employment of any means 
allowed by International Law.* It is difficult to under- 
stand how the two operations above mentioned can be 
reconciled, unless, indeed, the Germans considered that the 
Arabs and natives who had ' revolted ' in their sphere of 
influence were at war with the Sultan, and that they were 
acting as his agents in putting down the revolt,* under the 

^ B. S. P. 1889, Africa, No. 1, p. 65. This raises the interesting question as 
to the nature and extent of territorial waters. Vide also Appendix, p. 179. 

• Ibid., p. 48. » Ibid., p. 67. * Ibid., p. 63. 

• The wording of the 'Zanzibar (Prize Court) Order in Council, 1888' 
(£r. O. December 21, 1888), lends some support to this view. It runs 
as follows : ' And whereas a state of war exists between Her Majesty 
and other powers in belligerent alliance with the State of Zanzibar, on 
the one hand, and insurrectionary subjects of the Sultan and other African 
tribes and populations on the other hand.' It must be remembered, 
however, that such a recital would be technically necessary to create 
a prize court and revive in the consul-general the dormant jurisdiction 
of a Court of Vice- Admiralty. Too much stress must not, therefore, be 

PABTH ZANZIBAR, 1888-9 135 

authority, in the one case, of the concessions to the German 
East Africa Company, and, in the other, of the delegation 
of the power of blockade. But, if this is the explanation, 
the blockade must also have been an incident of war. Yet 
the Grermans did not treat it as such, only extending it to 
slaves, munitions of war and provisions, and letting other 
cargoes go. Again, as this was a joint blockade by Germany 
and Great Britain, this could not be a pacific blockade on 
the part of one power and an act of war on the part of 
the other, especially as it was entered into under the dele- 
gated authority of the Sultan. It was evident that Great 
Britain did not regard it as an act of war, and it is also 
clear that other nations did not so regard it, for otherwise 
there would have been no need for France to give per- 
mission for her dhows to be searched. 

The whole position is extremely anomalous, and it seems 
best to describe it as ' une mesure de haute police inter- 
nationale '.^ It is an axiom of International Law that its 
rules only apply in matters arising between two or more 
states who are members of the family of nations. And as 
it cannot be contended that the Sultanate of Zanzibar had 
arrived at that degree of civilization which would entitle 
it to be received as a member of the family of nations, 
there was nothing binding on Great Britain and Germany 
to treat it as they would treat an European nation. That 
being so, intervention in its internal aflEairs was perfectly 
justifiable, as the Sultan was unable to control them him- 
self, and their non-control was a serious menace to the 
powers interested. Having intervened, they assisted the 
Sultan, in his name, to put down the revolt which his 
concessions to the Germans had caused, and also to stop 
the slave trade then existing in his dominions — an object 

laid on these words. On the other hand. Sir J. Fergusson, the Under 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, speaks of the * state of war' 
(Hansard, 3rd series, vol cccxxxiv, coL 14), and Lord Salisbury (Hansard, 
3rd series, vol. cccxxxvi, col. 1236), in referring to these operations, said : 
'The Germans became by International Law practically masters of the 
territory in question.' 
^ Duorocq, p. 153. 


fipecially dear to the policy of Great Britain. The European 
powers were certainly not at war with the Sultan, as every- 
thing was being done in co-operation with him. On the 
other hand, it could not be contended that the revolting 
Arabs had reached such a pitch of organization as to warrant 
their recognition as a beUigerent community, and, that 
being so, the operations could not be considered as a war 
against them, but merely as the putting down of a revolt. 
The language of Count Hatzfeldt was, therefore, incorrect 
and ill-considered, but was doubtless intended to cover 
and e^lain away acts and a policy which were hardly 
contemplated by Great Britain when the joint action of 
herself and (Jermany was decided on. The whole story of 
the blockade, unsuccessful as it was, perhaps, in its main 
objects, is only one more example of the flexibility and 
adaptability of pacific blockade to awkward and unprece- 
dented international situations. 

The remainder of the blockade need not be considered 
at any great length. There was a considerable amount of 
hard work done in boarding the native dhows, but with 
little result. The figures for the various months were : 
January 1889, 637, February 617, March 1,360, April 1,232, 
not including canoes or dhows visited by boats off Pemba. 
Some of these dhows were visited for the fourth time.^ 

The Germans now took the aggressive, bombarded 
Saadani, and occupied Bushiri, Pangani, and Tanga, the 
centres of the revolt, which gradually fizzled out. The 
blockade was raised on October 1, 1889, but the senior 
German naval officer * added a rider stating that, notwith- 
standing this proclamation, the importation of munitions 
of war into the German sphere is still prohibited \^ 

Various disputes arose between the Germans and the 
British as to the methods by which the blockade was carried 
on, and the former put forward the ' claims of German 
subjects connected with the capture of the Neera in Lamu 
harbour by the British blockading squadron, and her con- 
demnation by the Zanzibar prize court, and ... on account 

* B. S. P. 1889, Africa, No. 1, pp. 58, 74, 78, 91. 

• L. O. October 1, 1889. 

PARTH ZANZIBAR, 188»-9 137 

of the alleged refusal of the British blockading dquadron 
to permit the landing at Lamu of some Somali porters 
engaged for the e^edition of Dr. Peters into the interior '.^ 

Finally, matters were settled by an agreement ^ between 
Great Britain and Germany, signed on July 1, 1890, by 
which (Article XI) Great Britain agreed to exercise its 
influence to obtain the cession by the Sultan to Germany 
of the territory comprised in the then existing concession 
to the German East Africa Company, and herself ceded 
Heligoland, while Germany recognized the protectorate of 
Great Britain over the remainder of Zanzibar, including the 
islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. 

This protectorate was subsequently recognized by France 
in a declaration signed on August 5, 1890.' 

SIAM, 1893* 

This blockade arose out of a boundary dispute between 
France and Siam. France claimed that the territory of 
Annam extended to the east bank of the Mekong.^ Siam, 
on the other hand, while being willing to refer the matter 
to arbitration,^ denied this claim, and pointed out that by 
the Franco-Siamese Convention of 1886 the French had 
claimed the right of sending a vice-consul to Luang-Prabang, 
which was within the territory that they now claimed as 
their own,'' and that, therefore, they had practically admitted 
that it did not belong to them. On March 14 the French 

' B. S. P. 1890, Africa, No. 6, p. 2. Letter, Sir P. Anderson to Sir 
E. Malet, dated June 28, 1890. 

* Ibid., pp. 4-11 ; Hertslet, Treatiea, vol. xviii, p. 466. 
» B. S. P. 1890, voL Lcm, p. 611. 

* (a) B. S. P. 1894, Siam, No. 1; livre Jaune, 'Affaire du Tonkin;' 
Ducrooq^ pp. 163-9. 

(6) Annual Register, 1893; Bevue de droit intemationdl et de legislation 
comparie, t. xxv, 1893. 

(c) Bevue de droit intemationdl pMie, t. i, 1894. 

• B. S. P. op. cit., p. 19 ; Ducrooq, p. 164. 

• B. S. P. op. cit.,- p. 19. ' Ibid., p. 82. 


representative at Bangkok demanded (1) the immediate 
evacuation of Annamite territory by Siam, (2) the release 
of a Siamese subject who had been imprisoned for raising 
a French flag, and (3) a Jieavy indemnity.^ As no immediate 
acceptance of these terms was made, France began to occupy 
part of the disputed territory. Stung Ireng being occupied 
on April 1, 1893,^ and the island of Khone on the 4th.' 
This led to a rising in the valley of the Lower Mekong, and 
an attack on the French in Khone on May 12. Thereupon 
one thousand men were dispatched to reinforce the French 
troops. About a month later various points on the coast 
were occupied.* In reply, Siam began to close the mouth 
of the river Menam. About the same time, too, a French 
officer was apparently murdered by a Siamese mandarin.** 
The Siamese Government were willing to make reparation 
for this if the French account of the outrage was proved 
to be correct,' but this naturally did not satisfy the French 
authorities, especially as another French officer had been 
taken prisoner by a tribe in the north of Siam, which was 
practically independent.'^ Matters were not mended by 
a dignified note in which the Siamese foreign minister 
stated that as a matter of courtesy they would release the 
officer in question, although he had been captured ' when 
in command of an aggressive and hostile expedition \^ 

On July 13 an incident occurred which brought matters 
rapidly to a head. Two French steamers, the Inconstant and 
the Comdte, forced the entrance of the Menam at Bangkok 
and ascended the river to Paknam. A sharp resistance 
was offered, which resulted in the killing of one man on the 
Inconstant and some twenty other casualties on the GornMe.^ 

* B. S. P. op. oit., p. 26. 

■ Ibid., p. 22 ; Xe Maiin, April 6, 1893 ; rindependant de Cochin- 
chine, April 11, 1893. 

» B. S. P. op. oit., p. 25 ; Ze Maiin, April 10, 1893. 

' Samit Island, June 13 ; Rong, June 17 ; and Rong Salem, June 18. 
B. S. P. op. cit., pp. 43 and 46 ; Ducrocq, p. 166. 

* B. S. P. op. cit., pp. 41 and 60 ; Ducrocq, p. 166. 

• B. S. P. op. cit., p. 42. 

' Ibid., p. 36. • Ibid., p. 68. 

• Ibid., p. 64 ; Ducrocq, p. 166. 

PARTH SIAM, 1893 13S 

A small steamer called the J. B, Say, which was compelled 
to act as a pilot, was sunk in the aflfray.^ Under a treaty 
of 1856 French vessels undoubtedly had a right of ascending 
the river to Paknam, but the Siamese were within their 
rights in endeavouring to close the river as a kind of reprisal 
against the French seizure of part of their territory. It 
would seem, also, that the commanders of the two French 
vessels acted under a mistake, and against the orders and 
agreement of the French minister.^ Whatever may have 
been the circumstances, however, the act of the French 
commanders was adopted by their superiors, and led to an 
ultimatum being presented to Siam on July 20. This 
demanded (1) the cession of the entire left bank of the 
Mekong, (2) an indemnity of three million francs, (3) the 
punishment of those concerned in the murder of the French 
officer and the attack on the ships.^ On non-acceptance of 
these demands within forty-eight hours, the French minister 
would leave Bangkok, and a blockade of the coast would 
at once be instituted. After inquiries as to the exact 
nature of the French demand for territory, Siam agreed to 
accept the above conditions, with the exception that they 
would not cede the whole of the left bank of the Mekong.* 
This did not prove satisfactory, and a few days later the 
blockade was instituted. 

The first declaration of blockade was made on July 26,^ 
by a Captain Reculoux. It is very doubtful, however, 
whether this declaration would have been held valid had it 
been tested, as the notice should have been given by the 
highest officer in command of the French warships. Admiral 
Humann. This point appears to have been noticed by the 
French authorities, and accordingly a fresh declaration of 
blockade was made by the French admiral on July 29, 
and at the same time the first declaration was annulled.® 

• B. S. P. op. cit., pp. 121-7. 

• Ibid., pp. 64-74. 

• Ibid., pp. 79-80. * Ibid., p. 82. 

• For text vide Appendix, p. 180. 

• For text vide Appendix, pp. 180-1 : the second declaration was more 
extensive than the first. 


A general confusion as to the exact details of the blockade 
seems to have resulted. Lord Bosebery, although he 
pressed for a reply, could gain no definite information, and 
was variously informed that the blockade started on July 26, 
July 28, and July 31.^ Such a state of affairs was most 
detrimental to British commerce, which owned 87 per cent, 
in tonnage and 93 per cent, in value of the shipping at 
Bangkok. British merchants and companies trading with 
Siam pressed Lord Bosebery to protest against this menace 
to their trade, but he refused to do so, at any rate until he 
was in possession of exact information. Indeed, relations 
were so strained between the two countries at the time^ 
that any formal protest might well have precipitated a war. 
I Meanwhile, considerable activity in conducting the block- 
ade was shown at Bangkok. An EngUsh captain wrote to 
Vice-Admiral Fremantle, on July 28, that * every care had 
been taken by the French to warn them and make every 
detail clear. French gunboats are already very busy in 
the bay, stopping and warning junks, &c.'' On July 29 
a British vessel, having on board some Chinese coolies from 
Hong Kong, was stopped at the bar at the mouth of the 
river, and forced to remain outside until the next day, 
when it was allowed to come in and clear.* Another British 
vessel, the Savoia, was also detained at Koh-si-Chang ^ 
for some time. In the meantime, orders had been given to 
the Governor of Singapore not to allow any French ships 
of war to take in supplies until the British Government 
had definite information as to the character of the blockade, 
but these orders were cancelled two days later in view of 
the prospective raising of the blockade.® ' Friendly vessels ' 
were given three days in which to complete their loading 
and quit the blockaded port ; a time which seems extremely 

^ July 26 from British representative at Bangkok; July 28 from the 
same and also the senior naval officer at Singapore ; July 31 from the 
British representative in Paris. Vide B. S. P. op. cit., pp. 91-2. 

• Note the language, e.g., of the Times, July 24, 1893, and Daily Tele- 
graph, July 26, 1893. 

» B. S. P. op. cit., p. 160. * Ibid., p. 99. 

• Ibid., pp. 104-6. • Ibid., p. 104. 

PABTH SIAM, 1893 141 

short, in spite of Ducrocq's statement that ' cette mesure 
fut appliqu6e dans I'esprit le plus conciliant '.^ A slight 
modification of the ordinary rules was made in favour of 
mail steamers. They were permitted to approach the 
anchorage of Koh-si-Chang, but then had to hand over 
their mails to the French minister, who would undertake to 
have them transmitted as quickly as possible.^ A curious 
departure from the usual rule of international courtesy 
remains to be noticed. The French admiral declared that 
the days of grace applied to warships as well as to merchant 
vessels, and it would, therefore, appear that he contem- 
plated preventing foreign men-of-war from entering the 
blockaded zone. So far as is known, this provision was not 
put into force, but if it had been, war might well have been 
the result. 

When the Siamese Government saw that France was in 
earnest in her demands, it gave way on all points. The 
blockade was raised at midday on August 3,* and at the 
same time the port of Chantaboun was handed over to 
the French as a pledge of Siamese sincerity.* Eventually 
the matters in dispute were settled, entirely in the favour 
of France, by a treaty dated October 3, 1893.* 

There can be little doubt that this blockade deserves the 
name of pacific, although Great Britain seems to have been 
inclined to treat the measures taken by the French as 
acts of war. The French view, however, was that it was 
' un blocus pacifique ',• and there is no evidence whatever 
that Siam regarded the blockade as hostile ; 7 indeed, every 
care seems to have been taken to prevent an outbreak 
against the French 

• Ducrocq, p. 166. * Vide Appendix, pp. 181-2. 
» B. S. P. op. cit., p. 174. * Ibid., p. 116. 

• Ibid., pp. 197 and 203 ; Ducrocq, p. 167. 

• B. S. P. op. cit., p. 97, and cf. p. 118. Letter, M. Jules Develle to the 
Marquis of Dufferin, dated August 3, 1893. 

' M. Ducrocq (p. 166) says, * En effet, elle ne cessait de protester de ses 
dispositions pacifiques.' 


CRETE, 18971 

The history of Crete in the nineteenth century is one 
long record of straggles on the part of the inhabitants 
against their rulers, the Turks. A fresh rising occurred 
early in 1897, and the vessels of the Great Powers were 
sent to Cretan waters to endeavour to maintain order and 
obtain a definite settlement of the question. The matter 
was, however, greatly complicated by the action of the 
Greek Government. Although the President of the Greek 
Chamber of Deputies, on February 6, 1897, stated the Greek 
policy as follows : ' Les piiissances s'eSor^ant d'appliquer 
les nouvelles institutions, la Gr^ce n'avait pas k intervenir ; 
elle surveillerait les 6v6nements dans Tespoir que les puis- 
sances feraient pr6valoirleurs decisions,' 'this policy was not 
adhered to. On February 8, the Cretan insurgents pro- 
claimed their imion with Greece,' and on the 10th Prince 
George set out for the island with a torpedo flotilla.' He 
was followed on the 13th by Colonel Vassos, at the head 
of fifteen hundred men and two batteries,' and this party 
landed on the 14th.' The next day, February 16, Colonel 
Vassos, as ' Commander-in-Chief of the Hellenic army 
which has to-day occupied the island of Crete', issued 
a proclamation as follows : ' In the name of His Majesty 
George the First, King of the Hellenes, I occupy the island 
of Crete, and proclaim this to its inhabitants.' * On the 
other hand, this sending of troops was at a later date 
explained by M. Delyannis, by saying that ' La Gr6ce 
avait envoy6 des navires en Cr6te pour sauver la population 

^ (a) B. S. P. 1897, Turkey, Nos. 4, 6, 9, 10, 11 and 12 (Nos. 11 and 12 
are bound in B. S. P. 1898, voL cvi) ; Ducrooq, pp. 169-74. 

(6) Anntud Register, 1897 ; Appleton*s Anntud Cyclopaedia for 1897, 
pp. 241-53; Bards, pp. 45-56; Bonfils, Mantiel de droit itUemational 
public (4th ed., by Fauchille, 1906), § 990* ; Holland, pp. 146-9 ; Law- 
rence, Principles of International Law (1900), pp. 670-1. 

• Quoted by Ducrooq^ p. 164. 

• Anntud Register, 1897, pp. 308 et seq. 

• B. S. P. 1897, Turkey, No. 10, p. 80. 

PAETH CRETE, 1897 143 

menac6e par le fer et le feu des musulmans '.^ There 
is a marked contrast between the two statements, and the 
genuineness of the latter may, perhaps, be gauged by the 
evidence of Bear-Admiral Harris, the commander of the 
British naval forces, who says ' the control of the Turkish 
soldiery here [Canea] is admirable ' ; ^ and again, ' the in- 
surgents in nine cases out of ten are the attacking parties, 
although they always deny it with the most vehement 
asseverations.'^ Indeed, 'to the presence of the Vassos 
detachment the blockade of the island is exclusively due.' * 

On February 13 the admirals met and occupied Canea, 
and stopped the further disembarkation of troops and 
munitions of war. On the 20th a Greek filibustering vessel 
was detained, and on the 24th a joint proclamation was 
made to the inhabitants to the effect that the admirals 
* intend to oppose any act of hostility which may be com- 
mitted in the presence of one of their ships in any part of 
the island '} 

On March 2 the representatives of Great Britain, Austrisr 
Hungary, France, Germany, Italy and Russia presented 
an identic note to the Greek Grovemment which stated 
that Crete could not be annexed to Greece, but that abso- 
lutely effective autonomous administration would be granted 
to it. The note further went on to require the withdrawal 
of the Greek ships and troops, and warned the Greeks that 
if this were not done the powers had decided ' not to shrink 
from any measure of compulsion '.* A somewhat similar 
note was also presented to Turkey on the same date.® 

On March 6 Turkey replied accepting the principle of 
the note, but desiring to discuss the details of carrying 
it out, and on the 8th a note was received from Greece which 
was practically a refusal.'^ 

• French livre Jaune, 'Affaires d'Orient,' February to May, 1897, No. 31. 

• B. S. P. 1897, Turkey, No. 9, p. 4. 

• Ibid., p. 27. 

*' Ibid., p. 33. Telegram, dated April 5, 1897, Admiralty to Bear- 
Admiral Harris. 

• Ibid., p. 10. • B. S. P. 1897, Turkey, No. 4. 
' B. S. P. 1897, Turkey, No. 6, pp. 1 and 4. 


Meanwhile affairs in Crete were steadily growing worse. 
Some two thousand persons were besieged by the insurgents 
at a place called Candanos, about three hours' journey 
inland. Their position had become desperate, and a relief 
expedition had to be sent by the admirals to bring them 
down to the coast, a result which was only achieved with 
considerable difficulty. After this the admirals refused to 
allow cargoes brought in by merchant vessels to be disposed 
of, as this would have meant the revictuaUing of the Greeks 
and insurgents.^ Shortly after the institution of this order, 
but before the actual commencement of the blockade, 
a Greek schooner, with munitions of war and volunteers on 
board, was sunk by an Austrian gunboat.* 

Instructions were now sent out for the institution of 
a blockade and a proclamation of autonomy to the people 
if all the admirals agreed on these measures.' The French 
admiral did not receive his instructions until March 17, but 
details were arranged on the 18th, and the blockade started 
at 8 a.m. on the 21st.^ The blockade only applied fully 
to Greek vessels : other vessels, while subject to being 
visited by the blockading ships, were free to land their 
cargoes if they were not to assist the insurgents. 

The British view with regard to the position of the 
blockade was expressed by Lord (then the Hon. N. G.) 
Curzon in answer to a question in the House of Commons 
on March 26, 1897 : ' No state of war exists between Great 
Britain and either Greece or Turkey. The blockade of 
Crete is understood by Her Majesty's Government to be in 
the nature of a measure of police, enforced (with the consent 
of the sovereign power) by the admirals who have control 
of the coast, with the object of preventing further fighting 
in the island. The instructions to the British admiral are 
to the effect that he should apply the rules of the blockade 

^ B. S. P. 1897, Turkey, No. 9, p. 14. Report, Bear-Admiral Harris to 
Admiral Sir J. 0. Hopkins, dated March 15. 
' Ibid., p. 36 ; Appleton's Annual CycUypaedia^ p. 249. 

• B. S. P. 1897, Turkey, No. 10, p. 118. 

* L. G. March 20, 1897. For text vide Appendix, pp. 182-3« 

PART It CRETE, 1897 145 

in accordance with these principles.'^ The Turkish view 
of the matter is shown by an extract from the Levant Herald 
of March 22, 1897, being a translation of an official com- 
munique : ' This pacific attitude of the Great Powers . , , 
is in accordance with the rights and political interests of 
the Imperial Government. '^ 

Several boats, containing for the most part provisions 
and munitions of war, were captured while endeavouring 
to run the blockade. On one occasion three of the captured 
boats had to be destroyed owing to the bad weather, their 
captor, the British warship Dryad, having first taken on 
board their cargo of flour.^ After a few days the British 
admiral was able to report that ' the steamers have . . . 
almost ceased to run, but a large amount of blockade 
running is done in caiques (native coasting boats), many of 
which have been captured by the cruisers and brought into 
Suda Bay, where they are detained'.* The flour and 
captured food suppUes taken by the British during the 
blockade were sent to Candia for the relief of the poor 
Mussulmans.^ Considerable firing went on on shore, particu- 
larly round a blockhouse on a ridge of heights overlooking 
Canea. The insurgents, who had regular Greek troops with 
them, were here very active, and had several times to be 
shelled before they desisted.® 

In spite of the blockade, however, Greece appeared to be 
in no hurry to recall Colonel Vassos, and the relations 
between Greece and Turkey became very strained. Both 
nations were informed by the powers that in case of war 
the aggressor would be held Uable.'' 

As was said at the time : ' War has practically been 
declared against the powers by Vassos, and it is necessary 

* Hansard, 4th series, vol, xlvii, col. 1311. 

• Cf. the Lausanne Gazette, March 27, 1897. 

" B. S. P. 1897, Turkey, No. 10, p. 163. Report, Rear-Admiral Harris 
to Admiralty, dated March 28. This incident is noteworthy in view of 
the outcry against the Russian action in mnlring neutral vessels in the 
recent Russo-Japanese war. 

* B. S. P. 1897, Turkey, No. 9, p. 30. * Ibid., p. 44. 

• Ibid., p. 31, » B. S. P. 1897, Turkey, No. 11, p. 176, 



that the King of Greece should have pressure put upon 
him to recall him.'^ Accordingly, proposals were made 
for a blockade of the Gulf of Athens, the Piraeus and the 
Gulf of Corinth, and the powers seem to have been practi- 
cally agreed on this course when, on April 18, war broke 
out between Greece and Turkey. Thereupon the powers 
agreed that, in view of war having actually broken out, it 
would be expedient ' to abstain from all intervention until 
a favourable opportunity presents itself for offering their 
mediation ' ; * but that the withdrawal of Greek troops from 
Crete would be a condition precedent to any intervention. 

On the outbreak of war a Turkish Irad^ provided for 
the expulsion of Greeks from Turkish territory within a 
period of fifteen days. The Porte endeavoured to include 
Crete in the sphere of this order, but was prevented by 
the powers ' en raison de la situation sp6ciale du pays \^ 

The position taken up by the powers was well expressed 
by Mr. Balfour, in answer to a question in the House of 
Commons on April 26, 1897. ' The powers having assumed 
the occupation of the littoral of the island before the out^ 
break of the war, have determined that it shall be con- 
sidered neutral. The blockade is maintained for the 
purpose of preventing opposition to that authority.'* 
M. Hanotaux also said: *La Crete doit 6tre consider6e 
comme territoire neutre ; les puissances maintenant le 
blocus strict empfecheront tout d^barquement des troupes 
bellig6rantes et continueront leurs efforts pour Torganisa- 
tion d6finitive de la Crdte.' * 

The war went against the Greeks, and to obtain the 
mediation of the powers the Greek Grovemment decided to 
withdraw their troops from Crete. Colonel Vassos and 
other officers left on May 9, and the next day the British 

' B. S. P. 1897, Turkey, No. 11, p. 163. Dispatch, Sir F. LaflceUes to 
the Marquess of Salisbury. 

• Ibid., p. 191. 

• French livre Jaune, * Affaire de Cr^te,' Nos. 680, 691, 603, 610, and 
625, cited by Ducrocq, p. 171. 

• Hansard, 4th series, voL xlviii, col. 1076. 

• French livre Jaune, * Affaire de Cr^te,' No. 669, p. 301. Cf. No. 639, 
p. 288, cited by Ducrocq, p. 172. 

PARTH CRETE, 1897 147 

admiral was ordered to ' allow Greek transports and ships 
of war to come to Crete for the sole purpose of embarking 
Greek troops '} The ships that had been seized during the 
blockade were also put at the disposal of the Greek Govern- 
ment for the same purpose.^ 

On May 14 five hundred troops embarked, a further 
six hundred and eighty-two on the 19th, and the last batch 
left for the Piraeus on May 26.* 

Thereupon the Great Powers intervened between the 
combatants, and an armistice was arranged dating from 
one p.m. on May 19; this subsequently broadened into 
a definite peace. 

Meanwhile the British admiral reported that ' the block- 
ade has been so far relaxed that it is practically inoperative 
at present '.* It was not, however, officially and formally 
raised until December 5, 1898,^ the powers continuing 
strictly to watch the coasts of Crete to prevent the landing 
of bands of Greek volunteers or munitions of war.* Finally, 
on April 29, 1899, a constitution was granted which made 
of Crete ' un £tat jouissant d'une autonomic complete dans 
les conditions ^tabUes par les quatre grandes puissances \'' 

Several important questions * were raised by this block- 
ade. In the first place, it seems clear that some vessels were 
stopped before the date announced for the starting of the 
blockade. Thus the Austrian torpedo boat Sebenico seized 
a Greek sailing vessel on March 17 in the Bay of Dia. The 
Austrian papers asserted that the reason for seizure was 
the opening fire on the Sebenico by the insurgents. This 
statement is repudiated by the Greek papers, which declare 
that the boat was seized because it refused to leave the 

* B. S. P. 1897, Turkey, No. 10, p. 196. ■ Ibid., p. 196. 
■ B. S. P. 1897, Turkey, No. 11, p. 293. 

* B. S. P. 1897, Turkey, No. 10, p. 196. • Duorocq, p. 167. 

* B. S. P. 1897, Turkey, No. 12, p. 269. 

' CoDBtitution of Crete, 1899, Art. I, Cap. L Duorocq (p. 174) writes: 
* Les puissances de six qu'elles 6taient an d^but, se trouvaient r^duites 
k quatre, par suite de la retraite de rAllemagne et de TAutriche.' 
i ' The questions of the sinking of vessels and the fact of the non-univer- 
sality of the blockade are dealt with in Part L 

K 2 


place after repeated demands^ It may be, however, that 
all the boats seized were of a filibustering character, and 
therefore rightly seized by the international squadron as 
agents (recognized by the Turkish note of March 6) of the 
sovereign authority. If this were so, the question of 
blockade would not arise, as, technically at any rate, a 
sovereign can close its ports to the vessels of another power. 

The most important question, however, arose after the 
outbreak of war between Greece and Turkey. The powers 
were blockading the coasts of one belligerent in that 
belligerent's interest, and prevented any hostile action 
taking place within the zone of blockade. Technically, it 
would seem that they became the allies of Turkey, because 
they prevented the Greek troops from further invading the 
Turkish territory of Crete ; but, on the other hand, it is 
without precedent for one ally to blockade another's ports. 
As a matter of fact, the measure prevented both sides from 
free action with regard to Crete, and it would seem best to 
regard it as sui generis, 'un droit des gens special, fait 
pour les besoins de la cause,' ^ and made valid by the 
dominant position which the Concert of Europe has assumed 
with regard to European affairs. 

Another question that arose was the attitude of powers 
(neutral powers, as they are called in the proclamation, 
although this is an improper use of the term) other than 
those actually engaged. On this point M. Ducrocq writes : 
' Aprds sa notification toutes les puissances tierces, sans 
aller jusqu'i ne pas le reconnaitre, ne I'acceptdrent pas 
toutes d'une fa9on pure et simple. Ainsi les £tats-Unis se 
bomdrent k un simple accus6 de reception sans entendre 
nullement par Ik reconnaitre la 16gitimit6 du blocus de la 
Crdte, d6sirant se r6server k cet 6gard.' ^ 

Although, however, the blockade presents a number of 
unusual features, there can be no doubt that it was really 
' pacific '. To regard it in any other hght would imply 
that the Great Powers were at war with Turkey and Greece, 
or one of them, which was certainly not the case. Their 

* Ducrocq, pp. 168-9. • Ibid., p. 173, • Ibid., p. 169, 

TABTH CRETE, 1897 149 

representatives remained at Athens and CJonstantinople 
during the whole period, and no one seems to have regarded 
the blockade in any other way than as a measure of coercion 
applied to the island of Crete with a view to its pacification 
and good government. 

VENEZUELA, 1902-3 ^ 

The cause of the blockade of Venezuela was the obstinate 
refusal of the Venezuelan Government to apologize and 
pay damages for certain gross outrages on British ships 
and seamen. There had beeji a whole series of cases in 
which the ordinary usages of International Law and courtesy 
had been violated. The principal of these are set out in 
a memorandum issued from the Foreign Office on July 20, 
1902.2 They may be summarized as follows : — 

1. The Venezuelan gunboat Augusta y on January 22, 
1901, seized four boats, their cargo, and some of their crew 
by means of a landing party of twenty men at the island 
of Patos.^ Patos was a small island belonging to Great 
Britain, as was acknowledged in a statement made by the 
Venezuelan consul.* 

2. On February 26, 1901, John Craig, a British subject 
of Trinidad, while in his boat, the Seahorse^ was pursued 
to Patos, where his boat was seized by a Venezuelan Guarda 

3. On August 30, 1901, a vessel called the Pastor was 
fired on while in British territorial waters at Patos.^ 

4. On May 1, 1902, the British vessel In Time was sunk 

* (a) B. S. P. 1902, Venezuela, No. 1 ; B. S. P. 1903, Venezuela, No. 1. 
(6) Appleton's Annual Cydopaedia for 1902, pp. 826-9; Bonfils, Manud 

de droit international public (4th ed., by Fauchille, 1905), § 990*. Westlake, 
International Law, Part II, * War' (1907), pp. 16-16. 

■ B. S. P. 1902, op. cit., pp. 1-4; B. S. P. 1903, op. cit., pp. 126-9. 

■ Of. B. S. P. 1903, op. cit., p. 1. Dispatch, Governor Sir A. Maloney 
to Mr. Chamberlain, with enclosures verified on oath. 

* B. S. P. 1903, op. cit., p. 6. 

* Ibid., p. 21. Dispatch, Mr. Grant Du£E to Lord Lansdowne. 

* Ibid., p. 39. Dispatch, Colonial Office to Foreign Office, with enclosures. 


in the harbour of Pedemales by the Venezuelan gunboat 
Oeneral Crespo after an order had been given to seize all 
craft in the harbour. 

5. In June, 1902, the British ship QiLcen of Orenada was 
seized. ' It appears from sworn testimony that the vessel, 
while on her voyage from Grenada to Trinidad, in ballast, 
was overhauled by the gunboat Reataurador some twenty 
miles off Campano ; that after the seizure the Queen was 
towed into the Venezuelan port of Porlamar, there stripped 
of her sails and papers, and finally confiscated on a mere 
suspicion of having carried a cargo of arms to Venezuela, 
the crew being put on shore and left destitute.^ ' 

6. The British sloop Indiana was seized by the Venezuelan 
authorities, and subsequently lost by them in the Barima 

7. The house of a Mr. J. N. Kelly was pillaged.* 

8. On September 22, 1902, the British sloop Racer, while 
in a disabled condition, drifted ashore, and was robbed by 
boats pulling off from shore, the ship being subsequently 
seized by the local authorities of Carupano.* 

Besides these specific instances of ill-treatment, there was 
also a number of ' cases in which British subjects and com- 
panies had large claims against the Venezuelan Government ', 
while the proceedings of Senor Figueredo, the acting Vene- 
zuelan consul at Trinidad, were strongly objected to.^ 

Many complaints and remonstrances were addressed to 
the Venezuelan Government, but these were of no avail, 
and at last it was stated that ' the position of His Majesty's 
legation at Caracas has been rendered for diplomatic pur- 
poses quite impracticable, as aU representations, protests 
and remonstrances now remain disregarded and unacknow- 
ledged '.« 

^ B. S. P. 1903, op. cit., pp. 124-6. Dispatch, Mr. Haggard to Lord 
Lansdowne, with enclosures, June 30, 1902. 

■ Ibid., pp. 116-22. 

' Ibid., p. 8. Dispatch, Mr. Grant Duff to Lord Lansdowne, dated 
March 27, 1901. * Ibid., pp. 147-8. 

• Ibid., pp. 89-99 and 107. 

• B. S. P. 1902, op. cit.. p. 4. 

PARTH VENEZUELA, 1902-3 151 

The position the Venezuelan Government took up was 
that they had ' decided to postpone dealing with any other 
matters pending with the British legation until the settle- 
ment of the Ban Righ question \^ 

The Ban Righ had been originally fitted out in England 
and had been detained by the British authorities as being 
apparently destined for warUke piu*poses. At this juncture 
the Colombian minister in London stated that the vessel 
was intended for the service of his Govemment,^ and as 
this was combined with a statement by the Venezuelan and 
Colombian ministers that no state of war existed between 
their respective countries, there was no further obligation, 
or indeed right, to detain the vessel, and she was accord- 
ingly released. Subsequently she took part in various fiU- 
bustering exploits against Venezuela, and that country 
claimed to be indemnified from the results by Great Britain, 
a claim which the latter declined to recognize. 

The German claims were of a somewhat different character, 
and consisted mainly of monetary claims by various creditors 
for damage done during the civil war. A summary of these 
is contained in the memorandum communicated to the 
British Government by Count Mettemich on November 13, 

Several other European nations also had claims against 
Venezuela, but Italy* was the only one which was wiUing 
to join England and Germany in obtaining satisfaction by 
forcible means : her claim amounted to 336,000 francs.^ 

It was at first suggested that a pacific blockade should 
be employed to enforce these claims, but, on the advice of 
Vice-Admiral Douglas, it was decided to adopt his alternative 
scheme of seizing all the Venezuelan gunboats in the first 
instance.® Orders were sent out by their respective Govern- 

' B. S. P. 1903, op. cit., p. 139. Letter, dated August 2, 1902, from 
Senor Baralt to Mr. Haggard. 

• Ibid., pp. 42-6, and B. S. P. 1902, op. cit.. Appendix, p. 17. 

' Ibid., p. 147. For summary of the Britisb claims communicated to 
the German ambassador, cf. p. 141. * Ibid., p. 161. 

• Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia for 1902, p. 828. 

• B. S. P. 1902, op. cit., p. 9, 


ments to the British and German representatives at Caracas, 
and it was arranged that a settlement of the claims of the 
one nation should not be accepted without a settlement of 
the claims of the other. Similar ultimatums were simul- 
taneously presented to Venezuela by Great Britain and 
Grermany on December 7/ and, as no answers were received 
within twenty-four hours, the ministers left for La Guayra, 
and after another twenty-four hours active measures were 
taken. Several Venezuelan ships of war were seized ^ with- 
out resistance, and two of them wj^re subsequently sunk 
by the German commodore.* This was the signal for the 
arrest of numerous Englishmen and Germans residing in 
Venezuela, but, owing to the good offices of the United 
States, these were soon released again. A few days later 
the captain and crew of a British ship were illtreated at 
Puerto Cabello, and forced to haul down the British flag. 
An apology was demanded, but not being forthcoming, two 
forts outside the town were shelled after due warning had 
been given. Practically no resistance was offered, and the 
work was completed by a landing party, who destroyed the 

Nearly the whole of the Venezuelan navy was seized in 
the course of a few days, but as this produced no effect 
it was decided to go on with the pacific blockade. It was 
arranged that the two powers should blockade different 
ports and issue their own notifications and instructions.^ 
The blockade started on December 20,® and applied to all 
vessels, although various days of grace were allowed to 
steamers and sailing vessels, according to their port of 
departure.'' Following on this announcement the coast was 

^ The Italian nltiinatum, which was similar, was presented on Decem- 
ber 13 (Appleton's Anmud Cyclopaedia, 1902, p. 828). 

• Among these was a transport called the Oasun, which had been hired 
from French owners. The fVench consul was informed that it would be 
given up to him on receipt of a guarantee that it should not be returned 
to Venezuela. • B. S. P. 1903, op. cit., p. 167. 

• Ibid., p. 174. • Ibid., p. 169. 

• L, Q. December 20, 1902. For full text vide Appendix, p. 183. 

' The American merchantman Caracaa, however, which had started for 
La Guayra before the notification of the blockade, was permitted to enter 

iPARTn VENEZUELA, 1902-3 153 

strictly blockaded, and elaborate instructions were issued for 
the naval officers concerned, as follows : — 

Instrtictions to Naval Officers. 

^ 1. Every merchant vessel sailing under other than the 
Venezuelan flag, which may be found by one of the block- 
ading ships in the immediate neighbourhood of a blockaded 
port, is to receive a special notification in accordance with 
the following procedure : — 

' 2. An officer of the blockading ship is to be sent on 
board the merchant vessel. He is to notify to the master 
of the merchant vessel the existence and extent of the 
blockade, and is to inform him that he cannot be permitted 
to communicate with the blockaded port, and that any 
attempt to do so in defiance of such warning will render his 
vessel liable to seizure and detention for trial in a Prize 
Court, with probable ultimate confiscation of ship and cargo. 

' 3. The boarding officer will then enter in the log-book 
of the merchant vessel and on the document which fixes her 
nationality, the name of His Majesty's ship by whom the 
notification in his person has been made, together with 
a statement of the terms of the notification and the date 
and place at which the visit was made, and to these entries 
he will affix his signature. 

' 4. Any such vessel which may appear to have an inten- 
tion of breaking the blockade is to be ordered to quit the 
neighbourhood under pain of seizure. 

' 6. Every merchant vessel sailing under other than the 
Venezuelan fiag, which in defiance of the above notification 
attempts to communicate with any of the blockaded ports, 
is to be seized and thereupon conveyed to Port of Spain, 
Trinidad, where she is to be handed over to the Prize Court. 

' 6. Merchant vessels which, on being boarded, 

(a) Produce obviously false papers, 

(b) Refuse or fail to produce the necessary documents to 

prove their nationality, identity, and destination, 

the port of La Guayra, but before she had discharged her cargo the German 
naval forces, on December 23, compelled her to leave (Appleton's Annwd 
Cyclopaedia, 1902, p. 829). 


are to be considered as attempting to break the blockade, 
and are to be ordered to quit the neighbourhood under 
pain of seizure and ultimate confiscation. 

' 7. Merchant vessels sailing under the Venezuelan flag, or 
merchant vessels sailing under other than the Venezuelan flag 
which may be proved to be in the service of the Venezuelan 
Government, are to be seized and treated as prize of war. 

' 8. The exceptions to the above instructions are as 
follows : — 

' (1) Ships which are bona fide in distress are to be per- 
mitted, as need shall arise, to enter or leave a blockaded port. 

' (2) The blockade does not affect foreigners, that is to 
say, persons of other than Venezuelan nationality, who 
wish to leave the country. 

' Ships under other than the Venezuelan flag, which have 
such persons on board and possess certiflcates from their 
Consuls, together with papers in proper form, wiU, after 
giving previous notice to the blockading ship, be allowed to 
pass. But such ships may have no cargo on board beyond 
the baggage of bona flde travellers. 

' (3) Every consideration is to be given, compatible with 
the exigencies of the blockade, to British and German 
nationals, and the subjects of neutral states. 

' A prize court wiU at once be estabUshed at Port of 
Spain.i ' 

Mail steamers were subject to the blockade restrictions, 
but if the mails were transferred to the blockading ships 
the latter endeavoured to land them.^ The blockading 
forces landed and seized the custom houses at Carupano, 
Cumana, Guanta, La Guayra, and Puerto CabeUo : and 
' a large number of merchant vessels belonging to Vene- 
zuelans and of cargoes destined for Venezuela were stopped 
by the blockading squadrons, and the captured ships were 
moored at Margarita Island '.^ 

While the blockade proceeded the Venezuelan Government 

* B. S. P. 1903, op. cit., p. 170. Admiralty to Vice-Admiral Sir A. 
Douglas. Dispatch, December 11, 1902. 

' Ibid., p. 180. Dispatch, Admiralty to Vice-Admiral Douglas, dated 
December 18. • Appleton's Annwd Cyclopaedia, 1902, p. 829. 

PARTH VENEZUELA, 1902-3 165 

appointed Mr. Bowen, the United States minister, as its 
agent to negotiate a settlement, and gave him the fullest 
powers^ It was suggested that Venezuela should give security 
for the payment of the various claims by setting apart 
a certain portion of the customs dues for that purpose, but 
the matter was complicated by the fact that other nations, 
such as Belgium and France, already had interests in the cus- 
toms of Venezuela. Finally, however, terms were arranged, 
and three similar protocols with the three blockading 
powers were signed by Venezuela on February 13, 1903. 
By the one with Great Britain,^ Venezuela acknowledged 
the justice of the British demiands, and paid £5,500 to 
satisfy the claims for the seizure and plunder of British 
vessels and imprisonment of British subjects. Other claims, 
with the exception of those of the bondholders, were referred 
to a mixed commission. The claims of the bondholders 
were met by the setting aside of thirty per cent, of the 
customs of La Guayra and Puerto Cabello. In default of 
any arrangement as to the distribution of the customs, and 
the right of Great Britain, Germany and Italy to have 
a settlement of their claims separate from the other powers, 
the matter was to be referred to the Hague tribunal with ' 
power for any state interested to become a party. 

The most important clauses, however, from the point of 
view of International Law were Articles VII and VIII, as fol- 
lows : — 

Article VII. ' The British and Venezuelan Governments 
agree that, inasmuch as it may be contended that the estab- 
lishment of a blockade of Venezuelan ports by the British 
naval forces has ipso facto created a state of war between 
Great Britain and Venezuela, and that any treaty existing 
between the two countries has been thereby abrogated, it 
shall be recorded in an exchange of notes between the under- 
signed that "' certain conventions " shall be deemed to be 
renewed and confirmed, or provisionally renewed and con- 
firmed, pending the conclusion of a new treaty of amity and 

Article VIII. 'Immediately upon the signature of this 

' B. S. P. 1903, op. cit., pp. 194 and 218. * Ibid., pp. 225-7. 


treaty arrangements will be made by His Majesty's Govern- 
ment, in concert with the Governments of Germany and 
Italy, to raise the blockade of the Venezuelan ports. His 
Majesty's Government will be prepared to restore the vessels 
of the Venezuelan navy which have been seized, and further 
to release any other vessels captured under the Venezuelan 
flag, on receipt of a guarantee from the Venezuelan Govern- 
ment that they will hold His Majesty's Government in- 
denmified in respect of any proceeding which might be taken 
against them by the owners of such ships or of goods on 
board them.' 

In accordance with this protocol, orders were given to 
raise the blockade on February 14.^ 

The blockade of Venezuela is chiefly remarkable for its 
stringency, and the definite character of the instructions 
to those who had to carry it out. In some quarters it has 
been considered as an act of war, and there is much to sup- 
port this view. A prize court was established, and ' neutral 
states ' and ' prize of war ' are mentioned in the instructions 
to naval officers. Moreover, considerable force was used in 
seizing the Venezuelan gunboats, and bombarding Puerto 
Cabello. Mr. Balfour's personal opinion also seems to incline 
this way. In answer to a question in the House of Commons 
on December 17, 1902, he stated : ' I think it is very likely 
that the United States will think there can be no such thing 
as a pacific blockade, and I personally take the same view. 
Evidently, a blockade does involve a state of war. . . . Does 
the honourable and learned gentleman suppose that without 
a state of war you can take the ships of another power and 
blockade its ports ? '^ Again, at Trinidad, on December 22, 
a Gazette extraordinary was issued to the effect that : 
' Being satisfied thereof by information received by me, I do 
hereby proclaim that war has broken out between His 
Majesty and the United States of Venezuela.' Professor 
Holland, in commenting on this, says : * The effect of this 
proclamation was, however, merely, under the Colonial Courts 
of Admiralty Act, 1890, and the Prize Courts Act, 1894, to 

^ B. S. P. 1903, op. cit., p. 228. Dispatch, Lord Lansdowne to Sir 
M. Herbert. * Hansard, 4th series, voL czvi, ooL 1490. 

PARTH VENEZUELA, 1902-3 167 

call into activity the dormant commission of the Supreme 
Comii of Admiralty to act as a Comij of Prize.' ^ This 
annomicement, coupled with Mr. Balfour's statement and 
the wording of the protocols entered into, sets up a strong 
line of evidence for those who maintain that a state of war 
actually existed. Professor Holland suggests that the 
situation created might be called ' war sub modo '.^ On 
the other hand, Venezuela made practically no resistance to 
the measures used against her, and when reprisals are 
adopted it is certain that it is for the state on whom they 
are being inflicted to determine whether it will consider 
them as such, or as acts of war. Venezuela does not appear 
to have considered the action of the three powers as warlike, 
and on the whole, therefore, it seems justifiable to consider 
the operations as in fact a pacific blockade.^ It might also 
well be argued that if two countries do not know whether 
they have been at war, it is highly probable that they have 
not, and Article VII of the protocol shows that there was 
considerable doubt as to the exact international status of 
the allies. 

The practice of the blockade shows one curious modi* 
fication of the usual British methods. The notification 
in the London Oazette and elsewhere was not considered 
sufficient evidence to condemn a vessel for violation of 
the blockade, but a separate notification was required 
for each vessel approaching the limits of the blockade, in 
accordance with the usual French doctrine. On the other 
hand, the German vessels interfered with the ordinary coast 
fishing vessels, a practice which has been declared by the 
United States courts, in the PaqueJte Habana, to be for- 
bidden in time of war,* except, perhaps, in cases of urgent 
necessity, such as Napoleon's proposed invasion of England. 

^ Holland, article in Law Quarterly Review, No. 74, April, 1903. 


' Oppenheim (§ 46) says that the blockade of Venezuela, althongh 
declared to be warlike, was essentially a pacific blockade : bat Westlake 
(op. cit.) considers that it was in fact warlike. 

* Holland, op. cit. Vide also Regulation adopted by the Second Hague 
Conference,1907. [B. S. P, Miscellaneous, No. 1 (1908), pp. 127-32.] 


British Official Notice of Embargo and Blockade. 

' And His Majesty is further pleased to order that a general 
embargo or stop be made of all ships and vessels whatsoever 
belonging to the subjects of the King of the Netherlands, 
now within, or which shall hereafter come into, any of the 
ports, harbours, or roads, within any part of His Majesty's 
dominions, together with all persons and effects on board such 
ships and vessels ; and that the commanders of His Majesty's 
ships of war do detain and bring into port all merchant 
ships and vessels bearing the flag of the Netherlands ; but 
that the utmost care be taken for the preservation of all 
and every part of the cargoes on board any of the said 
ships or vessels, so that no damage or embezzlement what- 
ever be sustained, and the commanders of His Majesty's 
ships of war are hereby instructed to detain and bring into 
port every such ship and vessel accordingly.^ ' 

Notice of Blockade for British Besidents. 

' I have to acquaint you for the information of British 
subjects here, and such others as it may concern, that on 
the 10th inst. [January, 1837] I declared at Jamaica the 
whole coast of New Granada to be under blockade 
externally.^ ' 

* L, Q. November 7 and 9, 1832. 

■ B. S. P. 1837, * CorreBpondence between His Majesty's Government 
and the Government of New Granada respecting the imprisonment of 
Mr. Pro-Consul Russell at Panama,' p. 119. Dispatch, dated January 21, 
1837, Commodore Peyton to Mr. Consul KeUy. 


MEXICO, 1838 
French Official Notice of Blockade to OrecU Britain. 

' Earl Granville, Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, has 
transmitted to Viscount Palmerston, Her Majesty's Principal 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, an official letter (of 
which the following is a translation), which has been addressed 
to Earl Granville by the Count M0I6, French Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, notifying the establishment of a blockade 
of the ports of Mexico, against all vessels, except British 
packet boats employed in the conveyance of the mails :— 

* (Translation) 
' My Lord, 

' The Mexican Gro vemment having refused to redress the 
numerous grievances for which the Minister Plenipotentiary 
of the King at Mexico had been directed to demand repara- 
tion, the commander of the French naval forces before 
Vera Cruz has found himself under the necessity of adopting, 
as by his instructions he was authorized to do, the measures 
which, in such a case, the dignity of France and the justice 
of its claims required. 

' Accordingly all the ports of Mexico have been declared 
to be in a state of blockade ; and this blockade, which 
became effective, as far as regards Vera Cruz, from the 
16th of April last, will, without delay, have taken effect 
in like manner with respect to the other ports of Mexico. 
In making known to you these measures, I hasten. My 
Lord, to add, that the orders given by the Government 
of the King for insuring the execution of them are so con- 
ceived as to reconcile the practical exercise of a legitimate 
right with the respect due to the independence of neutral 
flags, and with the sincere desire to cause the least possible 
inconvenience to the navigation of neutral vessels. Of this 
the Government of Her Brittanick Majesty wiU find a special 
proof in the measure which exempts British packet boats 
employed in the conveyance of correspondence from the 
appUcation of the rules of the blockade. This exemption 


has appeared to us to be an indirect consequence of the 
liberal principle sanctioned by the 13th article of the Post 
Office Convention of 14th June, 1833, which authorizes the 
continuation of the Post Office arrangements between the 
two countries, even in case of war. 

' I request you to be so good as to convey the present 
notification to the knowledge of the Government of Her 
Brittanick Majesty. 

* (signed) Mole. 

'Paris, June 1, 1838.' ^ 

French Official Notice of Blockade to the United Staies. 

' A Monsieur de Forsyth, ministre des affaires 6trangdres 
des fitats-Unis. Le gouvemement mexicain ayant rejfet6 
Fultimatum k lui adress6 le 21 mars dernier par le gouveme- 
ment du roi, dans un but de conciliation, I'ambassadeur 
de France, qui se trouve en ce moment k bord de la fr6gate 
VHerminiCy vient de me notifier ce refus ainsi que les mesures 
que le commandant de I'escadre fran9aise a cru devoir 
adopter. En consequence, tous les ports du Mexique sont 
d6clar6s en 6tat de blocus. En ce qui conceme la Vera 
Cruz, le blocus a commence k dater du 15 du mois dernier, 
et il est tr^ probable que depuis lors on I'aura etendu aux 
autres ports de la R6publique. Ainsi que vous le verrez 
par Textrait de la d6peche que m'a envoy6e le baron Def- 
faudis, les ordres donn^ au commandant Bazoche pour 
rex6cution de la tache qui lui est confi6e s'accordent par- 
faitement avec les principes Ub^raux que la France prof esse 
au sujet du blocus, et ces ordres sont con9us de maniere 
k preserver les vaisseaux neutres, et notamment ceux des 
£tats-Unis, de toutes restrictions et entraves qui ne seraient 
pas absolument indispensables k la realisation du but legitime 
que. se propose le gouvemement du roi.* ^ 

* L. O. June 5, 1838. 

' Bards, p. 33. M. de Pontois to. the Ametioan Govenunent. 


French Official Notice of Blockade to Oreai Britain. 
' Foreign Office, June 21, 1838. 

' A dispatch has been received at this office from Mr. 
Mandeville, Her Majesty's Minister at Buenos Ayres, stating 
that Rear-Admiral Le Blanc, Commander-in-Chief of the 
naval force of the King of the French on the coast of Brazil 
and in the South Seas, had declared the port of Buenos 
Ayres, and the whole of the rivers of the Argentine 
Republic, to be in a state of strict blockade by the French 
naval force. 

' The French Admiral had also declared that this blockade 
was to be strictly maintained, until the grounds of com- 
plaint upon which it was established should be removed ; 
but that the foreign merchant vessels then in the port or 
roads of Buenos Ayres should have permission to depart 
from thence until the 10th day of May following, from 
which time the blockade was to be general, and to extend 
equally to vessels entering or leaving the port. 

' The French Admiral had further informed Mr. Mandeville 
that Her Majesty's branch packets, conveying the mails 
between Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Ayres, would meet 
with no interruption from the blockading squadron, upon 
the condition that the Commanders of the said packets 
should declare, upon their word of honojac, that they are 
not bearers of any merchandize^ subject to Custom House 
duties. '2 

British Official Notice of Blockade. 
' It ia hereby notified that the Lords Commissionerd of 
the Admiralty have received a dispatch, dated the 19th day 
of June last, from Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Adam, K.C.B., 
Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty*s Naval Forces in North 
America, the West Indies, and seas adjoining, that he had 
* Sic. • L. Q. June 22, 1838. 



on the 17th of the same month, by virtue of the authority 
to him delegated, placed the port of San Juan de Nicaragua 
in a state of blockade ; and that he had issued a declaration 
to the following effect : — 

* I hereby declare the port of San Juan de Nicaragua, 
situated at the mouth of the river of that name, to be 
blockaded, and that all commercial intercourse with the said 
port shall be prevented and cease ; and whereas a sufficient 
force is stationed before the said port of San Juan de Nicar- 
agua to carry the blockade into effect : 

' I hereby give public notice of the same to all whom it 
may concern ; and that aU ships and vessels, under what- 
ever flag they may be, will be turned away and prevented 
from entering the said port of San Juan de Nicaragua ; and 
if, after any ship or vessel has been warned not to enter 
the said port, then and in that case any such ship or vessel 
that may attempt to break the blockade, will be seized 
and be dealt with according to the rules established for the 
breach of a de jacto blockade/^ 

British Oflicial Notice of Blockade. 

' It is hereby notified, that the Lords Commissioners of 
the Admiralty have received a dispatch, dated the 18th of 
May last, from Sir Charles Adam, K.C.B., Vice-Admiral 
of the White and Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's ships 
and vessels on the North American and West India station, 
and the seas adjacent, stating, that in virtue of authority 
duly conferred upon him, he has declared a blockade of the 
port of San Juan de Nicaragua ; and that the same was 
established on the 30th of March last. It is further notified-, 
that the measures sanctioned by the law of nations will 
be adopted and executed with respect to aU vessels and 
cargoes attempting to violate the said blockade.' ^ 

* L. Q, August 19, 1842. 
» L. O. June 11, 1844. 

NICARAGUA, 1844 163 

British Notice of Blockade to Nicaragua. 

' The Brittanic Majesty's Schooner Pickle, 

* St. Juan de Nicaragua, 23Td March, 1844. 

' Whereas it has come ^o my knowledge that dispatches 
from Her Brittanic Majesty's Vice-Consul at Realego for 
which I am here waiting, have been unlawfully detained 
since the 10th inst. at Grenada, and it having been further 
made known to me that officers and persons in the pay 
and service of the State of Nicaragua have aided and assisted 
at such unlawful detention, which I am bound to believe is 
without the sanction of His Excellency the Chief of the 

' And whereas I am weU assured that no other nation 
would any more than Great Britain herself give counten- 
ance to acts and deeds not considered lawful in civilized 
states, I do hereby give public notice to all whom it 
may concern that as long as the said dispatches are 
withheld from me I will not allow any intercourse whatso- 
ever with the Port of San Juan from seaward, and more- 
over I do hereby caU upon the Government officers in the 
State of Nicaragua to see that due protection is given to 
aU subjects and others in the interest or service of Great 
Britain, inasmuch as, though my intercourse with the Con- 
sular Office is cut off, I have ample means of making every 
aggression known to His Excellency the Chief of the State 
through my own Commander-in-Chief at Jamaica. 
' (signed) Joseph A. Bainbridgb, 

' Lieutenant and Senior Naval Officer. 

* To the Commandant Present, 
' San Juan de Nicaragua.' ^ 

British Notice of Blockade to a British Vessel. 

' Her Majesty's Schooner Pickle, 

' St. Juan de Nicaragua, 23rd March, 1844. 
' Whereas the State of Nicaragua has unlawfully detained 
important dispatches from the Vice-Consul of Her Brittanic 
^ P. R. 0. No. 5542. 


Majesty, for which I am here waiting, I do, in consequence, 
declare the Port of San Juan blockaded till such dispatches 
be delivered up to me, and I do hereby warn you the Com- 
mander of Santander that he is not to pass the Schooner 
imder my command, but is to anchor between her and Port 
Arenas, or to remain outside at his pleasure. 

' (signed) Joseph A. Bainbbidge, 
* Lieutenant and Senior Naval Officer Present.' ^ 

Renewed British Notice of Blockade to Nicaragtia. 

' I have hereby the honour to give Public Notice to the 
Commandant the Collector of Customs, the Merchants and 
Inhabitants of St. Juan de Nicaragua, that the said Port 
of St. Juan de Nicaragua is blockaded agreeably to instruc- 
tions from the Commander-in-Chief of Her Brittanic Majesty's 
Naval Forces in the West Indies and Seas adjacent, a copy 
of which I have * with the Commandant, who I request will 
use his best endeavours to make known to all persons resid- 
ing within the State of Nicaragua that their commercial 
intercourse with every nation from the Port of St. Juan 
has ceased, so that private individuals may not bring upon 
themselves unnecessary loss or inconvenience. 

' Dated on board Her Brittanic Majesty's Schooner Pickle, 
this 30th day of March, 1844. 

' (signed) Joseph A. Bainbbidge, 

' Lieutenant.' ' 

BriHah NoHce of Blockade to a Third State. 

' I have hereby the honour to give PubKc Notice to 
the officers of Government that* Merchants and Inhabitants 
of the State of Costa Bica that the Port of San Juan de 
Nicaragua in Central America is blockaded agreeable* to 
instructions from the Commander-in-Chief of Her Brittanic 
Majesty's Naval Forces in the West Indies and Seas adjacent, 
a copy of which I send herewith, and I caU on all influencial 

* P. R. 0. No. 6642. * Sic. • P. R. 0. No. 6642. * Sic. 

NICARAGUA, 1844 166 

Persons to make such Blockade generally known in order 
to prevent private individuals bringing upon themselves 
loss or inconvenience. 

' Dated on board Her Brittanic Majesty's Schooner Pickle^ 
this 30th day of March, 1844. 

^ (signed) Joseph A, Bainbbidgb 

* (Lieutenant). 
' To the Principal Secretary of the 
State of Costa Rica/ ^ 

British Notice of Blockade to the Vessel of a Third State. 

' I have hereby the honour to give Public Notice to aU 
ships and vessels to whatsoever nation belonging that the 
Port of San Juan de Nicaragua in Central America is 
blockaded agreeably to orders from the Commander-in-Chief 
of Her Brittanic Majesty's Naval Forces in the West Indies 
and Seas adjacent (a c<^y of which I send herewith), and 
further I do hereby warn the Commander of the Italian 
Bark San Joseph^ to whom this notification is delivered, 
that should he again appear off the said Port of San Juan de 
Nicaragua on any pretence whatever while the Blockade 
continues his Vessel will be seized and sent to a Vice- Admir- 
alty Court for adjudication. 

'In order to prevent as much as possible any loss or 
inconvenience to* the Inhabitants of neighbouring States 
I beg to call on all Commanders of Ships and Vessels to 
make known wherever they may go that at present their ^ 
is no commercial intercourse between the Port of San Juan 
de Nicaragua and any other part of the world. 

' Dated on Board Her Brittanic Majesty's Schooner Pickle^ 
at San Juan de Nicaragua, this 30th day of March, 1844. 
' (signed) Joseph A. Bainbridgb 

' (Lieutenant).'^ 

* P. R. O. No. 5542. * Sic. • P. R. O. No. 5542. 


British Official Notice of Blockade of Buceo. 

* It is hereby notified that a strict and rigorous blockade 
of the port of Buceo was established and maintained by 
Her Majesty's naval forces on the east coast of South America 
under the command of Bear-Admiral Inglefield, acting in 
conjunction with the naval forces of the King of the French, 
under the command of Rear-Admiral Lain6, on the 1st of 
August last ; but that neutral vessels were, nevertheless, 
permitted to quit the said port until the 12th day of the 
same month of August. 

' It is also hereby further notified, that a strict and rigorous 
blockade has been established and maintained by the same 
British and French naval forces, of all the other parts of the 
Oriental Republick, occupied by troops under the command 
of General Oribe : and that all the measures authorized by 
the Law of Nations, and the respective Treaties between Her 
Majesty and other Powers, will be adopted and executed with 
regard to all vessels attempting to violate the said blockade.' ^ 

British Official Notice of Blockade of Buenos Ayres. 
' It is hereby notified that the Right Honourable the Earl 
of Aberdeen, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, has received dispatches from Mr. Turner, 
Her Majesty's Charg6 d'Affaires at Monte Video, dated the 
24th of September last, and from Mr. Ouseley, Her Majesty's 
Minister Plenipotentiary accredited to the Argentine Re- 
public, dated the 31st day of October last, announcing that 
a blockade of the ports and coast of the province of Buenos 
Ayres was established, on the 24th of the said month of 
September, by the vessels of the British and French squadrons ; 
that the term of fifteen days had been granted for the 
departure of neutral vessels from the port of Buenos Ayres ; 
and that the Ck>mmanders of the blockading forces had been 
authorized farther to extend that term to the 31st of the 
said month of October .^ ' 

* X. Q, October 31, 1846. • L. O. December 26, 18-16. 


British Official Notice of Blockade to the Blockaded Staie, 
* (TraduccWn) 

' EI abajo firmado, Encargado de Negocios de S.M.B., tiene 
el honor de anunciar 4 S.E. D. Santiago Vazquez, Ministro 
de Gobiemo y Relaciones Esteriores, que en oonformidad 
de una declaraci6n que los Plenipotenciarios de las Potencias 
Mediadoras dirijieron al Gobiemo de Buenos Ayres el 18 dd 
presenti y que le fue entregada el 20, empeziixan a bloquear 
los Puertos y las Coslas de la Provincia de Buenos Ayres 
por las Escuadras Inglesa y Fraucesa, el dia manana 24 del 

' Se ha concedido el t^rmino de quince dias para la salida 
de las embarcaciones neutrales del puerto de Buenos Ayres ; 
y el Ck>mandante de la fuerza bloqueadora estd autorizado, 
en caso necesario, para prorrogar aquel t^rmino hasta el 
24 del prdximo Octubre, 

' El abajo firmado aprovecha esta oportunidad para re- 
novar k S.E. D. Santiago Vazquez las seguridades de su mds 
distinguida consideraci6n. 

' M. v., Setiembre 23 de 1846. 

'Adolfo Tttrner. 

'^.S.E. el Sr. D. Santiago Vazquez, Ministro de Negocios 
Estranjeros.' ^ 

GREECE, 1860 
British Notice of Blockade to the Blockaded State. 

'Athens, January 24, 1860. 

' I am instructed by the Right Honourable Thomas 
Wyse to inform you that the Commander-in-Chief of Her 
Majesty's Naval Forces, acting in obedience to the instruc- 
tions of Her Brittan'c Majesty's Government, and in concert 
with the Right Honourable Thomas Wyse, Her Brittanic 
Majesty's Representative, deems it necessary to extend to 
Greek merchant vessels the prohibition to put to sea, which 

* Bustamente, Los einco errores capUcUea de la IrUervencidn Anglo- 
Francesa en d Plata (Monte Video, 1849), p. 89. 


from an anxious desire not to injure Greek commerce, has 
up to this moment been limited to vessels belonging to the 
Greek Government. I am therefore to annoimce to you 
that no Greek vessel can be allowed to quit a Greek port 
unless previously chartered to carry a cargo or part of a 
cargo belonging to foreign merchants. Such vessels will be 
allowed to put to sea ; but this exception cannot be applied 
to any Greek vessel chartered by foreign merchants after 
the present communication. 
'This measure in no way affects foreign vessels of any 


'I have, &o. 

' (signed) John Green, 
' Her Brittanic Majesty's Consul.' ^ 

British Notice of Blockade to Third States. 

'Athens, January 24, 1860. 

' I am instructed by the Right Honourable Thomas 
Wyse to inform my coUeagues, that the Commander-in- 
Chief of Her Majesty's Naval Forces, acting in obedience to 
the instructions of Her Brittanic Majesty's Government, and 
in concert with Her Brittanic Majesty's Representative, 
deems it necessary to extend to Greek merchant vessels the 
prohibition to put to sea, which from an anxious desire not 
to injure Greek commerce, has up to this moment been 
limited to vessels belonging to the Greek Government. 

' I have, therefore, to announce to you that henceforward 
the Commander-in-Chief of Her Brittanic Majesty's Naval 
Forces will not permit any Greek vessel to quit a Greek 
port. Nevertheless any Greek vessel having been chartered 
previous to the present communication, to carry a cargo 
or part of a cargo belonging to foreign merchants, will be 
allowed to put to sea ; but this exception cannot be applied 
to any Greek vessel chartered by foreign merchants after 
the communication of this notice. 

^ B. S. P. 1850, * Farther Correspondence respecting the demands made 
upon the Greek Government' (bound in voL Ivi at p. 407), p. 46. Consul 
Green to the Local Authorities at the Piraeus. 

GREECE, 1860 169 

' The above measure in no way affects foreign vessels of 
any description, but it is exclusively confined to vessels 
under the Greek flag. 

'I have, &c., 

' (signed) John Greek, 
* Her Brittanic Majesty's Consul.' ^ 

Further British Notice of Blockade to the Blockaded State, 
' (Translation) 

' Syra, January J4> I860. 
' M. LB Prefbt, 

* I have received from His Excellency the Minister of 
Her Brittanic Majesty to His Majesty the King of Greece, 
orders to announce to you that Admiral Sir William Parker 
has desired the commanders of the British Navy not to 
aUow, from this day fwward, any Greek vessel to leave the 
port of Syra until the demands of the English Government 
shall have been acceded to by the Hellenic Government. 

'Accept, &e. 
' (signed) Richard Wzlkinson.' ^ 

Further British Notice of Blockade to Third States. 
' (Translation) 

' Syra, January 30, 1850. 

' His Excellency Admiral Sir WilKam Parker, com- 
manding Her Brittanic Majesty's naval forces, having 
ordered the commanders of the Royal British Marine not 
to permit any Greek vessel to sail from a Greek port, I have 
received orders from His Excellency the Minister of Her 
Brittanic Majesty to His Hellenic Majesty the King of 
Greece, to inform you that this measure does not in any 

^ B. S. P. 1850, op. cit., pp. 46-7. Consnl Oreento the ccmsuIaT body at 
Athens. This circular was sent to the consul-generals and consuls of Russia, 
France, Borne, Sweden, Sardinia, Belgium, Netherlands, Spain, Austria, 
Bavaria, Tuscany, the Two Sicilies, and the United States of America : 
there did not appear to be any Turkish or Prussian consular authority. 

' Ibid., p. 101. Consul Wilkinson to the Nomarch of the Cyclades. 


way interfere with vessels of other Powers, nor even with 
such Greek vessels as may have been already chartered by 
foreign merchants ; but this exemption will not be granted 
to any Greek ships after the present communication. 

' All Greek vessels having on board goods belonging partly 
or wholly to foreign merchants will be permitted to disem- 
bark them in Greek ports, the merchant being bound to 
produce proof of his property therein. 

* I have, &c. 
' (signed) Richard Wilkinson.' ^ 

Notice of Blockade to Great Britain. 

* Naples, October 6, I860. 
' It being necessary for us that supplies of artillery, arms 
and ammunition should be prevented from reaching the 
citadel of Messina and the fort of Gaeta, the Dictatorial 
Government has ordered that the above-mentioned places 
should be placed in a state of effective blockade in accord- 
ance with the principles established by the Treaty of Paris 
of 1866. 

' He 2 therefore declares that orders have been given that 
from eight days from the present date the said blockade 
should begin and that cruisers of warships' should watch 
the shores adjacent to Messina and Gaeta to prevent the 
introduction of war stores, arms and all other articles of war. 
' The imdersigned, &c., hastens to inform His Excellency 
Mr. Elliot of the above-mentioned resolution for the pro- 
tection of commerce and avails, &c. 

^(signed) F. Crispi.'^ 

^ B. S. P. 1860, op. cit., p. 102. Consul Wilkinson to the consular body 
at Syra. 

• Sic. 

' B. S. P. 1861, ' Fnither Correspondence relating to the Affairs of 
Italy presented to the House of Lords by command of Her Majesty in 
pursuance of their Address dated March 1, 1861,' p. i5« 

GAETA AND MESSINA, 1860-1 171 

Renewed Notice of Blockade to Oreat Britain. 
' It is hereby notified that the Right Honourable the 
Lord John Russell, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, has received from his Excellency 
the Marquis d'Azeglio, the Sardinian Minister in London, the 
following official communication : — 

' (Translation) 

' The squadron of His Majesty the King having, with 
a sufficient number of vessels to render it eflfective, estab- 
lished the blockade of the fortress of Gaeta, commencing 
from the 20th of January last, the Undersigned Envoy 
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty 
the King of Sardinia, has the honour officially to inform his 
Excellency Lord John Russell, Principal Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs of Her Brittanick Majesty, thereof. 

' In executing the instructions of his Government on this 
subject, the Undersigned hastens moreover to bring to the 
knowledge of his Excellency that the declaration of the 
Congress of Paris, of the 16th of April, 1866, with respect 
to the interests of Neutral Powers, will be put in practice. 

' The Undersigned begs his Excellency to accept the 
expression of his highest consideration. 

' (signed) V. E. D'Azeglio. 

'London, February 4, 1861. 
' 23, Park Lane.'i 

FORMOSA, 1884-5 
French Official Notice of Blockade to Oreat Britain. 
* Foreign Office, October 23, 1884. 
' It is hereby notified that the Right Honourable Earl 
Granville, K.G., Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State 
for Foreign AflFairs, has this day received an official com- 
munication from the French Ambassador at this Court, 
* B. S. P. 1861, op. cit., p. 22, and L, 0. February 8, 1861. 


announcing that the ports and roadsteads of the North 
and of the West coasts of the Island of Formosa will be 
placed in a state of blockade from this day, and that a delay 
of three days will be given to friendly vessels to complete 
their cargoes and to quit the places under blockade. 

' It is further notified that a Telegram has also been this 
day received from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris 
stating that the following Notice appeared in the Journal 
Officiel of this morning, and that a copy of it had been 
communicated to His Excellency by the Rrench Minister for 
Foreign Affairs * — 

' Notification du Elocua du Littorcd de VIU Formose. 

' Nous soussign6, vice-amiral commandant en chef les 
forces navales fran9aises dans TExtreme-Orient, agissant 
en vertu des pouvoirs qui nous appartiennent, d^claronsqu a 
partir du 23 Octobre 1884, tons les ports et rades de Tile 
de Formose compris entre le cap sud ou cap Nan-Sha et la 
baie de Soo-Au, en passant par I'ouest et le nord, seront 
tenus en etat de blocus efifectif par les forces navales sous 
notre commandement, et que les batiments amis auront 
un delai de trois jours pour achever leur chargement et 
quitter les lieux bloqu^s. H sera proc6d6 contre tout 
batiment qui tenterait de violer le dit blocus, conf orm^ment 
aux lois intemationales et aux trait6s en vigueur* 

* A bord du cuirass6 fran9ais Bayard, le 20 Octobre, 1884. 

' Sign6 : Courbbt. 

' (Translation) 

' NotifiAxUion of the Blockade of the Coast of the Island of 


' We, the undersigned, Vice-Admiral Commander-in-Chief 
of the French Naval Forces in the Far East, acting in 
virtue of the powers which belong to us, declare, that, 
commencing on the 23rd of October, 1884, all the ports and 
roadsteads of the Island of Formosa included between 
South Cape or Cape Nan-sha and the Soo-au Bay, passing 

FORMOSA, 1884 173 

west and north (the situation of these points being : the 
iSrst in 21°56'ja»<)h lat. and ii^^-dO' long, east of Paris 
and the second in 24° 30' north lat. and 119° 33' long, east 
of Paris), will be maintained in a state of effective blockade 
by the naval forces placed under our command, and that 
friendly ships will be allowed a delay of three days to effect 
their loading and to leave the blockaded places. Any ship 
attempting to violate the above-mentioned blockade will 
be proceeded against in conformity with International law 
and the treaties in force. 

' On board the Fr^ich ironclad Bayard, October 20, 1884. 

' (signed) Courbbt.' ^ 

Further French Official Notice to Oreat Britain. 

* ' It is hereby notified for public information that it has 
been announced to Her Majesty's Government by the 
Government of the French Republic that it is their inten- 
tion to exercise during the continuance of the present 
hostilities between France and China the rights of bel- 
ligerents which are recognized by the law of nations, 
including the right to search neutral vessels on the high 
seas for contraband of war.' * 

GREECE, 1886 
British Officiai Notice of Blockade. 

'It is hereby nertified that the Earl of Rosebery, Her 
Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Forei^ Affairs, 
has received a telegraphic Dispatch from Her Majesty's 
Charg6 d' Affaires at Athens, dated May 8, 1886, reporting 
that the Representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, 
Great Britain, Italy and Russia dehvered on that day to 
the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs a Declaration, of 
which the following is a translation : — : 

*" L. G. October 24, 1884; Journal Officid, Octoher 23, 1884 ; B. S. P. 
1886, Praace, No. 1, p. 2. / 

• L. 0. February 13, 1886 ; B. S. P. IS^, France, No. 1, p. 11. 


' The undersigned, Representatives of Germany, Austria, 
Great Britain, Italy and Russia, are directed by their re- 
spective Governments to make the following communication 
to the Cabinet of Athens : 

' The reply of the Cabinet of Athens to the Collective 
Note of the 26th of April, not being of a nature to satisfy 
the Powers, the above-mentioned Governments have given 
orders to the Commanders of their united squadrons to 
establish a blockade of the Coasts of Greece against all 
ships under the Greek flag. 

' This blockade will become effective from the date of the 
present declaration. It will extend from Cape Malea to 
Cape Colonna, and from thence to the northern frontier of 
Greece, including the Island of Euboea, and will also include 
on the west coast the entrance to the Gulf of Corinth. Any 
ship under the Greek flag which may endeavour to violate 
this blockade will render itself liable to detention.'^ 

(Signatures follow.) 

ZANZIBAR, 1888-9 
Declaration of Blockade by British and Oerman Admirals. 
' In accordance with instructions received from our re- 
spective Governments, and in the name of His Highness 
the Sultan of Zanzibar, we, the Admirals commanding the 
British and German squadrons, hereby declare a blockade 
against the importation of munitions of war and the exporta- 
tion of slaves only, on the continuous line of coast of Zanzi- 
bar, including the islands of Mafia and Lamu and the lesser 
islands adjoining the coast from 10*^ 28' south to 2^ 10' south 

'The blockade will be in force from noon on the 2nd 
December, 1888. 

' (signed) E. R. Prbmantlb, British Rear-Admiral, 

' Commander in Chief, East Indies Station. 
'Deinhard, German Rear- Admiral, 

'Commanding Flying Squadron. 
» L. 0. May 14, 1886. 

ZANZIBAR, 1888-9 175 

' Notice. 

' All ships, to whatever nation they may belong, are liable 
to visit and search ; they should " bring to ' and lower 
their sails immediately on a blank charge being fired. 
Should they not do so a warning shot wiU be fired across 
their bows, after which they will be treated as hostile. 

' Vessels engaged in ordinary trade wiU be allowed to 
continue their voyage after having been visited. 

' Dated at Zanzibar this 29th day of November, 1888. 

' (signed) E. R. Frbmantlb. 

British Official Notice of Blockade, 

' It is hereby notified that the Marquis of Salisbury, K.G., 
Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, has to-day received a Telegram from Colonel Euan- 
Smith, Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Zanzibar, 
stating that a Proclamation of Blockade of the continuous 
line of Continental Coast of the Sultan of Zanzibar, including 
the Islands of Mafia and Lamu, and the lesser Islands 
adjoining the Coast from 2^ 10' South Latitude to 10^ 28' 
South Latitude, had been issued on the 29th of November, 
the Blockade to commence at noon of the 2nd of December.' ^ 

Oerman Official Circular to Oerman Representatives Abroad for 
communication to the States to which they were accredited. 

' (Translation) 

' Foreign Office, Berlin, 1888. 
',The German Settlements established under Treaties with 
the Sultan on the coasts of the territory of Zanzibar, having 
been attacked by armed bands of insurgents living in the 
Sultan's territory, and in the neighbouring territory, under 
the leadership of slave dealers of the region, the Government 
of His Majesty the Emperor has thought it necessary to 
establish a blockade of the coasts in question, and an under- 

* B. S. P. 1889, Africa, No. 1, p. 12. 

* L, G. December 4, 1888. 


standing having been come to with the Government of Her 
Brittanic Majesty, the blockade has been declared by the 
Commanders of the German and the British squadrons in 
those waters. 

' The Undersigned has the honom- to transmit to 

the accompanying copy of this Declaration, published in 
the Imperial Oazette of the 4th instant, and to request that 
the same may be brought to the knowledge of those inter- 

' Copy enclosed. 
* Notification. 
' (Translation) 

' Zanzibar, November 30, 1888. 
' By command of our Governments, and in the name of 
EUs Highness the Sultan of Zanzibar, we, the Admirals 
commanding the German and English squadrons, hereby 
announce the blockade of the uninterrupted coast of the 
territory of the Sultan of Zanzibar, including the islands 
of Mafia, Lamu and other smaller islands near the coast 
between 10° 28' and 2"* 10' of south latitude. 

' The blockade is, however, only directed against the 
importation of material of war and the exportation of 
slaves. The blockade will come into force at noon on the 
2nd instant. 

(signed) Deinhabd. 

' Frbmantlb.' ^ 

Portuguese Official Notice of Blockade. 

' The Minister for Marine and Colonial Affairs to the 
Governor-General of Mozambique. 
' (Telegraphic) 
' Lisbon, December 6, 1888. 4.40 p.m. 
' Article 1. The import, export, re-export and sale of 
arms and aU munitions of war are prohibited, provisionally, 
in the districts of Cape Delgado, Mozambique, Angoche, 
Quilimane, Sofala and Inhambane. 

' B. S. P. Africa, No. 10 (1888), p. 102. Letter, Count Hatzfeldt to the 
Marquess of Salisbury, enclosing circular. 

ZANZIBAR, 1888-9 177 

' Article 2. All arms and munitions of war now m deposit 
in the Custom-Houses of the above-mentioned districts may 
be exported or re-exported to any ports excepting those of 
East Africa, national or foreign, north of Loren90 Marques. 

' Article 3. All the ports, bays and creeks of the East 
African coast as well as of the adjacent islands, between 
the mouth of the Bovuma in 10° 28^ south latitude, and 
the south entrance to Pomba Bay in 12° 68' south latitude, 
are hereby declared to be in a state of blockade by Portu- 
guese vessels of war, so far as relates to the import of arms 
and munitions of war and the export of slaves. 

' Article 4. This decree is to be enforced in the districts 
of Mozambique at once, and in the remaining districts of 
the province immediately notice of it is received from the 
seat of Government, from whence it is to be dispatched by 
the most rapid means. 

' Article 6. All legislation to the contrary is revoked. 

' (signed) The Minister.'^ 

Further Portiiguese Official Notice of Blockade. 

' Lisbon, December 17, 1888. 3.60 p.m. 
' Decree of the 22nd extends to Loren9o Marques the 
provisions of the Decree of the 6th respecting the trade in 
arms.' ^ 

Italian Official Notice of Blockade. 

* Ministry for Foreign AflFairs. 
* It is hereby notified that on the 5th inst. a telegram 
was received at this office from Signor Cechi, His Majesty's 
Consul and His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary, announcing 
that the Commander of His Majesty's ship Dogali had that 
day declared a blockade of the East Coast of the Sultanate 
of Zanzibar, between Cape Delgado and Witu, including the 

* B. S. P. Africa, No. 1 (1889), p. 16. Extract from Boletim Official of 
December 8, 1888. Also B. S. P. Africa, No. 10 (1888), pp. 103-4. Extract 
from the Diario do Oovemo of December 7, 1888, from Lisbon. 

* B. S. P. 1889, Africa, No. 1, p. 35. Extract from Boletim OffUiai of 
December 29, 1888. 



islands of Mafia and Lamu and the smaller islands adjacent 
to the coast, from 2"* 10' to 10"* 28' of south latitude. 

' The effects of the blockade are limited to the prohibition 
of the trade in slaves and arms and munitions of war. 

' The blockade declared by the Oerman and English 
squadrons was put in effect by the squadrons in question 
at Midday on the 2nd December, and by His Majesty's 
ship Dogaii immediately after the declaration thereof by the 
Commander of that ship. 

' Rome, December 19, 1888.' ^ 

Sultan's Official Proclamation of Blockade, 
* (Translation) 
' Proclamation from His Highness the Sultan Syed Khalifa, 
Sultan of Zanzibar, to all the Walis, Dewans, Akeedas, the 
Elders and others of His Highness' subjects. 

* Let it be known to all men that we have prohibited 
every one from trading in powder, arms, and munitions of 
war on account of the disturbances which have arisen on 
the mainland ; furthermore we also prohibited [sic] the 
Slave Trade ; no one of our subjects may deal in slaves or 
munitions of war. 

* Now we declare positively that if any one is found 
transgressing this our Proclamation, his property will be 
confiscated and he will be punished and imprisoned for 
six months and will be deported from our dominions. He 
will receive such rigorous pimishment that he will not be 
able to bear it. 

' The Governments of Great Britain and Germany have 
now arranged, with our consent, to establish a naval block- 
ade on our coast, in order that the above objects may be 
more fully attained, and in order to break the power of the 
insurgents and restore our authority* 

' Be it known to all men that the blockade is done with 
our full consent and sanction ; and that it will be directed 
against vessels carrying flags of all nations, but only against 

^ B. S. P. 1889, Africa, No. 1, p. 18. Extract from the Official Gazette 
of the Kingdom of Italy of December 19, 1888. 

ZANZIBAR, 1888-9 179 

the Trade in Slaves, and arms and munitions of war. Or- 
dinary commerce will in no way be interfered with. 

' [Seal of His Highness the Sultan of Zanzibar].' ^ 

Further Declaration of the British and Oerman Admirals. 

' By authority of His Highness the Sultan the Admirals 
commanding the British and German squadrons are em- 
powered to board and search every vessel or boat belonging 
to any of His Highness' subjects in the territorial waters of 
Zanzibar and Pemba for the purpose of putting a stop to 
the transport of arms, slaves, and munitions of war that 
are intended for trade, and their power to search Arab 
dhows has been extended by permission of the French 
Government to dhows flying the French flag. 

* 2. By territorial waters of Zanzibar and Pemba we 
understand : — 

' (a) The channel of Zanzibar which is limited to the 
northward by the latitude of 6° 40' south, and to the south- 
ward by a line ENE. from Bas-Kankadya. 

' The channel of Zanzibar is looked upon as a territorial 
water, as the coasts on both sides belong to the same Sove- 
reign and one is already under blockade. 

' In other parts of Zanzibar islands and as regards the 
Island of Pemba, which is already under search and visita- 
tion, the territorial waters are limited to five miles (gunshot 
of modem guns) from the shore, as well as bays and inlets. 
' As regards Zanzibar, the search in territorial waters will 
commence from noon of the 4th March, 1889. 
' (signed) E. R. Fbbmantlb, 

* Bear-Admiral and C!ommander-in- 
Chief British Squadron East 
Indies Station. 
' Deinhabd, 

' Bear-Admiral, Commanding the 
German Flying Squadron.^ 

* March 1, 1889.' 

' B. S. P. Africa, No. 1, 1889, p. 9. * Ibid., p. 65. 

M 2 


SIAM, 1893 
First Declaration of Blockade. 

' On Board the For fait, July 26, 1893. 

' We the undersigned * Capitaine de Vaisseau ', Senior 
Officer of the men-of-war now employed in the Gulf of 
Slam, acting under the orders of the Bear-Admiral, Com- 
mander-in-Chief of the Eastern Squadron, and in virtue of 
the powers vested in him, hereby declare that on the 26th 
July, 1893, at 5 p.m., all the ports in the roadsteads on the 
coast and the Siamese islands between Point Chulai and 
Point Lem £j*abang to the northward (these points, the 
first 13^ 3^ north and 97^ 43^ east Paris meridian ; the second 
13^ 6' north, 98*' 31' east Paris meridian) will be eflfectively 
blockaded by the naval forces under our orders, and the 
friendly ships will have three days' grace to leave the 
blockaded ports. 

' Proceedings will be taken against all vessels attempting 
to violate the blockade, in accordance with International 
Law and the Treaties in force. 

' Given on board the cruizer Forfait anchored off the bar 
at Bangkok. 

' (signed) A. Rbculoux.' ^ 

Second Declaration of Blockade, 

* We the undersigned Bear-Admiral Humann, Com- 
mander-in-Chief of the French naval forces in the Extreme 
East, in view of the state of reprisals existing between 
France and Siam, acting in virtue of the powers that pertain 
to us, declare : — 

' That from the 29th July, 1893, the coasts and ports of 
Siam comprised : 

* 1. Between Point Chulai, latitude 13° 2' north, longitude 
97° 43' east, and Point Lem Krabang, latitude 13° 5' north, 
longitude 98° 31' east ; 

' 2. Between the south point of Ko-samit Island, latitude 
' B. S. P. 1894, Siam, No. 1, p. 159, as there translated. 

SIAM, 1893 181 

12'' 31' north, longitude 99° 6' east, and Point Lem Ling, 
latitude 12° 11' north, longitude 93° 68' east ; 
will be held in a state of eflFective blockade by the naval 
forces placed under our command, and that friendly ships 
or neutrals will have a delay of three days to complete their 
loading and quit the blockaded places. 

' The limits of the blockade will extend — 

' 1. For the first blockaded zone, to a line joining Point 
Chulai (before described) to Point Lem Krabang (before 

* 2. For the second blockaded zone, to a line joining the 
point of Ko-samit Island (before described)to Point Lem Ling 
(before described). 

' Proceedings will be taken against all ships which attempt 
to violate the said blockade, conformably to International 
Law and to Treaties in force with neutral powers. 

' On board the Triomphante, French armoured cruizer, at 
Koh-si-Chang, the 29th July, 1893. 

' (signed) Humann.'^ 

* From the orders of my Government. 

' The blockade arrangements which concern days of 
departure are equally applicable to ships of war as to mer- 
chant ships . . . the provisional act of notification made by 
Captain Beculoux is proved to be annulled, in fact, by this 
that I have the honour to succeed it with.' ^ 

French Notice to Third States, 

' Bear-Admiral Humann, Commander-in-Chief of the 
naval division in the Far East, to the Chevalier Keun de 
Sloogerwoerd, Consul-Oeneral of Holland, in charge of 
French interests at Bangkok. 
' M. LB Chevalier, 

' With a view to reconcile as far as possible the exi- 
gencies of the present situation with my strong desire to 

* B. S. P. 1894, Siam, No. 1, p. 168. 

' Ibid., p. 167. Extract from the letter covering the previous notice of 
Bear-Admiral Humann to Captain MacLeod. 


be agreeable to the Consular and Diplomatic Corps, and 
also not to interrupt entirely the relations of European 
commerce at Bangkok with the outside world, I have 
ordered the cruizers which are guarding the line of blockade 
to allow mail steamers from Europe to approach as near 
as the anchorage of Koh-si-Chang, where they will have to 
hand over their mails to the French Minister, who is willing 
to undertake to have them transmitted to you by the 
quickest means. 

' I should be grateful, M. le Chevalier, if you would be 
so good as to bring this decision to the knowledge of your 
colleagues, and accept, &;c. 

' (signed) Humann. 

' La Triomphante at Koh-si-Chang, 
' August 1st, 1893.' 1 

CRETE, 1897 
British Official Notice of Blockade. 

' It is hereby notified that the Marquess of Salisbury, K.G., 
Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, has received a Telegraphic Dispatch from Rear- 
Admiral Harris, Commanding Her Majesty's Naval Forces in 
Cretan Waters, addressed to the Lords Commissioners of 
the Admiralty, and dated the I8th of March, announcing 
that the Admirals in command of the British, Austro- 
Hungarian, French, German, Italian and Russian Naval 
Forces have decided to put the Island of Crete in a state 
of Blockade, commencing 21st of March, 8 a.m. 

' The Blockade will be general for all ships under the 
Greek flag. 

' Ships of the Six Powers or Neutral Powers may enter 
into the ports occupied by the Powers and land their mer- 
chandize, but only if it is not for the Greek troops or the 
interior of the Island. These ships may be visited by the 
ships of the International Fleets. 

* B. S. P. 1894, Siam, No. 1, p. 174. 

CRETE, 1897 183 

' The limits of the Blockade are comprised between 
23^ 24' and 26° 30' longitude East of Greenwich and 35° 48' 
and 34° 45' North latitude.' ^ 

VENEZUELA, 1902-3 
British Official Notice of Blockade. 

' It is hereby notified that as the United States of Vene- 
zuela have failed to comply with the demands of HisMajesty's 
Government, a blockade by His Majesty's naval forces of 
the ports of La Guayra, Carenero, Guanta, Cumana, Caru- 
pano and the mouths of the Orinoco is declared and such 
blockade will be effectively maintained from and after the 
20th day of December subject to an allowance of the follow- 
ing days of grace : For vessels sailing before the date of 
this notification from West Indian ports and from ports on 
the East coasts of the C!ontinent of America ten days for 
steamers and twenty days for sailing vessels ; from all 
other ports twenty days for steamers and forty days for 
sailing vessels. For vessels lying in ports now declared to 
be blockaded, fifteen days. Vessels which attempt to 
violate the blockade will render themselves liable to all 
measures authorized by the law of nations and the respective 
treaties between His Majesty and the different neutral 
powers.' ^ 

» L, 0. March 20, 1897. * L. 0. December 20, 1902. 




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